VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #3707 1840943
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 030943Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3937
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3089
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 9234
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

S E C R E T TOKYO 003707 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2026 
TAGS: EWWT PBST PHSA PREL KS JA
SUBJECT: LIANCOURT ROCKS: ROK SHOULD "PAY A COST" 
 
REF: A. STATE 109302 (302236Z JUN 06) 
 
     ¶B. TOKYO 3623 (291034Z JUN 06) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer.  Reason: 1.4 (b)(d). 
 
¶1.  (S)  Summary:  On July 3, the DCM delivered reftel A 
points to MOFA Asian Affairs DG Sasae, urging restraint and 
emphasizing that our common agenda on North Korea should not 
be side-tracked by the Liancourt Rocks dispute.  DG Sasae 
said FM Aso would try this evening to call ROK FM Ban, but 
such a call was unlikely to influence the ROKG on the matter 
because the Blue House, with whom the GOJ had no 
communication, was calling the shots.  Expressing strong 
disappointment with the U.S. even-handed approach, DG Sasae 
asserted that the GOJ, but not the ROK, was exercising 
restraint.  He wondered aloud why the ROK was pushing the 
issue now, adding that it would be unacceptable for the ROK 
to send the research vessel into the disputed waters and then 
expect things to return to normal.  Instead, the ROK, which 
he accused of ignoring the effect of its actions on overall 
Japan-ROK relations, would have to "pay a cost," he asserted. 
 DG Sasae thought the next 48 hours were the last chance to 
prevent the ROK from going forward with the survey operation, 
strongly implying that the USG should use that time to try to 
dissuade the ROK from such a course.  He added that the GOJ 
was not giving up on diplomacy, but concluded that the 
situation was "quite dangerous."  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S)  The DCM met July 3 with MOFA Asian Affairs Director 
General Kenichiro Sasae to convey reftel A points.  Noting 
that the U.S. took no position on the competing claims in the 
disputed area, he said the U.S. continued to urge restraint. 
Pointing out the possibility of a Taepodong-II launch, the 
DCM emphasized that our shared interests in dealing with 
North Korea should not be side-tracked by the current dispute 
involving the Liancourt Rocks. 
 
¶3.  (S)  DG Sasae said the GOJ understood that the ROK 
research vessel had left port on the evening of July 2, 
earlier than expected, because of heavy ROK media interest. 
The ROK, he pointed out, had still not provided any official 
notice about the vessel to the GOJ.  "We don't know what 
they're thinking," Sasae mused, by moving at this time into 
the disputed waters. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Sasae related that, upon his return from the G-8 
summit, FM Aso had tried to call ROK FM Ban last night, but 
was unable to reach him due to schedule conflicts.  Aso would 
try again this evening, but Sasae discounted the chances that 
such a call would influence the ROKG, because the Blue House, 
not MOFAT, was calling the shots on this matter.  Sasae added 
that the GOJ had no communication with the Blue House, which 
made the situation "dangerous." 
 
¶5.  (S)  Expressing strong disappointment with the U.S. 
even-handed message, Sasae asserted that the GOJ had shown 
restraint so far, but not the ROKG.  If the ROKG were to stop 
the survey ship even at this point, there would be no 
problem, he said.  But the ROKG should not think that it 
could dispatch the survey ship into the contested waters, 
accept a protest from the GOJ, and then expect things to 
simply return to normal.  Instead, the ROK would have to, in 
Sasae's words, "pay a cost" for ignoring the effect such 
actions would have on overall relations.  He thought in 
response Japan would decide to go ahead with its own survey. 
 
¶6.  (S)  DG Sasae thought the next 48 hours were the last 
chance to prevent the ROK from going forward with the survey 
operation, strongly implying that the USG should use that 
time to try to dissuade the ROK from such a course.  He added 
that the GOJ was not giving up on diplomacy, but concluded 
that the situation was "quite dangerous." 
SCHIEFFER