VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #1650/01 1840949
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030949Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1164
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 7241
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1164
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1596
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 8172
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0702
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 001650 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG - HARRIS, NEA/FO, NEA/PI 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV KMPI KPAO TS
SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA QUARTERLY REPORT 
 
REF: A. TUNIS 1565 
 
     ¶B. TUNIS 1425 
     ¶C. TUNIS 1424 
     ¶D. TUNIS 1402 
     ¶E. TUNIS 1390 
     ¶F. TUNIS 1308 
     ¶G. TUNIS 1255 
     ¶H. TUNIS 1254 
     ¶I. TUNIS 1253 
     ¶J. TUNIS 1252 
     ¶K. TUNIS 1238 
     ¶L. TUNIS 1220 
     ¶M. TUNIS 1204 
     ¶N. TUNIS 1021 
     ¶O. TUNIS 816 
     ¶P. TUNIS 808 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM HUDSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The one year anniversary of our Freedom 
Agenda was marked by increased USG engagement and continued 
GOT stagnation on political reform.  This quarter, post 
continued its active engagement of the GOT, which was 
reinforced by Deputy Secretary Zoellick during his May visit 
and the visit of Deputy Assistant Secretary Gray in June. 
Positive steps were also taken to increase EU cooperation on 
Freedom Agenda goals in Tunisia, and civil society activists 
continued to speak out. Despite these efforts, the GOT did 
not take any positive steps and reports of civil society 
harassment and intimidation continued.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) HIGH LEVEL ENGAGEMENT: This quarter was marked by the 
highest level State Department engagement in Tunisia since 
the December 2003 visit of former Secretary Powell.  During 
his May 18-19 visit, Deputy Secretary Zoellick recommended 
reconfiguring a multifaceted dialogue with the GOT to include 
economic and social reform, human rights, and political 
reform.  The Deputy Secretary also made it clear to the GOT 
that the "quality of our relationship will depend on moving 
forward with political reform."  Typically sensitive to any 
criticism, Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali 
acknowledged that the GOT "made some mistakes", but did not 
indicate any positive progress on reform would be 
forthcoming.  The Deputy Secretary also met with civil 
society representatives to encourage their efforts to promote 
political reform (Refs G,H,I,J). 
 
¶3. (C) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray reinforced 
Zoellick's engagement during his June 27-28 visit to Tunisia. 
 DAS Gray raised our key Freedom Agenda goals with Deputy 
Foreign Minister for the Americas and Asia, Saida Chtioui, 
and also discussed our efforts with Tunisian contacts 
(septels).  Additionally, in response to continued GOT 
harassment of civil society activists, on April 3 the 
Department issued a statement criticizing these actions and 
calling on the GOT "to take actions consistent with its 
declared intentions to engage in democratic reform. 
Throughout the quarter, post raised USG concerns about 
restrictions on freedom of expression and association with a 
wide variety of GOT and private interlocutors.  For World 
Press Freedom Day, post organized a successful May 4 DVC for 
independent journalists with NEA/PPD Director Alberto 
Fernandez (Ref K). 
 
¶4. (C) Further, the Ambassador and other emboffs raised our 
Freedom Agenda priorities in a number of meetings with GOT 
officials and met with a wide variety of civil society 
activists in support of our Freedom Agenda goals.  From 
attending NGO events to meeting one-on-one with activists 
facing GOT harassment to discussing our efforts with local 
journalists, post's support for key civil society entities 
continued throughout the quarter.  For example, Ambassador 
and poloffs attended LTDH events and met with multiple LTDH 
officials during the quarter.  Emboffs were present at the 
LTDH court appearance, the Bar Association sit-in, and the 
national congress of a feminist organization, which further 
demonstrated our commitment to our Freedom Agenda goals to 
civil society and the GOT, whose security officials closely 
monitor all independent civil society activities (see also 
para 7). 
 
¶5. (C) US/EU COOPERATION: Perhaps in response to the 
escalation in GOT-civil society conflict, EU interest in 
cooperation on efforts to encourage democratic and human 
rights reform grew.  On several occasions, EU officials in 
Tunisia reached out to discuss how to use joint pressure to 
further shared political goals in Tunisia.  The European 
Commission Head of Delegation and other officials explored 
with the Ambassador and DCM greater coordination between US 
and EU human rights messages to the GOT (Refs A,E).  DAS Gray 
met with EU officials in June to follow up on these 
discussions and the way ahead (septel). 
 
¶6. (C) GOT RECALCITRANCE: While civil society entities 
appreciated our engagement, the GOT took no positive steps 
toward political reform.  In fact, no progress on Freedom 
Agenda objectives has been noted, and the quarter was marked 
by increasing levels of civil society harassment and 
intimidation (Ref N).  On May 27, the GOT violently blocked a 
proposed National Congress of the Tunisian Human Rights 
League (LTDH), and prior to the event, the GOT warned 
diplomats to avoid the area (Ref F).  Further, despite post 
and Washington support for the establishment of an 
International Republican Institute (IRI) office in Tunisia, 
the Tunisian Embassy in Washington informed IRI in June that 
the "relevant Tunisian authorities are not ready to examine 
IRI's request to establish an office."  According to Tunisian 
human rights activists, the GOT also tried to exert control 
over the independent Tunisian Bar Association by establishing 
a new law institute that some lawyers fear would bring 
entrance into the Bar Association under government control. 
 
¶7. (C) CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVISM: Despite increased constraints, 
Tunisian civil society remained active.  In response to the 
GOT law institute announcement, the Tunisian Bar Association 
organized a May sit-in despite a heavy police presence and 
reports of numerous physical and verbal assaults (Ref M).  On 
the margins of a conference held by the Tunisian Association 
of Deomcratic Women (ATFD), Tunisian civil society also 
expressed its intention to remain unified to advance 
political reform goals (Ref C).  Meanwhile, in addition to 
the GOT blockage of its national congress, LTDH officials 
said they expect the legal deadlock to continue indefinitely 
(Ref B). 
 
¶8. (C) OUTLOOK: A year into the Freedom Agenda, Tunisia has 
made little progress on our Freedom Agenda goals.  While the 
GOT tries to give the appearance of a commitment to 
democracy, the gap continues to widen between our efforts and 
the GOT's willingness to respond and to work to increase 
political space.  However, the dismissal of a senior Ministry 
of Interior official may be a sign to domestic and 
international critics that the heavy-handed GOT response to 
local activists may be coming to an end (Ref D).  While 
continuing our efforts to advance the Freedom Agenda goals, 
post also awaits Washington guidance on an action plan for 
following up on the Deputy Secretary's visit to develop a 
strategy to further the goals of the Freedom Agenda. 
HUDSON