This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000946 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON PREL BM NLD
SUBJECT: NLD IN CENTRAL BURMA: TREADING WATER 
 
REF: RANGOON 287 
 
Classified By: P/E: Mark B. Taylor; for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Facing repressive measures by regional 
authorities, the NLD struggles to maintain minimal activities 
in the key central divisions of Mandalay and Magwe. Elder 
party leaders shrugged off the effects of the SPDC's public 
campaign to coerce NLD resignations, but hope for "outside 
help" to rekindle Burma's dispirited opposition.  The GOB 
closely watches NLD youth and students and prevents them from 
organizing or communicating and coordinating with the NLD's 
leadership.  NLD leaders in central Burma highlighted growing 
involvement of USDA in intimidation efforts.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.(C)  During a June 22-23 visit to Mandalay, Emboffs met 
with five members of the NLD's Mandalay Division Committee. 
The Mandalay Committee members voiced their intention to 
maintain limited party activities, but expressed concern over 
moves by the SPDC to tighten control through the state-made 
mass mobilization organization, Union Solidarity Development 
Association (USDA).  Chairman Bo Zan recounted personal 
attacks on him and other NLD members by suspected USDA 
members on motorcycle. (reftel). 
 
3.(C) The NLD members expressed keen interest in the UN 
Security Council resolution proposed by the USG. In 
particular, they asked how the resolution would fare with 
Chinese and Russian opposition.  Emboff acknowledged that PRC 
and Russian resistance presents a challenge to the UNSC 
initiative and noted that discussions on the resolution were 
ongoing in New York and other countries.  The NLD members 
noted the regime's alarm over the prospective resolution and 
expressed hope that the initiative would succeed.  According 
to the NLD officials, Burmese people, too afraid to speak out 
themselves, put the burden of political dissent on the NLD, 
which sees "outside help" as essential to break the political 
stalemate.  Chairman U Bo Zan cited many examples in history 
when Burmese rulers sought outside assistance in the fight 
for self-determination. 
 
4.(C). The NLD elders then discussed the government's public 
campaign touting the resignations of key NLD members in 
Mandalay Division.  Chairman U Bo Zan declared that most of 
the resigning NLD members were unknown to the party leaders 
in the Division.  In a recent group of 40 resignations in the 
Mandalay area, only two of the "members" were known to be 
active, added Daw Win Mya Mya.  "They are lying," concluded 
the NLD officials, who expressed confidence that this public 
campaign would not have a serious effect on the NLD.  Later, 
however, the NLD leaders spoke about the deleterious effects 
of the government's efforts, often through the USDA, to lure 
NLD members away from the party by offering bribes and perks, 
such as permission to engage in illegal businesses.  The 
regime promises "hundreds of lakhs" of kyat (equivalent to 
thousands of dollars) to some NLD officials, they complained. 
  The elder politicians also inquired about the future of the 
former U.S. Consulate in Mandalay, which they hoped would be 
reopened to represent America and indirectly  help the NLD. 
 
5.(C) The five elder officials noted that they continue to 
hold monthly party meetings in private residences and issue 
statements to the international media and external 
supporters.  The NLD office in Mandalay remains closed, 
although its sign remains.  Party Secretary U Kan Htun 
described how party members repainted the fading and 
paint-chipped sign over the office at night without taking 
the sign down.  Removal and replacement of the sign, claimed 
the Secretary, would have broken a regulation against 
erecting new political party signs. 
 
TAKING THE DEBAYIN ATTACK TO THE HAGUE? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6.(C) Daw Win Mya Mya revisited the violent USDA attack on 
Daw Aung Sang Suu Kyi and her entourage in Debayin on May 30, 
2003, showing Emboff the scars remaining from wounds she 
suffered in that attack.  Not only has the SPDC failed to 
investigate the attack, noted the Party's Mandalay Secretary, 
but its security personnel arrested her and others who 
survived the attack, releasing them with a warning that "you 
have not been interviewed."  NLD members infer from this 
warning that it could be used by authorities a pretext to 
re-arrest and "investigate" them at any time.  Win Mya Mya 
then revealed a proposal developed by the Mandalay Committee, 
to bring the Debayin incident before the International Court 
of Justice in The Hague.  She noted that the drivers of the 
vehicles ferrying USDA members to the site, who she intimated 
are sympathetic to the NLD, are available as eye witnesses to 
the violence and killings. 
 
7.(C) If the international media revisits the Debayin 
massacre in the international media, and holds the SPDC 
accountable, the NLD Mandalay office hopes to rekindle a 
national uprising, Win Mya Mya disclosed.  The Mandalay NLD 
office is in a "pre-assessment" phase, according to Win Mya 
May, and seeks guidance on how to present the case to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the highest 
prospects of success.  She acknowledged that the Mandalay 
Committee had not yet raised this proposal with the NLD's 
National Committee in Rangoon, but will do so soon.  She also 
opined that the proposal, which would undoubtedly raise the 
SPDC's ire, might not yield the National Committee's approval 
since the "uncles" in Rangoon seek to encourage contacts with 
the regime. 
 
 
LIKE THIEVES THEY CHASE US 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Daw Win Mya Mya noted that the Mandalay Committee's 
members are watched more closely now.  She predicted that 
there would be security personnel waiting for the five NLD 
officials after the meeting and she was proven correct.  She 
described the recently increased monitoring of NLD officials' 
movements by security personnel, who she claimed are assisted 
by USDA members trained in surveillance, by saying "they act 
like thieves, chasing us everywhere." 
 
 
TIGHT CONTROL ON NLD IN MAGWE 
----------------------------- 
 
9.(C) Magwe Division, one of the country's largest sources of 
agricultural output and recruits for the Army, is not known 
for tolerating political dissent.  The Division capital was 
one of Burma's few cities that saw no significant public 
protests in the summer of 1988.  Magwe NLD Committee 
officers, contacted in Rangoon during the commemoration of 
Aung San Suu Kyi's birthday, claimed to be "rebuilding" and 
focused on strengthening the Party's role in Magwe, but they 
asked that Emboffs not contact them while visiting Magwe, as 
such a visit would provoke additional suppression of the 
Party's activities in  the state.   Emboffs found that other 
local figures, such as a politically active monk with no 
direct ties to the NLD, were also reluctant to meet them 
during their visit. 
 
MAGWE NLD YOUTH DISPIRITED, REALISTIC 
------------------------------------- 
 
10.(C) On June 27 Emboffs met in Magwe town with five 
representatives of the NLD Youth in the residence of one of 
the "Youth" who had been imprisoned for several years 
following the 1988 uprising.  Three are now in their late 
thirties or early forties; two were in their twenties.  As a 
group, they disparaged the new generation of students, 
describing them as politically inert, "with eyes and ears 
shut."  They admitted, however, that some younger students 
still "see the light" and get involved despite the greater 
risks.  The older students credited international support for 
the opposition in Burma but stated that the onus for pushing 
the regime was on those inside the country.  They expressed 
appreciation for meeting with a USG official, and stressed 
that they are under unprecedented control now.  Parents are 
afraid that their children's' political behavior could result 
in a student being barred from matriculation exams or 
entering university.  One of the younger students noted that 
parents now get nervous when students listen to RFA or DVB at 
home. 
 
11.(C) They described a new, lower threshold of dissent that 
now provokes a harsh response from the regime.  For example, 
the NLD youth cited a modest 2006 action by current Magwe 
University students.  The students protested a hike in the 
cost of bus transport from the center of Magwe to the new 
campus on the far outskirts of town.  Police broke up the 
protest and expelled ten students identified as leaders. 
 
12.(C) Illustrating the bleak prospects for Burma's youth 
today, one student said that, of his two daughters in their 
twenties, one has graduated university but can only find work 
selling snacks from a roadside store.  The other daughter for 
the past year attended one of the SPDC's "computer colleges" 
where all the computers are inoperable.  She has never 
operated a functioning computer.  "What future do my 
daughters face?" he asked in despair. 
 
13.(C) The Magwe youth claimed the forced NLD resignation 
campaign has yet to hit Magwe Division, but they acknowledged 
significant official pressure, particularly on students, to 
join the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA), the 
regime's mass member organization.  Some high-performing 
students who refused to join the USDA, have found themselves 
inexplicably locked out of matriculation exams and unable to 
get into universities, claimed one of the youth.  In 
addition, the USDA has developed a security function, claimed 
the youth.  These USDA informers, who assist the regular and 
Special Branch police in keeping tabs on and suppressing 
potential political activities, are part of an informal 
organization known as the "people's militia" which receives 
some training in fighting, claimed the youth. 
 
14.(C) Comment:  Continued repression by the regime against 
NLD in the Burmese heartland will likely continue.  Regime 
intimidation tactics in these areas get less international 
press coverage, giving local authorities more latitude.  In a 
tightly closed society, the NLD can do little to put the 
spotlight on the ongoing repression, which is why they 
welcome visits by Embassy officers, even though they expect 
even greater harassment.  The most troubling trend we see 
appearing nationwide is the increasing use of USDA cadres as 
another element of intimidation, in addition to the police 
and military.  END COMMENT. 
VILLAROSA