VZCZCXRO7646
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0918/01 1841041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031041Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2148
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
REUHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000918 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KNAR EUN LY BU
SUBJECT: AMB. BEYRLE'S 6/30 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARVANOV 
 
REF: A. WHITEHOUSE 271616Z JUN 06 
 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 108110 
 
Classified By: Amb. John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY:  Ambassador on June 30 delivered Ref A 
letter from President Bush to President Parvanov reiterating 
U.S. support for Bulgaria's European Union accession.  In the 
ensuing 40-minute discussion, Parvanov expressed deep 
appreciation for the President's timely response and vowed 
Bulgaria's ongoing efforts to meet EU concerns would justify 
U.S. support.   Parvanov also expressed hope that improving 
U.S.-Libyan relations would assist in freeing the Bulgarian 
medics held in Tripoli.  Ambassador thanked Parvanov for 
formation of the government commission studying Jewish 
community restitution issues and raised continuing problems 
in Bulgaria's business climate.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C)  Parvanov appeared upbeat about Bulgaria's EU progress 
and noted that the government's "action plan" -- while 
perhaps overly ambitious and detailed --  demonstrated 
Bulgaria's determination to address weaknesses raised by the 
European Commission report in a number of areas -- not just 
the "red-card" issues.   He predicted a positive review in 
the EU's fall report and was hopeful that Bulgaria would be 
spared from safeguard clauses.   Citing President Bush's 
letter, the Ambassador urged continued efforts -- especially 
in the key areas of organized crime and corruption.  Parvanov 
and the Ambassador agreed that the new Prosecutor General 
(Boris Velchev) was a good fit for the job. Parvanov noted 
that while Velchev was starting with the first priority -- 
making personnel changes to clean up the prosecution service 
itself -- he ultimately intended to address problems 
throughout the government.  This was already leading to overt 
and covert attempts to undermine him, Parvanov said, but 
Velchev would persevere.  The Ambassador said Velchev's July 
10-13 visit to Washington would allow us to identify concrete 
ways to support his efforts. 
 
¶3. (C)  To support Bulgaria's EU accession, the Ambassador 
reassured Parvanov that for the immediate future, he would be 
stressing Bulgaria's progress in public statements, saving 
criticism for private discussions.  The Embassy, the 
Ambassador said, will continue to highlight growing U.S. 
investment in Bulgaria as a sign of support for Bulgaria's 
political stability and economic potential.  But this should 
not be taken as a sign that our concerns over the business 
climate were weakening. On the contrary, the Ambassador said, 
most Western investors agreed that the "cost" of doing 
business in Bulgaria had increased under the current 
government.  He cited the long battle to conclude the 
privatization of the Boyana Film Studio as a conspicuous bad 
example in this regard that weakened our ability and even 
desire to advocate for more investment.  Parvanov said he 
would check on the state of play of the "notorious" Boyana 
deal. 
 
¶4. (C)  Reflecting on the upcoming presidential elections, 
Parvanov thought foreign affairs would play a very small role 
-- but a negative EU decision would clearly have an effect. 
Parvanov (a former leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party) 
was certain the fractured rightist parties would be unable to 
unify behind a single candidate.  The rightist parties' 
frustration over this, he observed, was leading to 
increasingly bitter battles between them.  (Note: Only a 
trace of Schadenfreude was evident in that observation.) 
 
¶5. (C)  Turning to Libya, Parvanov expressed hope this year 
would see release of the nurses after more than six years of 
detention.  The Ambassador reassured Parvanov that the issue 
is always included in our discussions with the Libyans and 
they understand that truly full relations with the U.S. will 
not be possible until the case is successfully resolved. 
Parvanov again expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts. 
 
¶6. (C)  In closing, the Ambassador thanked the President for 
formation of the government commission studying Jewish 
property restitution issues (ref B).  Parvanov responded that 
he had made a personal commitment on this issue and would 
continue to follow the commission's work closely. 
 
¶7. (C)  COMMENT:  As in public, Parvanov in private exudes 
the confidence of an experienced incumbent entering a 
Presidential campaign with approval ratings of 60-70%  and 
facing a divided and fractious opposition.  Weeks of media 
scrutiny and opposition attacks surrounding his alleged work 
as an "agent" of the communist-era state security seem to 
have petered out, following his strong public denial of the 
allegations in which he dramatically read exculpatory 
excerpts from his security file.  He continues to voice 
 
SOFIA 00000918  002 OF 002 
 
 
public support for Bulgaria's participation in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the military basing agreement with the U.S., 
while conceding privately that this helps him little in 
political terms with his conservative socialist voter base. 
Parvanov's statements supporting stronger measures against 
crime and corruption hit all the right notes, but there is 
still little serious progress that he can point to on this 
front.  Although clearly possessed of the political skills 
and probably even the will to promote progress against these 
traditional Bulgarian ills, Parvanov's history of political / 
business associations compromise his ability to be a truly 
effective crusader against them.  END COMMENT. 
 
Beyrle