VZCZCXRO8119
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2768/01 2141156
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021156Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6037
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0322
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002768

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REPORT SOME MOVEMENT ON RESOLVING PKK ISSUE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2628 B. BAGHDAD 2655 C. KIRKUK 134

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate conversations on July 30 and 31, President Talabani and Foreign Minister Zebari assured Charge d'Affaires that the Iraqi Government (GOI) remained committed to resolving the PKK issue and resuming the trilateral meetings. Talabani reported that the GOI had taken steps to close down PKK front offices, and both he and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masud Barzani had delivered a strong message to PKK leaders directing them to implement an immediate unilateral ceasefire. While the PKK agreed in principle to the ceasefire, they wanted instructions directly from their imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Talabani reported that the Turkish Government had agreed to allow the leader of the legitimate Kurdish Party in Turkey, Dr. Ahmed Turk, to see Ocalan. In a separate meeting on July 30, Foreign Minister Zebari told CDA that the GOI was prepared to address legitimate concerns with the Turks. Zebari reported that his recent bilateral meetings with Turkish Foreign Minister Gul had gone well, and the two had discussed measures for improving political and economic relations between the two countries. END SUMMARY.

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Government of Iraq Moves to Resolve PKK Issue
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¶2. (S) President Jalal Talabani told Charge d'Affaires Scobey on July 31 that the situation with the PKK remained delicate. He reported that the Iraqis had implemented the steps both he and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masud Barzani had agreed upon earlier to prevent Turkish cross-border operations in northern Iraq (see reftels). According to Talabani, he had ordered the Minister of the Interior, with the Prime Minister's blessing, to shut PKK-front offices and the Ocalan Center in Baghdad, and PKK-front offices in Mosul and Kirkuk. The KRG would close similar offices in Irbil. Talabani and Barzani sent a message to the PKK leadership in the Kandil mountain area to begin an immediate unilateral ceasefire, noting that continued PKK activity against Turkey was working against the interests of the Kurdish people. Talabani said that the Peshmerga had been redeployed closer to PKK positions, but further military pressure, such as encircling them and preventing movement of men and material in and out would not be done unless the PKK failed to observe the ceasefire. (NOTE: PRT Kirkuk confirms that KDSP offices in Erbil and Dahuk were closed by the KDP. See reftel Kirkuk 134. END NOTE) Finally, he said that the high-level PUK/KDP delegation was "on its way" to Ankara.

¶3. (S) Talabani said that the PKK responded positively to the KDP/PUK intervention. However, they wanted to hear from their jailed leader Ocalan. Talabani said that the Turks have not been cooperative on this point in the past and were suspected of fabricating messages supposedly from Ocalan to his followers. However, Talabani said he persuaded the Turks to allow the leader of the legitimate Kurdish Party in Turkey, Dr. Ahmed Turk, to see Ocalan to urge him to make a statement calling on the PKK to stop fighting. A statement from Ocalan delivered by someone trusted by the PKK might be the best way to convince the PKK's popular base to accept the ceasefire as legitimate, Talabani suggested.

¶4. (S) Talabani repeated earlier reports that the PKK were ready to hand in their weapons to U.S. authorities in Iraq in return for a Turkish agreement to unconditional amnesty. The PKK, he said, now viewed the U.S. as liberators bringing democracy to the Middle East. He mentioned that the PKK had asked him to deliver a letter to Washington on their behalf, but he had refused to act as an intermediary unless the PKK implemented the ceasefire.

¶5. (S) Talabani praised Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's government as a democratic administration which recognized the Kurds, and expressed his disappointment with the PKK and "certain circles" in Turkey who were trying to instigate conflict with Erdogan and Ankara. He also noted that Vice President Tarik al-Hashimi was scheduled to travel to Ankara soon to meet with Erdogan. Hashimi was fully briefed on the situation, Talabani stated, and was ready to discuss steps to resume the trilateral (Turkey-Iraq-U.S.) meetings.

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Zebari Confirms Baghdad Reaching Out to Ankara
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¶5. (S) In a separate phone call on July 31, Foreign Minister Zebari confirmed the details passed by Talabani and said that he had also checked the status of these measures with KRG President Barzani.

¶6. (C) Zebari reported that his own recent bilateral meetings in Ankara had gone well, paving the way for more investment. Ankara had promised to open a second border crossing to expand trade relations, and is considering opening a third border gate. He and Turkish Foreign Minister Gul had also talked about resuming the railway networks and flights between Iraq and Turkey. Zebari noted, however, that Iraqi Airways would need roughly $1.5 million USD to start a new air route.

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Makhmour Camp
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¶7. (C) Zebari also mentioned that the GOI is ready to assist with voluntary repatriation for the Makhmour refugee camp. In response to the CDA's query on whether the GOI was prepared to use force to remove PKK elements from the camp, Zebari claimed that the PKK could be neutralized by removing all weapons and regulating access in and out of the camp. He did not commit to a specific use of force. Zebari said that a senior KRG official must be designated to negotiate with the refugees and monitor that the PKK are abiding by their commitment to leave the camp.
SPECKHARD