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DE RUEHTA #3065/01 2401138
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FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0138
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1274
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0371
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0686
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0194
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0249
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0417
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0086
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0216
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0350
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1627

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALMATY 003065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016 
TAGS: KZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM MEETS WITH FOREIGN 
MINISTER TOKAYEV 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan 
Feigenbaum and Ambassador Ordway held a wide-ranging 
discussion with Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev in 
Astana on August 25.  Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan would 
continue to press its bid for the 2009 OSCE chairmanship. 
Feigenbaum responded that the United States does not and will 
not support Kazakhstan for 2009.  The meeting also covered a 
range of bilateral and regional issues.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Kazakhstan to Continue Pursuing OSCE Chairmanship in 2009 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2. (C) The heart of the meeting occurred in its final 
minutes, when discussion turned to Kazakhstan,s bid to chair 
the OSCE in 2009.  Tokayev urged the United States to 
acknowledge Kazakhstan,s progress in democratization, 
especially relative to its neighbors in the Central Asian 
region.  He drew special attention to the State Committee for 
Democratization, which he predicted would produce tangible 
results.  He noted Kazakhstan,s upcoming regional elections 
and proposed expansion of the Parliament.  These steps, said 
Tokayev, constitute tangible evidence of the GOK,s 
commitment to democratic reform.  In light of such steps, he 
expressed his hope that the United States would revisit its 
position and support Kazakhstan,s 2009 bid as a signal that 
the United States recognizes Kazakhstan,s progress toward 
democracy.  Tokayev said he understood U.S. reservations on 
the matter, but it was important to focus on progress rather 
than shortcomings.  He added that, in his view, democratic 
reform would become more difficult in Kazakhstan if the 
United States did not support the 2009 bid.  In the event, 
domestic proponents of reform would be weakened politically. 
 
¶3. (C) Feigenbaum responded that Tokayev,s remarks were 
deeply disappointing.  After the foreign minister,s July 6 
meeting with Secretary Rice in Washington, there had been 
considerable interest in the United States throughout July 
and August as to whether and how Kazakhstan would resolve the 
issue in a mutually agreeable way.  Last week, Washington had 
heard Tokayev,s clear message to Ambassador Ordway that 
Kazakhstan would not, in fact, stand down.  As a result, the 
U.S. position had become even more firm:  the United States 
does not and will not support Kazakhstan,s bid to chair the 
OSCE in 2009.  Reiterating earlier USG messages, Feigenbaum 
explained that Kazakhstan does not yet meet the OSCE,s 
standards for a chairman in office. 
 
¶4. (C) Following Tokayev,s July 6 meetings, Feigenbaum 
continued, it was believed in Washington that the two 
countries had reached an understanding that Kazakhstan would 
defer its bid.  In return, the United States would go out of 
its way not to embarrass Kazakhstan, focusing instead on 
affirmative steps that could be taken jointly to help 
Kazakhstan pursue the chairmanship at a future date. 
Kazakhstan,s position now put the U.S. into the unfortunate 
position of having to discuss with other countries its 
thoughts on Kazakhstan,s suitability for the OSCE 
chairmanship ) precisely the position the United States had 
tried to avoid in the spirit of partnership.  Feigenbaum 
added with regret that Kazakhstan,s position meant the two 
countries would be working at cross-purposes on this issue in 
the run-up to President Nazarbayev,s visit to Washington. 
 
¶5. (C) Feigenbaum then reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to 
democratic reform in Kazakhstan.  He drew attention to the 
list of ideas provided by the USG to assist Kazakhstan in its 
reform process.  He reiterated the U.S. commitment to an 
affirmative conversation on democratization.  The United 
States, concluded Feigenbaum, still stands ready to assist 
the GOK in that regard. 
 
¶6. (C) Foreign Minister Tokayev responded that merely by 
communicating its position to other OSCE countries, the U.S. 
would, in effect, embarrass Kazakhstan, all the more so given 
Nazarbayev,s visit in September.  Still, he said, Kazakhstan 
 
ALMATY 00003065  002 OF 004 
 
 
would not withdraw its bid for 2009.  By his vote count, 
Kazakhstan had already secured the support of 70 percent of 
OSCE members, including all of the CIS member-states.  That 
support from third countries, he said, gave Kazakhstan the 
&political and moral right8 to press ahead.  He added that 
Washington was mistaken if his July visit had given it hope 
that the GOK would defer its bid.  He insisted he never 
agreed to or even mentioned the possibility of withdrawing 
Kazakhstan,s bid. 
 
¶7. (C) Tokayev proposed the two countries focus on how to 
minimize embarrassment.  He noted that there was still time 
to talk about the issue, and asked the U.S. not to go public 
with its views.  He added that talking to European 
governments was tantamount to going public, as the U.S. 
position would quickly find its way into the media.  In 
response, Feigenbaum reiterated his regret that the U.S. had 
been forced into this position. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Assessing the Bilateral Relationship 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Until the exchange on Kazakhstan,s OSCE bid, the 
meeting had been uncontroversial.  Tokayev began by 
emphasizing the importance of the upcoming Nazarbayev visit 
to Washington.  Feigenbaum noted ongoing USG planning. 
Tokayev informed DAS Feigenbaum that a draft joint statement 
had been sent to Kazakhstan,s Embassy in Washington.  He 
said he had directed Ambassador Saudabayev to work with all 
relevant USG agencies to ensure that the document fully 
reflects the robust nature of the bilateral relationship. 
 
¶9. (C) He stated that all talks between the two presidents 
must be positive.  This would not be difficult, he suggested, 
given what the two countries had accomplished together in the 
past 2-3 years.  Tokayev plainly stated his belief that there 
were no negative aspects in the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship. 
 He thought it natural that on occasion difficult discussions 
would arise between the two governments, offering human 
rights and democratic reform as thematic examples.  But in 
his opinion, such conversations were necessary and useful to 
Kazakhstan, and he encouraged the U.S. to continue to raise 
such issues. 
 
¶10. (C) Feigenbaum assured Tokayev that the U.S. also places 
a great deal of importance on Nazarbayev,s visit.  He noted 
the robust nature of the bilateral relationship, which now 
included security, economic, energy, and democracy baskets. 
The United States and Kazakhstan have a genuinely 
multidimensional relationship.  He added that the chances of 
success would be greatly increased if, in the run-up to the 
visit, Kazakhstan could demonstrate a forward trajectory in 
the area of democratic reform.  He referred to a list of 
tangible suggestions previously provided by the USG, adding 
that the USG was looking for affirmative steps.  At the same 
time, Feigenbaum applauded the state of bilateral ties. 
Feigenbaum noted that U.S.-Kazakhstan cooperation was not 
only multidimensional but reached beyond the bilateral 
context.  Strong and growing U.S.-Kazakhstan ties benefited 
the region and the world. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Kazakhstani PRT Participation in Afghanistan Likely, But Not 
Assured 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶11. (C) Feigenbaum inquired about the possibility of 
Kazakhstan,s participation in a PRT in Afghanistan.  Tokayev 
answered that the GOK was planning to send an interagency 
fact-finding team, i.e., a survey team, to Afghanistan to 
assess the security environment and weigh Afghan needs 
against Kazakhstan,s operational capabilities.  He added 
that he had been working with Ambassador Ordway to move 
through these early stages.  Tokayev predicted that the 
answer on Afghanistan would ultimately be positive. 
Kazakhstan,s participation will further demonstrate the 
strength of the bilateral relationship.  But he warned that 
 
ALMATY 00003065  003 OF 004 
 
 
it was premature to say anything for certain on a PRT, as 
Afghanistan was a difficult country in a difficult situation. 
 (Note: Tokayev added that President Putin had recently asked 
him about the situation in Afghanistan.  When Tokayev began 
to say that democracy was on the rise there, Putin replied, 
&Never talk to me about democracy in Afghanistan.8  End 
note.). 
 
---------------------------------- 
U.S. Regional Presence and the SCO 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Tokayev then took a broader look at U.S. presence in 
the region.  He said that if regional actors were to welcome 
the U.S. economic presence, they would have to acknowledge 
the political and military aspects of U.S. policy as well. 
He described the debate on this matter at the SCO,s June 
Summit in China, where he said Kazakhstan had argued that 
military operations in Afghanistan were still necessary and 
enhanced Central Asia,s security.  Feigenbaum asked how this 
position had gone over with the other SCO members.  Tokayev 
laughed and said it had been very controversial. 
 
¶13. (C) Feigenbaum asked for Tokayev,s view of the SCO,s 
trajectory, noting the proliferation of multilateral 
groupings in Central Asia and questioning whether the SCO,s 
expanding agenda and membership would dilute the group. 
Tokayev characterized the SCO as an organization still in 
development.  He noted that the geopolitical situation had 
changed since its creation, thus it was natural that the 
SCO,s agenda had evolved as well.  Kazakhstan did not feel 
the time was right to admit new members for three reasons: no 
observer had formally accepted the guiding documents of the 
SCO; the legal framework of the organization was 
insufficiently developed for further expansion; and the GOK 
did not want to inject controversial issues into the SCO,s 
business (i.e., Kashmir if India and Pakistan joined, and 
Iran,s anti-western policies if Iran joined). 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Around the Horn: Tokayev,s Views on Iran, China, Uzbekistan 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶14. (C) Tokayev noted his contacts with Iran,s President 
Ahmadinejad.  Feigenbaum asked for Tokayev,s assessment of 
the man.  Tokayev did not answer directly, but opined that 
Iranian society was moving toward westernization.  He gave 
his belief that young Iranians in particular desire more 
freedom and an end to their country,s isolation.  With 
regard to Kazakhstan-Iran relations, Tokayev stated that 
while economic ties were increasing, difficulties remain.  He 
mentioned that the two countries had explored the possibility 
of a presidential visit, but it had been postponed due to 
Iran,s unhelpful attitude toward the Caspian.  Tokayev 
characterized Caspian delimitation as a difficult issue that 
would take years to resolve.  Tokayev also predicted future 
problems in Iran,s energy sector, as its oil and gas 
infrastructure was becoming increasingly outdated. 
 
¶15. (C) Tokayev characterized Kazakhstan-China relations as 
very good.  He noted an upcoming Nazarbayev to Beijing, and 
possibly Hong Kong, in December, as well as President Hu,s 
recent stop in Kazakhstan.  He opined, however, that Chinese 
companies were seeking access to Kazakhstan,s oil market on 
political rather than purely economic grounds.  As such, he 
saw Chinese ownership of Kazakhstan,s energy sector as a 
security issue and thought their share in the Kazakhstani 
market should be capped at current levels. 
 
¶16. (C) With regard to Uzbekistan, Tokayev saw its 
participation in the Eurasian Economic Community and the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization as positive in that 
its absence had created a hole in these ostensibly 
®ional8 organizations.  When pressed by DAS Feigenbaum 
and Ambassador Ordway about Uzbekistan,s policies on visas, 
customs, and particularly on landmines, Tokayev admitted that 
Uzbekistan,s membership has come with its share of 
difficulties.  But he suggested that Uzbekistan,s newfound 
 
ALMATY 00003065  004 OF 004 
 
 
interest in these organizations was a signal that Karimov may 
be shifting his foreign policy in a positive direction. 
ORDWAY