VZCZCXRO2569
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #3040/01 2400813
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280813Z AUG 06 ZFR
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6699
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ASTANA
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ALMATY 003040 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - MUDGE, DEHART 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KZ
SUBJECT:  SECURITY COUNCIL CHAIRMAN: KAZAKHSTAN WILL SEND 
SURVEY TEAM TO AFGHANISTAN TO STUDY PRT PARTICIPATION 
 
 
ALMATY 00003040  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
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with increased trans-Caspian oil shipments, even more 
attention needed to be paid to the issue.  Tazhin 
articulated Kazakhstan's significant economic promise as a 
transit country, suggesting that, in time, government 
revenues from transit trade could exceed those from the 
oil sector.  Finally, Tazhin argued that, even if unseen, 
democracy was developing in Kazakhstan, driven by the 
"fragmentation" of the economic elite and the political 
articulation of their economic interests.  End Summary. 
 
A History of GOK Support in Afghanistan... 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Opening with the issue of possible Kazakhstani 
participation in an Afghanistan PRT, Tazhin summarized 
past GOK support for the anti-terrorist coalition in 
Afghanistan.  Since 2001, he said, Kazakhstan had allowed 
2700 coalition overflights and 40 emergency landings on 
Kazakhstani soil.  Further, the Kazakhstani special 
services had intensified information sharing with their 
U.S. counterparts, and had received "high marks" for the 
quality and intensity of the cooperation.  The GOK had no 
objections to this type of cooperation, Tazhin explained, 
because Afghanistan's problems directly affected Central 
Asia. 
 
...and a "Survey Team" to Come 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) In this context, Tazhin continued, the GOK was 
putting together an inter-agency Survey Team.  Once 
assembled, likely "by September or October," the team 
would work fast to make a "strategic" decision about 
Kazakhstani participation in a PRT.  The primary obstacle, 
Tazhin observed, was the "problem of security" in the 
provinces. 
 
Caspian Security: Serious Work Needs to be Done 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Asked for his perspective on Caspian Sea 
security, Tazhin began by citing the recent GOK signing of 
an Inter-governmental Agreement governing entry of 
Kazakhstani oil into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline.  The fact that in the near future large volumes 
of Kazakhstani oil would be crossing the Caspian on 
tankers - combined with the littoral states' clear trend 
toward "militarizing" the sea - meant that Caspian 
security was an issue of increasing importance.  We have 
serious work to do, Tazhin concluded, both in protecting 
Kazakhstan's coasts and in preventing a possible terrorist 
attack on oil infrastructure. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Tazhin and Deputy Defense Minister Bolat Sembinov 
reviewed several USG/GOK projects aimed an enhancing 
Caspian security, with Tazhin suggesting that the U.S. 
sale of a big (1000 ton displacement) military vessel to 
Kazakhstan would be a valuable enhancement to Caspian 
security. 
 
Reflecting on Neighbors... 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Reflecting on the neighboring countries, Tazhin 
underscored that Kazakhstan had much to gain from economic 
integration with its neighbors.  While in early years 
Kazakhstan might have been in competition with other 
Central Asian states, he explained, the country's economic 
success had put it in a position to benefit from its 
neighbors' development.  Furthermore, regional economic 
development would help mitigate three growing  Kazakhstani 
concerns:  illegal migration, nacre-trafficking (and a 
related increase in domestic drug addition), and the 
threat that standing governments could be overtaken by 
theocracies.  The USG might not see the latter risk in 
Uzbekistan as it pushed for greater democratization, 
Tazhin warned, "but we clearly see the dangers from here." 
 
...and on Ourselves... 
---------------------- 
 
ALMATY 00003040  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
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¶7. (SBU) DAS Feigenbaum pushed back, noting that the U.S. 
experience suggested that the often-heard argument that 
states faced a choice between "democracy" and "stability" 
was, in fact, a false choice, as decisions made to promote 
short-term stability at the expense of democracy often 
eroded stability in the long-run.  Tazhin responded by 
defending Kazakhstan's own path of democratic development, 
arguing that, with economic institutions built, it was 
(only) now time to create a "liberal political 
infrastructure." 
 
¶8. (SBU) Kazakhstan wouldn't develop a "classical liberal 
democracy" any time in the next decade, Tazhin predicted, 
but progress was being made, driven by the "fragmentation 
of the economic elite" into ten or fifteen groupings.  By 
virtue of pursuing the political articulation of their 
economic interests, Tazhin explained, these groups were 
driving political change.  "We are making progress," 
Tazhin vowed, adding that, because the change was 
occurring in the society itself, and "not as a result of 
the subjective will of one person or another," the outcome 
would be lasting. 
 
Kazakhstan's Potential as a Transit Country 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Responding to DAS Feigenbaum vision of Kazakhstan 
expanding its traditional Northern and Western focus to 
become truly "omni-directional" in its regional trade and 
infrastructure ties, tapping the dynamic economies of 
China and India in the process, Tazhin articulated great 
potential for Kazakhstan as a transit country.  China, he 
said, processes 2.5 billion tons of cargo a year through 
its ports and railroads.  If Kazakhstan captured even 1% 
of that trade, he reasoned - capitalizing on the fact that 
Chinese-Europe trade via Kazakhstan was 12-14 days faster 
than by sea - it would represent 25 million tons a year. 
The potential for growth in transit trade was huge, he 
concluded, suggesting that in "seventeen years" GOK 
revenues from transit trade could equal revenues from the 
oil sector. 
 
ORDWAY