VZCZCXRO6903
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0587/01 1931832
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121832Z JUL 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6293
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0760
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BRAUN, 
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: TENSIONS BUILDING OVER NORTHERN KOSOVO 
 
REF: (A) PRISTINA 518 (B) PRISTINA 575 (C) PRISTINA 519 
 
Classified By: COM PHILIP S. GOLDBERG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  As all concerned enter the Kosovo final 
status home stretch, the north of Kosovo is increasingly 
coming into focus as the area where preferred status outcomes 
potentially collide.  UNMIK officials say they have credible 
reports that Kosovo Serbs in the north are attempting to 
reinforce de facto partition.  COM has urged Prime Minister 
Ceku to resist the pressure he says is increasing on him to 
take a government stand on the north.  In recent weeks, 
UNMIK, police, and KFOR have poured security resources into 
the north, but the jury is still out on the utility of the 
added presence.  In recent days, the presence of USOP 
officials provoked a reaction from illicit Serbian security 
personnel.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) UNMIK police and civilian sides are convinced that 
Belgrade has in recent weeks significantly upped the number 
of interior ministry police (MUP) illicitly patrolling in the 
north of Kosovo in plainclothes (ref A).  Acting SRSG Steven 
Schook recently told COM that a well-placed UNMIK source in 
the north is reporting that the build-up is ongoing and is 
intended as a means of reinforcing de facto partition.  The 
three northern municipalities, all majority-Serb, meanwhile 
continue to organize volunteer "self-defense committees" as 
some variety of neighborhood watch groups to assist the MUP 
(ref B). 
 
¶3. (C) Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku recently told COM that 
Kosovo Albanians are increasingly nervous about the north. 
Ceku said he is becoming frustrated at having nothing to say 
in response. (NOTE. COM impressed on Ceku in reply that any 
unilateral PISG action in the north would surely provoke a 
Kosovo Serb reaction that could only be counterproductive to 
Pristina's interests, particularly in the final status 
process.  The best thing Ceku could do, COM added, would be 
to manage the hotheads on this side of the Ibar River that 
divides Mitrovica and let KFOR and CIVPOL handle the 
situation on the ground.  Ceku acknowledged that there is 
little else the government can do. END NOTE.)  One Kosovo 
Albanian daily carried a communique on July 12, allegedly 
authored by the radical Albanian National Army (AKSH), 
calling on Kosovo Albanians to mobilize in the north "to face 
difficulties in the circumstances that may be created by the 
eternal Serb enemy." 
 
¶4. (C) In this context of increasing tension, USAID officers 
from Pristina, Belgrade, and Kosovo met with area high school 
principals on June 30 in north Mitrovica to discuss possible 
USG assistance.  The meetings were routinely substantive, but 
outside the meeting site (a vocational high school) USOP 
drivers and security personnel, all ethnic Albanians, were 
approached by seven Serb men, all dressed casually and 
apparently unarmed, in an obviously-coordinated action.  One 
USOP employee recognized two of the Serbs as MUP personnel. 
The encounter ended without confrontation, but its occurrence 
was the first in several years involving USOP personnel in 
the north. 
 
¶5. (C) COMMENT.  We see four threads of developments in 
Kosovo's north: KFOR is re-asserting its presence (ref C); 
Serb municipal leaders are reacting to a perceived up-tick in 
interethnic violence (ref A); UNMIK is increasing the degree 
and visibility of the CIVPOL and Kosovo Police Service 
presence; and the Serbian ministry of the interior is 
seemingly re-inforcing its illicit police presence.  KFOR's 
return was prompted by a sudden collective international 
community realization that French KFOR had quietly and 
inexplicably withdrawn from the north months ago, leaving 
NATO with no troops north of the Ibar.  KFOR does not do 
policing and its return is not intended to directly address 
Kosovo Serb concerns over recent violent crimes.  Further, 
KFOR has set up camp (ref C) in Leposavic Municipality, which 
has not been the venue of the recent violence, and the troops 
are not necessarily seen by area Serbs as protectors. 
 
 
PRISTINA 00000587  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED.  The major unknown regarding these 
four developments is the extent to which the reactions of 
Belgrade and the three northern municipalities are 
coordinated.  The unusual recent reluctance of all three 
involved mayors to engage USOP officials suggests outside 
influence and leaves us believing that the hardening of their 
rhetoric reflects more a calculated decision to also harden 
the de facto soft partition of the north than an effort to 
address legitimate security concerns. 
 
¶7. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release in 
its entirety to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti 
Ahtisaari. 
GOLDBERG