VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1378/01 1990200
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 180200Z JUL 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9628
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0109
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0591

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001378 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY AHTISAARI BRIEFS UNSC ON KOSOVO 
FUTURE STATUS TALKS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On July 13, the Security Council met for a 
briefing by Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari on his progress on 
overseeing the Kosovo Future Status Talks.  The unusual 
format for the day involved three separate events: a private 
meeting of the Security Council, closed consultations in 
which Ahtisaari briefed on his progress and the road ahead 
and lastly an "Arria-formula" meeting at which President 
Sejdiu spoke and listened to statements by some Security 
Council members.  In the Private Meeting, Serbian Prime 
Minister Kostunica delivered a highly legalistic message 
pointing successively to UNSCR 1244, the Helsinki Final Act 
and the UN Charter as legal arguments for why Kosovo could 
not be separated from Serbia.  Kostunica also asserted that 
the Contact Group statement from London in January did not 
allow for a rushed and imposed solution and stated in a final 
comment at the end of the session that the Albanians had 
"already gotten their state in the previous century, so, they 
do not deserve another one now."  In consultations Ahtisaari 
read from prepared comments and noted that he planned to 
convene a session on the larger status issues later this 
month, but positions were far apart so it would be difficult 
to come to an agreed solution.  Russian PermRep Vitaly 
Churkin said the international community should "get over 
Milosevic" and stop blaming the current democratic government 
in Belgrade for his actions.  Churkin also said the 
international community would have no right at all to impose 
a solution and that Kosovo was not a unique case and would, 
to the contrary, have an impact around the globe.  In the 
afternoon Arria-formula meeting, President Sejdiu delivered a 
well-balanced and temperate speech.  The U.S., UK, France, 
Greece and Italy made comments.  Russia was represented at 
the expert level and made no comments.  End summary. 
 
Private Meeting 
--------------- 
¶2. (C) In the private meeting, Prime Minister Kostunica 
(statement also faxed to Washington) delivered a highly 
legalistic message focused on Serbia's territorial integrity 
saying that Kosovo was incontestably part of Serbia and 
nobody had managed to call into question this fundamental 
fact by means of legal arguments.  Kostunica stated that 
Albanians who were the clear majority in Kosovo demanded to 
be given independence and full sovereignty of territory that 
belongs to Serbia and continued that these arguments for 
Kosovo's independence "amounted to violence and persistent 
threats to use force."  Kostunica further argued that the 
standards "were really about fundamental human rights", but 
thinking had slipped from "standards before status" to a 
consecutive approach and finally to the current situation of 
"almost forgetting about the standards all together." 
Kostunica concluded that "the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of democratic states should be sacrosanct."  He 
further stated that "the Parliament of Serbia would, without 
a shadow of a doubt, reject any imposed solution and declare 
it legally void, and Serbia would continue to consider the 
territory of Kosovo as part of its sovereignty." 
 
¶3.  (C) In national statements, UK Deputy Permrep Karen 
Pierce welcomed Kostunica's offer to move the process 
forward, but stated that the January Contact Group Statement 
and Guiding Principles along with 1244 must be adhered to 
firmly.  Pierce also stated that Kosovo was a very unique 
case because of the history of the region.  Pierce, welcomed 
Kostunica's willingness to engage Ahtisaari, but said the UK 
was concerned by "attempts to undermine him."  Countering an 
argument by Kostunica, she said "no one would be trying to 
change the borders of the Balkans by force and with 7000 NATO 
troops there, no one would allow Kosovo to become a threat to 
its neighbors."  The fact was that Kosovars did not want to 
be ruled by Belgrade, however, was a fact that Ahtisaari 
would have to take into account, Pierce stated.  In its 
statement, Greece stressed that any solution needed to be 
negotiated and Belgrade should encourage Serbs to participate 
in Kosovo institutions.  There should be no inflexible 
deadlines, but also "no dragging out of the process." 
Denmark underscored that Ahtisaari's approach was realistic 
and his process was "the only game in town, so we all needed 
to support him."  In addition, parallel structures were not 
helpful. 
 
¶4.  (C) Slovakia said its principal for the Kosovo Future 
Status Process was "impartiality and transparency."  It also 
argued that the international community should not "give the 
impression that the outcome of the status talks had been 
prejudged."  Slovakia also called on Belgrade to allow Serb 
participation in Kosovar institutions.  The French Permrep 
 
 
said France fully supported Ahtisaari and that Serbs needed 
to be involved in Kosovo institutions.  France hoped a 
negotiated settlement could be reached, but, in any case, one 
needed to be found within the timeline previously determined 
by the Contact Group.  France supported the Guiding 
Principles and we could not accept a return to the status quo 
before 1999, nor could we accept the attachment of Kosovo to 
any another state. 
 
¶5.  (C) Kostunica, who asked to speak again at the end of the 
Private meeting, said that the London Contact Group statement 
had stated we should listen to the will of the majority, but 
had also addressed the need for compromise and "negotiated 
settlement", so we needed to find a solution without a change 
in borders.  Kostunica also asserted that despite calls for 
self-determination in the Security Council meeting that day, 
"the Albanians had in fact already gotten their state in the 
early 20th Century and did not need another one now." 
 
Consultations With Ahtisaari 
---------------------------- 
¶6.  (C) In consultations, Ahtisaari spoke and read a prepared 
statement (same text as advance copy received by Washington). 
 Delivering a strong statement, Russian Permrep Vitaly 
Churkin said we should not over-dramatize the modest results 
achieved in status talks thus far.  There should not be any 
imposed timelines or any prejudgment of the outcome and 
continued dialogue would be the only way we would come up 
with a solution.  Some claimed that a solution to the problem 
of Kosovo's status could be reached without action by the 
Security Council, but that would set a negative precedent, 
said Churkin.  The argument that the Kosovo case was is 
unique is false and could set a dangerous double standard in 
international relations. In reality in many unsettled regions 
of the world, people were watching the outcome for Kosovo and 
it could affect their actions.  Churkin continued, averring 
that we should "get over Milosevic" and stop blaming the 
current democratic government in Belgrade for his past sins. 
He also said the international community would have no right 
at all to impose a solution.  In an open exchange at the end 
of the meeting Ahtisaari countered Churkin's argument, saying 
there had been considerable violence against Kosovars by the 
Milosevic regime and that the period from 1989 to 1999 could 
not simply be forgotten.  Churkin rebutted that Ahtisaari had 
misunderstood his point, which was that while the repression 
of the Milosevic regime might be true it was to be sorted out 
in the Hague and not in the future status process for Kosovo. 
 Ahtisaari responded that we could not just separate the 
status process from the actual history of the region. 
 
¶7.  (C) In addition to the talking points in STATE 114589, 
the U.S. also responded to Churkin's comment about the 
non-uniqueness of Kosovo pointing out that the events since 
1989 had indeed made it sui generis.  Greece stated that 
standards implementation had come a long way in the past 
year, but more still needed to be done.  Above all, we needed 
to find an outcome that would ensure peaceful coexistence 
with the Serbs and stability in the region.  China stated 
that it was important to respect sovereignty and 
international territory under international law and 
negotiations needed to take place within the framework of 
relevant Security Council resolutions.  UK Deputy Permrep 
Karen Pierce stated that there was no alternative to 
Ahtisaari and we needed to offer him our full support. 
Pierce also argued that Ahtisaari had misinterpreted the 
Contact Group statement from January when he said that it 
dictated that a negotiated settlement was the only option. 
Slovakia stated that we needed a balanced and negotiated 
settlement and to lay the ground for a modern multi-ethnic 
society in Kosovo, which would be measured by returns on the 
ground and, ultimately, by what happens the day after status 
is decided. 
 
Arria-formula Session With President Sejdiu 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) In the afternoon Arria-formula meeting, President 
Sejdiu delivered a well-balanced and temperate speech (text 
faxed to the Department). The U.S., UK, France, Greece and 
Italy made comments.  The U.S., UK and French comments all 
offered support for Sejdiu, but stressed that he had much 
more to do to forge compromises and push standards 
implementation.  Russia was represented at the expert level 
and did not exercise its right to make a statement.  (Note: 
Russia had expressed reservations to this meeting format in 
the first place, saying Sejdiu should be offered only a lunch 
outside of the UN Secretariat building.) 
 
 
BOLTON