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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002826 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016 
TAGS: PREL ECON PGOV PTER LE SY IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  MODERATE SHI'A MP YASSINE JABER ON 
BLOCKADE, HIZBALLAH 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador.  Reason: 1.4 (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) The Lebanese economy, government and armed forces have 
been weakened by years of crisis and the recent armed 
conflict, according to moderate Shi'a MP Yassine Jaber. 
Lebanon's institutions are incapable of heading off the 
Hizballah threat without significant support from the 
international community and especially the USG.  Jaber, who 
may represent a significant strain of Lebanese political 
thought, minimized the role of arms smuggling and suggested 
that the GOL might not succeed in grappling earnestly with 
the problem, even as a condition for lifting the blockade on 
Lebanon's ports and airport.  End Summary. 
 
Lebanon Suffering 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (S) The Ambassador, Pol/Econ Chief and FSN political 
adviser hosted Yassine Jaber, a prominent but moderate Shi'a 
Member of Parliament and two-time former Minister for lunch. 
Jaber, a frequent Embassy contact, is AN MP on Nabib Berri's 
Amal list, although not an Amal member himself.  Jaber opened 
by claiming that, "the blockade is worse than the war."  The 
economy has suffered and he hinted at capital flight. 
International companies, he claimed, have had to endure 35 
days without communication with the outside world and would 
not remain in Lebanon under such conditions.  The Ambassador 
noted that many U.S. companies had decided that Hizballah's 
increased popularity and triumphalism after the conflict made 
Lebanon an undesirable place to be based. 
 
¶2. (S) Many of Lebanon's wealthiest families have also 
delayed their return to Lebanon or departed for good, Jaber 
noted.  The "big spenders" were staying away from Lebanon 
because, among other things, private schools had recently 
decided to follow the lead of public schools and officially 
delay the beginning of the academic year.  (Note:  The 
American Community School, on whose board Jaber serves, 
decided this week to delay its opening to October 9, a week 
earlier than the new target opening for public schools.  End 
Note.)  Jaber cited the disruption to education as one of the 
hardest blows to Lebanon from the recent conflict. 
 
¶3. (S) The conflict made Hizballah popular, Jaber claimed, 
but it destroyed a lot of lives and livelihoods -- in 
particular, due to the targeting of infrastructure.  If arms 
smuggling is not controlled, the Ambassador noted, the next 
conflict will be worse; Hizballah is willing to destroy 
Lebanon to ensure its own survival. 
 
Conspiracies 
------------ 
 
¶4. (S) Jaber complained that there is a perception in Lebanon 
that Israel operated with a green light from the 
international community in the recent conflict.  While the 
Ambassador clarified that there was no secret Israeli 
"September-October War Plan" as alleged this week by 
Hizballah SYG Nasrallah, Jaber noted that the latest rumor 
had it that Israel launched its attack out of an "Agenda of 
Envy" to target the Lebanese economy because of its recent 
success, especially in the tourism and other service sectors. 
 When challenged by Pol/Econ Chief who noted that Lebanon's 
tourism infrastructure was left largely untouched, Jaber 
noted that the oil spill had made Lebanon's beaches 
unattractive and sparked rumors that its seafood was 
contaminated and might cause cancer, even from breathing the 
fumes.  Peddling the usual conspiracy theories, Jaber also 
alluded to local reports that the Israeli forces had used 
ordnance containing depleted uranium. 
 
Arms Smuggling and the Blockade 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Jaber repeatedly asked why the blockade could not be 
lifted at least to allow flights from European airports to 
Beirut International Airport as a "Phase One" in reopening 
Lebanon's access to the outside world.  Ambassador and 
Pol/Econ Chief pointed out that "Phase One" had been the 
opening of flights to Amman, and the Ambassador noted that 
 
BEIRUT 00002826  002 OF 004 
 
 
should the international community grant a "Phase Two" 
without any assurances from Lebanon on the arms smuggling 
issue, there would in all likelihood be no real progress. 
While grateful for "Phase One," Jaber noted that the current 
situation was difficult for both Siniora and the Jordanians, 
the latter being accused of collaborating with Israel or 
Israeli intelligence. 
 
¶6. (S) Jaber noted that Israeli PM Olmert had stated in a 
press conference with UN SYG Annan that lifting the blockade 
depends on direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon -- 
which would be untenable.  The Ambassador repeated the USG 
position -- that we hope for a total lifting of the blockade 
but that Lebanon has to demonstrate a clear will and effort 
to abide by its commitments and UNSCR 1701 obligations to 
stop arms smuggling. 
 
¶7. (C) Jaber challenged the Ambassador's assertion that 
smuggling was a real problem, in particular at the airport. 
The Ambassador maintained that airport procedures had, in 
fact, allowed smuggling of all sorts.  This implied that arms 
smuggling and other security issues are far from resolved 
there. 
 
¶8. (C) Jaber repeatedly raised the possibility of technical 
solutions to the arms smuggling issue.  He noted that Lebanon 
had tried using customs verification services such as that 
offered by the Swiss company Societe Generale de Surveillance 
in the past but that "the time wasn't right."  He hoped for 
deployment of equipment, technicians and trainers from 
Germany at border points.  Pol/Econ Chief noted that the 
German assistance, according to the Chief of the Customs 
Brigade with whom he had spoken earlier that day, would be 
deployed at only four crossings on the land border with Syria 
and would do very little to stop clandestine smuggling. 
Also, even if the equipment was world-class, the Lebanese 
still needed to show that they would use it as intended.  The 
more important issue is that Lebanon demonstrate the 
political will to stop smuggling, and provide support to 
officials who may face intimidation or corruption in 
attempting to stop it. 
 
¶9. (C) Jaber asserted that Hizballah wants to "absorb the 
anger and let things calm down" for the time being, and that 
its supporters -- in particular, the Shi'a -- have no 
appetite for another war, or a "round two" in Nasrallah's 
phrase.  The Ambassador reminded Jaber that "Hizballah is 
provoking the next war right now" through its arms smuggling 
activities. 
 
Siniora Government in Trouble 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Jaber said "we need an injection of support" and that 
Siniora needs some political gesture or victory to help him 
survive after the Stockholm Conference.  He bemoaned the 
government's performance during and after the crisis, citing 
in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' inability to 
take energetic diplomatic action abroad.  It is inexcusable 
that the GOL lacks Ambassadorial representation in Washington 
and in New York.  Furthermore, he suggested that the GOL 
should have rented out hotels to house people made homeless 
during the conflict, which would have helped the destitute 
while propping up the hospitality sector. 
 
¶11. (C) While Jaber admitted that Siniora and Speaker Berri 
had scored well with their Seven Point Plan, both figures 
have lost ground due to the perception that Hizballah has 
been more active against Israel and on Lebanon's behalf. 
Jaber maintained that Berri had asked Hizballah not to 
rebuild houses in Amal areas, so that Berri could (with some 
uncertain resources) do the job and keep his supporters' 
allegiance. 
 
Lebanese Armed Forces 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The Lebanese Armed Forces, which Jaber and the 
Ambassador agreed performed admirably and gained confidence 
and integrity during the 2005 Cedar Revolution, also are in 
dire need of support before they can take up the additional 
responsibilities that will come with their deployment around 
the country.  Jaber asked, "Why can't we have a bridge of 
 
BEIRUT 00002826  003 OF 004 
 
 
immediate assistance?"  He suggested an emergency program to 
equip the army and checkpoints.  He bemoaned the delays in 
getting UNIFIL deployments to the south, and noted that the 
German assistance to the customs and other border authorities 
could take two months or more. 
 
¶13. (C) The Ambassador suggested that Lebanon should ask for 
UNIFIL help on the Syrian border.  The LAF Chief had not 
specified needs to the international community; he had merely 
announced that the Syrian border was "watertight," which was 
neither serious nor credible.  Jaber countered that UNIFIL's 
deployment was already taking too long and that the LAF could 
not wait to coordinate its deployment with UNIFIL, and at any 
rate such an idea was "controversial."  In addition, 
Hizballah is currently trying to project an image of 
cooperation rather than confrontation, weakening the case for 
the GOL to call in UNIFIL. 
 
Lebanese Parliament to Snub Visitors? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Jaber informed us that the Parliament had taken a 
decision today to refuse to receive any official delegations 
-- including the CODEL planned for this weekend -- or to 
travel, in protest against the blockade.  The Ambassador 
characterized the decision as unwise, in particular in view 
of the Lebanese-American character of upcoming visits, and 
appealed to Jaber to fight to reverse it.  He noted that many 
of our cooperative programs, including humanitarian 
assistance and disposal of unexploded ordinance, could be 
jeopardized as a result.  It seemed foolish for the 
Parliament to miss the opportunity to make Lebanon's case to 
congressional visitors. 
 
¶15. (C) Pol/Econ Chief asked whether yesterday's visiting 
Iranian delegation -- including the Iranian Vice President -- 
had been entertained by MPs.  Jaber confirmed that MP's had 
met the Iranians, explaining that, "that was yesterday." 
Pol/Econ Chief told Jaber that was a distinction that may be 
lost on some, as well as a bad signal to send to the 
international community.  The Ambassador noted that several 
figures in the U.S. political scene are questioning their 
support for Lebanon and again stressed to Jaber the 
importance that the Parliament remain open to visiting 
delegations.  (Note: For the upcoming Codel, MPs will come to 
a lunch hosted by the Ambassador.  End note.) 
 
Shebaa Farms -- Obsession or Pretext? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) While more pragmatic than many of our interlocutors 
on the subject of the Shebaa Farms, Jaber stressed several 
times the importance of the territorial issue as a pretext 
for Hizballah to retain its weapons and gather supporters. 
He had no answer, however, when the Ambassador challenged him 
on next steps after a proposed return of the Shebaa (and 
satisfaction of other public Lebanese demands such as the 
freeing of Samir Kantar and an end to airspace violations by 
the IAF).  The Ambassador said that people might be more 
willing to think creatively about Shebaa if Lebanon had a 
clear, credible blueprint for dealing with Hizballah's arms 
and Iranian influence after a resolution. 
 
¶17. (C) Jaber stressed also that Hizballah's armed force was 
of a quality both different and more dangerous than any 
unofficial force previously seen in Lebanon.  "These are not 
normal Arab fighters -- they stayed under bombardment and did 
not flee.  They have an ideology" that empowers them to 
prodigious acts of resistance, Jaber said.  The Shebaa Farms 
issue provides them with political cover, but Israeli 
incursions -- Jaber used the analogy of a rape -- convinces 
Lebanese to join and support the group.  Even Al-Qaeda leader 
Aiman Zawahiri, who has waged a genocidal terrorist campaign 
against Shi'a, and other fellow Sunni extremists lent their 
support to Hizballah. 
 
¶18. (C) In response to the Shebaa-as-pretext argument, the 
Ambassador noted that the UN had certified the 2000 Israeli 
pullout from southern Lebanon.  Jaber claimed that "one of 
the biggest mistakes" was the U.S. decision at the July 2000 
donors' conference to stipulate that the LAF would have to 
deploy to the south as a condition of international aid to 
that region.  Arab donors, Jaber said, also neglected the 
 
BEIRUT 00002826  004 OF 004 
 
 
south.  These factors had made the south fertile for 
extremism.  Disputing that no assistance had flowed to hte 
south since 2000, the Ambassador repeated that Lebanon had 
offered no credible plan to reward the return of the Shebaa 
and the freeing of Lebanese prisoners with a serious 
disarmament of Hizballah. 
FELTMAN