VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #2251/01 2421003
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301003Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6601
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0282

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 002251 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNAUS UNMIK YI EU GR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO:  GREEK MFA ON STATUS NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: A) STATE 136492 B) PRISTINA 687 
 
Classified By: DCM TOM COUNTRYMAN.  REASON:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  DCM met with the director of the MFA's 
Balkans unit, Ambassador Michael Christides, on August 29 to 
review ref a points on the Kosovo status negotiations. 
Christides -- who will meet with DAS DiCarlo in Washington 
the week of September 4 -- favored a "transition period" in 
order to prevent "radicalization" in Serbia and focused  on 
the importance of a civilian mission with executive powers as 
part of an eventual settlement.  Christides also suggested 
that "carrots" for the Serb side would make a settlement more 
palatable, noting that the GOG was already preparing a draft 
"action plan" for its own use with Serbia.  FM Bakoyannis 
plans to travel to Belgrade and Pristina the week of 
September 11 in advance of her trip to the U.S.; Christides's 
visit to Washington will be an opportunity to influence her 
message.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  DCM outlined Ref A points, underscoring that there 
was no realistic alternative to an independent Kosovo in 
order to ensure stability in the region.  The U.S. foresaw a 
Kosovo which would continue to be governed from Pristina, 
with substantial devolution of competencies to 
Serbian-majority principalities.  Support from the 
international community -- including thorugh a new civilian 
mission with sufficient executive powers to implement a 
settlement -- would be essential.  But both sides needed to 
do more.  Kosovar Albanians needed to increase their 
commitment to rule of law and protection of non-Albanian 
minorities; Belgrade needed to show more flexibility and 
encourage Kosovar Serbs to participate in institutions.  He 
emphasized the role Greece could play in encouraging Belgrade 
to be more practical in the negotiations.  Drawing on ref B, 
DCM pointed to U.S.-funded projects in three Serb 
municipalities as well as north Mitrovica, projects which had 
been greeted positively by community leaders. 
 
CHRISTIDES:  TRANSITION PERIOD IMPORTANT 
 
¶3.  (C)  Christides agreed that Ahtisaari was likely to 
recommend some form of independence for Kosovo.  But a 
transition period would be important -- not only to allow the 
Kosovars to confront immediate problems, but also to mitigate 
Serb "humiliation."  Christides was concerned about 
Belgrade's reaction, citing creeping "radicalization" in 
Serbia.  Above all, the international community should avoid 
giving the impression that it had tilted a solution toward 
the Kosovo Albanians because of the implicit threat of 
Albanian-instigated violence or because it believed a 
thwarted Belgrade would be less difficult to placate in the 
aftermath of a settlement. 
 
FM TRAVEL TO BELGRADE, PRISTINA 
 
¶4.  (C)  Christides argued that an "action plan" to help 
Serbia would be essential.  The Greek MFA has drafted a 
document outlining possible multilateral and bilateral 
initiatives.  FM Bakoyannis planned to discuss the 
still-unfinished draft with Serb leaders during her upcoming 
visit to Pristina and Belgrade -- currently scheduled for 
the week of September 11 (prior to her travel to New York for 
the UNGA.  Greece will be president of the Security Council 
during September.)  Possible initiatives included raising the 
level of EU dialogue with Belgrade (for example, regular 
consultations with the Troika) and a more generous visa 
regime for travel to EU states.  Serbia also needed to be 
brought into security fora, including via a closer 
relationship with NATO.  Finally, Christides suggested an 
IC-sponsored "donor's conference" for Serbia to help it 
address its own economic issues. 
 
¶5.  (C)  DCM questioned whether the GOG would be able to 
direct (or redirect) resources to help both the Serbian 
government and Kosovar Serbs.  Christides claimed this was 
already happening; under Greece's Balkan regional development 
programs, funds for Serbia and Kosovo are being disbursed 
more rapidly than for other projects.  Other possibilities 
(such as a seasonal employment agreement with Serbia) were 
under consideration.  Clearly, carrots were needed to make a 
Kosovo status agreement more palatable to the Serb side.  At 
the same time, the Kosovar Albanians must not appear to be 
making no concessions.  For that reason, Christides 
particularly welcomed U.S. support for a civilian mission 
with executive powers as part of a Kosovo status settlement. 
Christides predicted that, as the status negotiation end-game 
approached, democratic forces in Serbia would need to show 
greater unity -- a message he expected FM Bakoyannis to 
deliver during her visit. 
RIES