R 221619Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5926
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAMAKO 000914 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS MASS PARM ML
SUBJECT: AN ISLAMIC LEADER'S VIEW OF THE U.S., THE ALGIERS 
ACCORDS AND THE GSPC 
 
REF: BAMAKO 864 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, U.S. Embassy 
Bamako, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.(C) Summary: On August 8 Mohamed Kimbiri, the Secretary 
General of the Association for Islam in Mali (AISLAM) and a 
2004 International Visitors participant, discussed his 
organization of a July 28 anti-U.S, anti-Israeli 
demonstration to condemn the violence in Lebanon.  Kimbiri 
also explained the logistics of organizing Mali's Islamic 
community, his support of the controversial Algiers accords 
between the GOM and Tuareg rebels, and AISLAM's view of the 
GSPC.  Kimbiri said that AISLAM would not support the GOM 
were it to attack other Muslims such as the Tuareg rebels or 
the GSPC.  The July 28 demonstration was a rare display of 
anti-American sentiment in Mali, and should not be 
interpreted as a change from the generally positive view 
Malians hold of the United States.  End Summary. 
 
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The Anatomy of an Anti-American Protest 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.(C) On July 28 Mohamed Kimbiri, the Secretary General of 
the Association for Islam in Mali (AISLAM), organized Mali's 
first and only public protest against Israel and the U.S. 
response to the violence in Lebanon (reftel).  The protest 
attracted between 300 and 400 people despite a driving 
rainstorm.  Kimbiri is a key Embassy contact and an outspoken 
leader of the Malian Islamic community.  He traveled to the 
U.S. in 2004 on an International Visitors program for 
religious leaders and visited Muslim communities throughout 
the U.S. 
 
3.(C) Kimbiri said he originally intended to organize a march 
on either the U.S. Embassy or USAID building in Bamako. 
Kimbiri worried, however, that controlling the crowd in the 
market area around the U.S. Embassy could prove difficult. 
USAID's proximity to the Malian Prime Minister's office also 
posed logistical problems.  Aware that trouble during the 
march could provoke Malian authorities to prevent subsequent 
protests, the march location was moved to the residence of 
the Palestinian Ambassador. 
 
4.(C) To broaden the appeal of the protest, Kimbiri enlisted 
as a co-organizer PARENA, a coalition of small political 
parties led by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tiebele 
Drame.  During his negotiations with PARENA, Kimbiri insisted 
that the demonstration be billed as a march by members of the 
Malian "religious" community, rather than the "Islamic" 
community, in hopes of attracting support from some of Mali's 
non-Muslim religious associations.  Joining his group with 
PARENA (which had been in the process of planning a similar 
protest) shifted the focus of the protest toward "solidarity" 
with the Lebanese and Palestinian people.  Kimbiri, however, 
indicated that AISLAM's interest remained expressing 
anti-Israeli and, in particular, anti-USG sentiment. 
 
5.(C) Kimbiri complained that Malian security forces in riot 
gear attempted to prevent protesters from assembling.  At one 
point, Kimbiri reportedly told a Malian security official 
that they could "go ahead and shoot" because the protesters 
were going to march anyway.  The security forces apparently 
stood down when faced with Kimbiri's determination and the 
arrival of former Minister of Justice Hamidou Diabite as a 
march participant.  PARENA leader Drame did not attend. 
 
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Kimbiri's View of the U.S. 
-------------------------- 
 
6.(C) During the discussion, Kimbiri sought to reconcile his 
fondness for the U.S. with his newfound role as an anti-USG 
political organizer.  He said the July 28 protest was against 
American policy and not the American people.  When asked 
whether he thought his followers who were waving anti-U.S. 
and pro-Hezbollah placards during the protest made the same 
distinction, Kimbiri said he hoped that was the case. 
Kimbiri described his 2004 trip to the U.S., and the number 
of American Muslim leaders he met, as eye-opening.  He 
recalled in particular meeting a Malian Imam in Chicago who 
was, unbeknownst to Kimbiri, a member of AISLAM.  Kimbiri 
expressed eagerness to return to the U.S and said he has 
encouraged many of his colleagues in Mali's Islamic community 
to also travel. "I correct a lot of people in Mali," Kimbiri 
said, "when they try to talk about Muslims in America."  On 
August 18 Kimbiri contacted the Embassy's political officer 
to state that a planned second march by the Malian Islamic 
community had been called off following the cease-fire in 
Lebanon. 
 
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Radio as an Organizing Tool 
--------------------------- 
 
7.(C) Kimbiri used AISLAM's radio station, Radio Dambe, to 
advertise the march.  Radio Dambe may not be among the three 
most popular radio stations in Bamako (as Kimbiri claimed) 
but it does have a wide audience, particularly in the market 
areas of downtown Bamako.  In addition to broadcasting 
sermons and religious texts, the station airs news from Al 
Jazeera and Al Arabiya in Arabic, followed by summaries in 
Bambara.  Kimbiri said Radio Dambe unofficially broadcast BBC 
Arabic language news until recently and tried to reach 
agreements with both the Voice of America and radio 
Deutsche-Welle.  Kimbiri claimed VOA and Deutsche-Welle 
declined to provide news programming due to Radio Dambe's 
status as a "religious" radio station.  After traveling to 
Germany to convince Deutsche-Welle that Radio Dambe had 
programs devoted to news, sports, youth and women's issues, 
Kimbiri finally gave up.  Radio Dambe's listeners, Kimbiri 
told Deutsche-Welle, would simply "remain misinformed." 
Kimbiri stated that this experience soured his opinion of 
western radio programming. (Note: The VOA's authorized outlet 
in Bamako is Radio Kledu.  The Embassy will, however, look 
into the possibility of providing Radio Dambe with some VOA 
programming.  End note). 
 
-------------------------- 
Tuareg Rebels and the GSPC 
-------------------------- 
 
8.(C) Kimbiri was one of the first public figures in Mali to 
publicly support, on behalf of AISLAM, the controversial July 
4 Algiers accords signed by the GOM and Tuareg rebels. 
Kimbiri said he was eager to endorse the agreement "from an 
Islamic point of view" because the accords provided a way to 
avoid hostilities between Muslims.  Kimbiri said he supported 
the agreement because "Islam is too often portrayed as 
violent."  "Even if the accords are flawed," Kimbiri 
continued, "they can always be amended or corrected." 
Referring to rumors regarding a connection between the rebels 
and the GSPC - a connection both the rebels and the GOM deny 
- Kimbiri said that he and AISLAM would not support the GOM 
were it to attack either the Tuareg rebels or the GSPC in 
Mali. 
 
 
9.(C) Asked whether one could interpret his support for the 
Algiers accords as an endorsement of President Amadou Toumani 
Toure (ATT) for reelection in April 2007, Kimbiri said Mali's 
Islamic leaders have always been close to National Assembly 
president and ATT challenger Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK). 
Kimbiri pointed out, however, that being close to IBK did not 
necessarily translate into support for IBK's party, the Rally 
for Mali (RPM).  Kimbiri acknowledged that IBK's denunciation 
of the Algiers agreement as an "accord of shame" ran contrary 
to AISLAM's position but stated that he and other Islamic 
leaders intended to meet with IBK to discuss the matter 
further. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Kimbiri's political stance is best described as 
opposition to violence perpetrated against Muslims.  His 
position regarding the United States, the Algiers accords, 
and the GSPC should be seen in that light, and Kimbiri would 
characterize himself as a friend of the people of the United 
States. 
 
 
MCCULLEY