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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004978 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2021 
TAGS: PREL PGOV USUN LE TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SUPPORTS 
PARTICIPATION IN UNIFIL; STILL NEEDS PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4893 
 
     ¶B. ANKARA 4878 
     ¶C. ANKARA 4875 
     ¶D. ANKARA 4953 
 
Classified by Ambassador Ross Wilson for Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Turkish Council of Ministers announced 
its support of Turkish participation in UNIFIL on August 28; 
it plans to seek parliamentary approval within the next week 
or two.  A united front by PM Erdogan, FM Gul and Speaker 
Arinc, along with the ruling Justice and Development Party's 
(AKP) parliamentary majority, make approval likely, though 
strong opposition and events out of their control -- such as 
continued PKK-related bombings at tourist sites -- could 
derail AKP's careful planning.  Turkey's president has come 
out against a deployment and opposition leaders are vocally 
resisting troop participation.  The Turkish General Staff 
(TGS), which has remained publicly neutral, has stated that 
the military is prepared to deploy wherever the government 
directs.  The vote does not now look nearly as momentous as 
the March 2003 vote on the Iraq war, but its results might 
provide insights into the durability of Erdogan's leadership 
ahead of the May 2007 presidential election.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Cabinet Announces Support 
but Needs Parliamentary Approval 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Prime Minister Erdogan's Council of Ministers publicly 
announced its support for Turkish participation in UNIFIL 
following an August 28 meeting.  Senior government officials 
are meeting August 29 to discuss when to convene parliament, 
according to Government Spokesman and Minister of Justice 
Cemil Cicek.  Cicek said the government may convene an 
extraordinary session of parliament for a vote as early as 
next week; AKP whips have told the press they already have 
the number of signatures needed to convene a special session. 
 A parliamentary vote is required under the constitution. 
 
¶3. (C) Cicek made clear that the government's decision is to 
participate in the peacekeeping force "within the framework 
of UNSCR 1701."  The government has begun the process to make 
Turkey's airports and airspace available in support of 
UNIFIL, based on an earlier cabinet decision, according to 
Cicek. 
 
¶4. (C) It was "out of the question for Turkey to remain a 
mere spectator," Cicek stated, adding that some may exploit 
the issue for domestic political purposes.  Consistent with 
earlier government statements, he stressed Turkish troops 
would only go to protect the peace and "not to disarm 
Hezbollah."   While Cicek did not mention deployment details, 
PM Erdogan advisor Ahmet Davutoglu told Ambassador on August 
26 that the GOT is looking at sending 500 to 1000 troops; MFA 
spokesman Namik Tan referred on August 28 to "several 
hundred".  Davutoglu added that deployment at the outset of 
Ramadan (which starts September 24) is unlikely; troops would 
likely arrive in Lebanon after October 1. 
 
------------------------- 
AKP Laying the Groundwork 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  PM Erdogan has been out front on this issue for 
weeks, publicly making a case for Turkish participation.  FM 
Gul has also been laying the groundwork for deployment, 
including a well-publicized regional tour to Beirut, Tel Aviv 
and Damascus to gauge the views of regional actors.  Each 
visit included a high-level Turkish military officer to 
discuss logistics (Refs A and B).  The GOT also plans to use 
SYG Annan's September 6 visit to good effect.  We understand 
that Annan may give a speech at parliament, and the GOT may 
choose to time a vote to coincide with that or take place 
soon thereafter.  The PM also appears to have parliamentary 
 
ANKARA 00004978  002 OF 003 
 
 
speaker Bulent Arinc on board.  Arinc responded to a negative 
spin by President Sezer, stating that voting on a troop 
deployment was the prerogative of parliament, not the 
President. 
 
¶6. (C) PM Erdogan advisor Davutoglu told Ambassador August 26 
that AKP is thinking carefully about how to use the press to 
measure public reaction and calibrate next steps.  He and PM 
Advisor Egemen Bagis tell us that AKP is in touch with 
columnists and opinion makers to help make the case.  We have 
heard reports of a leadership-initiated gag order on ruling 
party deputies, and that unfortunately, the chairman of 
parliament's foreign affairs committee, Mehmet Dulger, as 
well as habitual AKP dissenters, have spoken out publicly 
against a deployment.  Party leaders may well tell dissenters 
to absent themselves on the day of the vote. 
 
¶7. (C)  AKP would prefer not to impose party discipline, 
Bagis told us.  Almost all AKP deputies owe PM Erdogan their 
seats.  If Erdogan is in parliament for the vote, Bagis 
emphasized, "No one can look him in the eye and vote against 
him."  Bagis and Davutoglu distinguished this vote from the 
March 1, 2003 vote on Iraq, noting that the UNIFIL vote will 
be for a peacekeeping mission (vice war) involving Turkish 
troops (vice American ones) under PM Erdogan's tested 
government (vice Gul).  The GOT had learned its lessons well, 
he added.  It now knows how to maneuver vis-a-vis the 
opposition Republican People's party (CHP), a skill its 
then-fledgling MPs had not yet developed in March 2003. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
But Parliamentary Approval Not Guaranteed 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) AKP cannot afford to declare victory too early. 
President Sezer, in response to a press question on the 
margins of the August 25 Turkish Land Forces Change of 
Command ceremony, stated that he opposes Turkish 
participation in UNIFIL.  Turkey's priority should be to 
"solve its own problems,"  not protect the interests of other 
countries or solved security problems abroad.  Nobody has 
backed Turkey on the PKK issue, Sezer stated; why should 
Turkey extend support to others? 
 
¶9. (C) Other secular leaders have been voicing opposition 
since the cease-fire took hold.  The main opposition party, 
CHP, which was instrumental in derailing the March 1 vote, 
has publicly opposed a deployment barring an additional UN 
resolution that clarifies the mission.  Following the Council 
of Ministers decision, CHP Vice Chairman Onur Oymen (a former 
Turkish Ambassador to NATO) declared that it would be 
"extremely wrong to send troops to a minefield."  Other 
parties, including the nationalist MHP and center-right 
Motherland Party (ANAP), echoed these statements. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Military Will Follow Civilian Lead 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) GEN Yasar Buyukanit, who assumed command as Chief of 
the General Staff on August 28, stated on August 25 that the 
military would "do as it was told" with regard to sending 
troops to participate in a robust UNIFIL, according to the 
press.  In discussions with Embassy officials and in other 
public pronouncements, the Turkish military leadership has 
been somewhat more circumspect, saying only that Turkey's 
participation would be reviewed in light of the expanded 
UNIFIL mandate and the cease-fire conditions.  Some observers 
have commented that the military wants to be able to point at 
the government as having made the decision to deploy should 
post-deployment circumstances on the ground in Lebanon lead 
to negative public reaction.  Following several interagency 
meetings -- including the August 21 National Security Council 
meeting -- to discuss Lebanon, MFA officials have suggested 
that the General Staff supports participation in UNIFIL but 
is concerned about placing troops in a position where they 
may have to shoot -- or could be shot by -- other Muslims. 
 
ANKARA 00004978  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Recent Bombings Complicate the Situation 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Another possible complicating factor that could lead 
some to follow President Sezer's lead is home-grown 
terrorism.  A series of seven bombings from August 24 to 28 
killed at least three and injured more than 40 in Istanbul, 
Adana and the tourist centers of Antalya and Marmaris.  The 
PKK-affiliated Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (ref D) finally 
claimed responsibility late August 28.  This uptick in 
PKK-related violence will strengthen those who argue Turkey 
should take care of its own problems first.  Absent 
sufficient initiative on combating the PKK and speed in 
bringing the proposed deployment to a vote, these arguments 
may gain traction in parliament.  Alternatively, a PKK 
cease-fire or significant action by the U.S. or Iraq against 
the PKK could serve to dilute the isolationist and 
nationalist appeal. 
 
---------------------------- 
Comment: This is Not March 1 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C)  The government, Erdogan leading the charge, has come 
out four-square in favor of a UNIFIL deployment.  AKP has not 
gone in blindly, despite serious misgivings of many in 
government and military alike on placing troops where  they 
risk having to shoot at (or disarm) fellow Muslims.  Foreign 
Affairs Committee chair Dulger voiced what many were 
reluctant to -- that Turkey would be stepping into an 
unknown, with equally unknown consequences.  He represents 
the status quo attitude of traditional Turkish governments. 
Erdogan has chosen instead to pursue his activist ambition 
that Turkey play a more robust role in the region.  With 
leadership comes risks, and Erdogan is putting his leadership 
on the line, both within his diverse party and 
internationally.  The PM may rightly believe that he and his 
whips can control enough of his party, but he has no control 
over outside actors such as the PKK/TAK or a vocal 
opposition.  The outcome will serve a a barometer of the PM's 
power and internal party loyalty as Turkey enters a dual 
election year. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON