VZCZCXRO6655
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #1211/01 2130855
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010855Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9080
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1171
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001211 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SWCI AND EUR/SCE 
DOJ FOR ALEXANDRE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY 
TAGS: ICTY GPGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: SWCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S VISIT TO BELGRADE 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Rod Moore, reasons 1.4 (b,c,d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (c)  S/WCI Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues 
Clint Williamson told the senior GoS leadership that we are 
eager to see Serbia integrate into Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, but that we needed to see results on Mladic and 
ICTY cooperation first.  Calling the GOS' Action Plan on ICTY 
a good starting point (as a "statement of intent"), he urged 
the GoS to incorporate into the implementation of its Plan 
the eleven USG recommendations on ICTY. PM Kostunica voiced a 
strong commitment to "complete" ICTY cooperation.  The GOS 
has already taken initial procedural steps to implement its 
new Action Plan, but much work remains to be done before it 
can be judged credible and effective.  Ambassador Williamson 
called on Serbian law enforcement and judicial authorities to 
be more pro-active in investigating new war crimes cases and 
exhorted them to bring justice in the Bytyqi brothers case. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (c)  S/WCI Ambassador Clint WilliamsQs visit to 
Belgrade July 26-28 included separate meetings with every key 
plQ in the ICTY portfolio - PM Kostunica, President Tadic, 
FONMIN Draskovic,QFMIN Stankovic (with VBA chief Kovac 
alongside), MININT Jocic, BIA chief Rade Bulatovic, and DPM 
Dulic-Markovic.  He also met with Rasim Ljajic and War Crimes 
Prosecutor Vladimir Vukcevic in their new positions as 
coordinators for the GoS Action Plan.  The Ambassador also 
toured the Special Court and met with key officials involved 
in the Bytyqi brothers' murder case.  Media coverage of the 
visit was generally positive, carrying Ambassador 
Williamson's messages about our desire to assist Serbia and 
the need to implement the Action Plan. 
 
KEY MESSAGES 
 
¶3.  (c)  Ambassador Williamson conveyed five key messages to 
senior officials regarding ICTY cooperation.  He reassured 
the leadership of the USG's strong interest in helping Serbia 
integrate into the EU and NATO, emphasizing that transferring 
Mladic to the ICTY is a key obstacle to progress in these 
processes.  He noted that he was encouraged by the GOS' 
progress on transferring 16 indictees to the Hague in 2005, 
but stressed the need for all sides to move beyond combative 
rhetoric and start building productive, professional working 
relationships to finish with Mladic.  He welcomed the Action 
Plan as a good statement of intent for the GoS, but cautioned 
that the international community would expect to see strong 
and concrete operational implementation measures.  One key 
component, he stressed, would be an aggressive media campaign 
to reshape public opinion and change the terms of the debate 
about Mladic - i.e., to stop characterizing ICTY cooperation 
as sacrificing a hero in exchange for EU membership, and to 
instead to show the public that the government believes ICTY 
cooperation is in the interest of Serbia as a modern and just 
democracy that promotes the rule of law.  Finally, he urged 
the GOS to incorporate the USG's recently-presented eleven 
recommendations into its operational plan for implementation 
of the Action Plan.  He noted that the USG recommendations 
had been positively received by ICTY and the EU. 
 
GOS REACTIONS 
 
¶4.  (c)  All of the GoS leadership welcomed Ambassador 
Williamson's visit and expressed willingness to work with us 
closely on the Mladic issue.  Kostunica was in surprisingly 
high spirits ) in marked contrast to his bitterness in the 
previous day's meetings with Ambassador Wisner on Kosovo 
status issues.  The PM assured Ambassador Williamson that the 
GoS is totally committed to finding Mladic, noting: "it is in 
our utmost interest to complete this."  Kostunica noted that 
the GoS's transfer of 16 PIFWCs in 2005 was proof of its 
commitment to cooperation.  In another signal of the GoS's 
commitment, Kostunica included war crimes prosecutor and 
operational coordinator for the Action Plan, Vladimir 
Vukcevic, in his meeting with Ambassador Williamson.  In a 
separate meeting, Ljajic told Ambassador Williamson he would 
not have agreed to take a key role in the Plan if he was not 
absolutely convinced the government was serious about 
finishing the job. 
 
¶5.  (c)  All the leadership voiced support for VukceQs 
 
BELGRADE 00001211  002 OF 003 
 
 
appointment, and officials responsible for operations (BIA 
chief Bulatovic, VBA chief Kovac, and MUP General Veljevic) 
all assured Ambassador Williamson they would support 
Vukcevic.  While Bulatovic acknowledged he had reservations 
about Vukcevic's qualifications to coordinate the effort, he 
pledged BIA operations would continue to approach the Mladic 
hunt with the utmost professionalism, and welcomed the GoS's 
commitment in the Action Plan to more closely coordinate the 
efforts of BIA, VBA, and MUP. 
 
ACTION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION 
 
¶6.  (c)  Jocic noted, and others later confirmed, that the 
GoS had already started putting in place the appropriate 
structure to implement the Action Plan.  Of note, the GoS had 
already delineated responsibilities - Rasim Ljajic will serve 
as the diplomatic/political coordinator for the Plan, and 
along with DPM Dulic-Markovic, Jocic, Stankovic, and others 
as necessary, will represent a sort of executive council for 
the Plan.  Vukcevic, meanwhile, will be the operational 
coordinator, in consultation with Bulatovic, Kovac, and 
Veljevic - each of whom, in turn, will establish separate 
operational teams that will carry out the "leg work" of the 
search effort.  Jocic told Ambassador Williamson, and Ljajic 
and Dulic-Markovic confirmed, that the political and 
operational coordinators had already held two meetings to set 
up these structures, and they expected the operational teams 
from each of the three services to have work plans completed 
by July 31.  Both Ljajic and Vukcevic will have regular 
meetings (at least weekly) separately with USG, EU, and ICTY 
officials to brief on GoS actions and share information. 
 
MEDIA PLAN 
 
¶7.  (c)  Ljajic will be in charge of developing the media 
plan, and wasted no time asking for help from the USG in 
creating a convincing plan.  Ambassador Williamson stressed 
to Ljajic and the rest of the leadership that personal 
involvement from the top-most ranks of the GoS ) including 
the PM - would be critical to public acceptance of the Action 
Plan itself and of the Government's commitment to capture 
Mladic.  He said it was not enough to tell the Serbian people 
that Mladic was a "box to check" to get into the EU.  Mladic 
would have to be de-mythologized so that average Serbs 
stopped viewing him as a martyr/hero and started viewing him 
as an indicted criminal and fugitive from justice. He noted 
the importance of portraying efforts to bring indicted 
fugitives to justice as the right thing to do in order to 
promote the rule of law and a just society.  Ambassador 
Williamson expressed confidence that, once the people started 
hearing this message consistently from the highest levels of 
the Serbian leadership, this would help to sway public 
opinion. 
 
¶8.  (c)  The USG recommendations were welcomed by Tadic, 
Draskovic, and Dulic-Markovic, all of whom have made 
statements in support of this approach in the past.  Ljajic, 
too, recognized the efficacy of such an approach, admitting 
also that the GoS would have to work to restore the 
confidence of the international community.  He admitted that 
GoS "errors in assessment" and "promises made too soon" had 
led to an atmosphere of distrust with ICTY, and that the GoS 
would now have to engage strongly to dispel this.  Kostunica 
did not comment on the leadership's role in the media plan, 
but he did acknowledge that the government would have to 
focus on reshaping public opinion, much as it had done in 
advance of the PIFWC transfers in 2005.  Kostunica advisor 
Vladeta Jankovic pointed to recent increased press attention 
on Mladic and his recent whereabouts as proof that the GoS 
had already started trying to reshape public opinion.  Jocic, 
meanwhile, expressed his opinion that there would likely 
not/not be any significant public backlash even if Mladic was 
apprehended "tomorrow." 
 
ELEVEN POINTS 
 
¶9.  (c)  Most officials ) some of whom had just seen the USG 
recommendations for the first time in their meetings with 
Ambassador Williamson ) expressed general support for our 
recommendations. DEFMIN Stankovic said he fully supported the 
recommendations on a first reading, while Draskovic, 
Dulic-Markovic and Tadic all expressed support for the key 
aims of the recommendations, noting especially the need for 
 
BELGRADE 00001211  003 OF 003 
 
 
Kostunica to take a leadership role in the media campaign. 
Tadic, in particular, told Ambassador Williamson he has been 
"listening every day" for Kostunica to take a public, 
personal stand on Mladic's arrest.  Kostunica took a more 
cautious approach to the USG recommendations, telling 
Ambassador Williamson the GoS will "go on with implementation 
of the Action Plan as presented and accepted by the ICTY," 
but allowing that they would "consider the proposals" 
presented in the paper. 
 
REGIONAL COOPERATION 
 
¶10.  (c) Several officials, including Ljajic, Dulic-Markovic 
and Vukcevic, expressed their desire for improved cooperation 
with neighboring countries for apprehending ICTY fugitives 
and for facilitating investigations and prosecutions of 
domestic war crimes cases.  They warmly welcomed Ambassador 
Williamson's proposed initiative to provide a regional 
liaison who would engage regional governments on a regular 
basis to failitate cooperation and information sharing among 
prosecutors, security an law enforcement services, an 
enhance cooperation with the ICTY. 
OTHER ISSUES:  DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS AND BYTYQI BROTHERS 
 
¶11.  (c)  In addition to his extensive meetings on Mladic and 
the Action Plan, Ambassador Williamson spent considerable 
time discussing domestic prosecutions, especially the Bytyqi 
brothers murder case, with officials in MUP and the Special 
Court for War Crimes.  Officials at all levels, including 
MININT Jocic, reiterated their commitment to solving the case 
) Jocic said it is his top priority after Mladic.  The 
minister and Investigative Judge Dilparic provided detailed 
updates on the case (to be provided SEPTEL), and Dilparic 
pledged to work closely with FBI agents assigned to the case 
in Washington.  Ambassador Williamson delivered copies of a 
Letter Rogatory asking for assistance in the case to Jocic, 
Dilparic, and Vukcevic, and advised that the formal Letter 
would arrive via official channels soon. 
 
¶12. (c)  Ambassador Williamson also took the opportunity to 
commend the work of the Special Court, and in particular the 
work of Vukcevic to successfully prosecute a number of 
high-profile cases.  He expressed his hope, both to Vukcevic 
and to MUP War Crimes unit chief Kostic in separate meetings, 
that the Court and the War Crimes unit in MUP would soon be 
in a position to take more aggressive action to initiate 
their own cases in addition to following up on cases handed 
over to them by other parties.  Kostic asserted his 
willingness to do so, noting only that severe resource 
constraints made it difficult to spread his unit too thin 
when priority cases still demanded the attention of all five 
of the investigators on his staff.  He said he would welcome 
any additional assistance the USG could provide in terms of 
office space, personnel funding, and equipment. 
 
¶13.  COMMENT:  This visit was timely, allowing Ambassador 
Williamson to convey the strong USG message that we view the 
Action Plan as only a first step and that we would need to 
see aggressive operational implementation of measures such as 
those contained in our 11-point recommendations in order to 
assess the GOS effort on Mladic as credible.  Some of the 
initial steps the GOS has taken are moderately encouraging. 
Still, these steps are largely procedural at this point, and 
we have seen no commitments yet to follow through on many of 
our key recommendations - including a direct, public role by 
the PM.  Moreover, we will have to keep a close eye on the 
functioning of the Action Team that will be in charge of the 
Mladic hunt.  Given the mutual suspicions between the 
security services, their general lack of confidence in 
Vukcevic, and the fact that the services will still 
apparently retain separate teams (i.e., not a standing task 
force), a special effort will be required to make this group 
produce results. 
 
¶14.  (u) Ambassador Williamson has cleared this message. 
MOORE