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OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBD #0415/01 2280828
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O 160828Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3476
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0477
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0020
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000415 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPARTMENT FOR P, EAP, EUR, NEA, PM, IO, AND NSC 
SINGAPORE ALSO FOR DAO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2016 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL BX IS LE
SUBJECT: BRUNEI CONTINUES TO PLAN UNIFIL CONTRIBUTION, BUT 
WANTS MORE DETAIL ON ROE AND SCOPE OF MISSION 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 134133 
 
     ¶B. (B) USUN 1545 
     ¶C. (C) BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 398 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Government of Brunei (GOB) continues to 
plan contribution of a mechanized infantry company to UNIFIL 
and remains publicly committed to such a deployment in 
conjunction with Malaysian and/or Indonesian troops. 
Privately, GOB defense officials recognize the challenges 
that a Lebanon mission would pose for their largely untested 
troops, and tell us they want to see more details on the 
scope of UNIFIL's new mission and its revised ROE before 
making a final decision.  Embassy recommends USUN New York 
encourage UN DPKO to invite Brunei UN Mission to August 17 
meeting of UNIFIL Troop Contributing Countries, which will 
discuss CONOPS and ROE.  Also recommend EAP and PM invite 
GOB's Washington Embassy to A/S Hillen's August 16 UNIFIL 
briefing; if opportunity arises, A/S Hillen should mention at 
that briefing that Brunei is considering a UNIFIL troop 
contribution, as such recognition will make it more difficult 
for the GOB to back away from the commitment to provide 
troops made by the Sultan to the OIC.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On August 15, prior to receipt of ref A demarche 
instructions, Ambassador asked Deputy Defense Minister Pehin 
Yasmin for update on GOB planning for its contribution to 
UNIFIL in wake of passage of UNSCR 1701 (Yasmin is de facto 
Defense Minister, since Brunei's Sultan retains the official 
title of Minister for himself).  Ambassador noted GOB's 
consistent public line that it is committed to making good 
the Sultan of Brunei's pledge to provide troops to a Lebanon 
multinational force, in accordance with the statement made by 
the Sultan at the OIC Emergency Meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 
August 3, and reminded Yasmin of his previous comments to 
Ambassador that Brunei was looking at contributing a total of 
approximately 200 troops built around a mechanized infantry 
company, in conjunction with a Malaysian and/or Indonesian 
deployment (ref C). 
 
¶3.  (C) Yasmin confirmed that Royal Brunei Armed Forces 
(RBAF) were continuing to plan for deployment of a mechanized 
company to UNIFIL with Indonesian and/or Malaysian forces. 
The RBAF would hold a second high-level planning conference 
with counterparts from these neighboring countries this week 
or next.  Yasmin, however, hedged when asked if UNSCR 1701 
gave the GOB all the information it needed to make a final 
commitment.  He said a final decision would be contingent on 
the mandate and rules of engagement given to the new UN force 
in Lebanon. 
 
¶4.  (C) Specifically, Yasmin said, the Ministry of Defense 
and RBAF wanted to know whether any troops it committed would 
be "peacekeepers" or "peacemakers."  The former mission they 
could handle, but the latter would be problematical.  Telling 
the Ambassador "Don't quote me on this," Yasmin continued by 
saying that the GOB did not want to send its troops on a 
"suicide mission."  Ambassador pointed out to Yasmin that the 
mandate for the new UNIFIL was spelled out in some detail in 
UNSCR 1701.  Yasmin acknowledged this, but repeated that the 
GOB wanted to see the new ROE for UNIFIL and more details on 
its mandate before making a final commitment. 
 
¶5.  (C) Following receipt of ref A demarche instructions on 
August 16, Ambassador delivered talking points to Yasmin and 
to Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister II Pehin Lim, and urged 
them to ensure that Brunei's UN Mission in New York attend 
the DPKO briefing on August 17 at which UNIFIL ROE would be 
discussed per ref B. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  Yasmin's caution is not unreasonable given 
the RBAF's lack of PKO experience outside its immediate 
neighborhood in Southeast Asia.  The fact remains, however, 
that the Sultan is on record as having made a political 
 
BANDAR SER 00000415  002 OF 002 
 
 
commitment to the OIC to join Malaysia and/or Indonesia if 
they contribute troops to UNIFIL, and failure to carry 
through would be a significant loss of face.  We expect the 
Sultan's commitment will trump practical concerns within the 
MOD and RBAF, and if Malaysia or Indonesia contribute troops 
to UNIFIL, the GOB will find it hard not to join them.  End 
Comment. 
 
¶7.  (C) Action Recommendation -- USUN:  Embassy recommends 
that USUN New York encourage DPKO to invite Brunei's UN 
Mission to send a representative to August 17 briefing for 
UNIFIL Troop Contributing Countries so that it can report 
details on proposed ROE and CONOPS back to its capital. 
 
¶8.  (C) Action Recommendation -- Department:  Embassy 
recommends PM and EAP ensure that Brunei Embassy Washington 
is invited to A/S Hillen's August 16 briefing on UNIFIL force 
generation.  If the opportunity arises, Brunei should be 
specifically named as one of those countries that has 
publicly expressed interest in a UNIFIL contribution, in 
order to underscore that the Sultan's commitment has been 
widely noted and that we hope it will be fulfilled. 
SKODON