VZCZCXRO2192
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0576/01 1881627
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071627Z JUL 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6283
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0756
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000576 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BRAUN, 
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: NEGOTIATION TEAM RECEPTIVE TO POST-UNMIK 
INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN MISSION PLANNING 
 
 
Classified By: COM PHILIP S. GOLDBERG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  In response to an invitation from President 
Fatmir Sejdiu, COM and Torbjorn Sohlstrom, the head of the EU 
mission in Kosovo, briefed the Kosovo negotiating team July 5 
on initial thinking on a post-status, post-UNMIK 
international civilian mission.  They stressed that any 
future international presence would be a "clean break from 
UNMIK" and have a "different mission."  COM added that the 
more the Kosovo government demonstrates capacity and 
performance on standards in the current period, the stronger 
our case for a light follow-on mission.  Sohlstrom told the 
negotiating team that while any future international presence 
in Kosovo will be based on a UNSC resolution, the EU believed 
it should also be shaped by discussions with the Kosovo 
government.  President Fatmir Sejdiu stated that he has 
always been in favor of a continued, but smaller, 
international civilian presence in Kosovo after UNMIK 
departs.  Prime Minister Agim Ceku responded that he hoped 
that when UNMIK leaves, most of its current competencies 
would be given to the Kosovo government.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) COM and the head of the EU Liaison Office Torbjorn 
Sohlstrom briefed the six-member Kosovo final status 
negotiating team July 5 on initial thinking on the follow-on 
international civilian mission after a decision on Kosovo's 
status.  (NOTE:  The Kosovo negotiating team, or "Unity 
Team," consists of President Sejdiu, Prime Minister Agim 
Ceku, Kosovo Assembly president Kole Berisha, opposition 
leaders Hashim Thaci and Veton Surroi, and coordinator Blerim 
Shala.  Also at the meeting were Sejdiu's advisors Skender 
Hyseni and Muhamet Hamiti, Minister for Environmental and 
Spatial Planning Ardian Gjini, EU Liaison Mission advisor Ben 
Crampton and PolOff.  END NOTE).  According to Sohlstrom, 
Veton Surroi had insisted the heads of the EU and USOP 
liaison office brief the entire negotiating team rather than 
the political sub-working group due to the importance of this 
subject. 
 
¶3. (C) COM started by assuring the Unity Team that the U.S. 
would play a strong role in implementing any agreement, as 
well as continuing with assistance programs to develop 
capacity in the judicial and other areas.  At the same time, 
COM stressed EU and USG agreement that the future 
international presence be a clean break from UNMIK and that 
it will be different in size and scope from UNMIK.  COM 
recognized that this was an important political optic for the 
Kosovo side in selling the international community presence 
to its population.  COM noted that there are countries that 
will be asked to support the final status agreement that 
question the capacity of the Kosovo government to fulfill its 
obligations thereunder.  Therefore, he continued, the more 
the government can do to implement the Standards for Kosovo 
prior to final status, the more we will be able to sell a 
light follow-on mission. 
 
¶4. (C) President Sejdiu stated that he has always been in 
favor of a continued, but smaller, international presence in 
Kosovo after UNMIK departs.  Sejdiu noted that an experts 
group led by Minister for Environmental and Spatial Planning 
Ardian Gjini is currently drafting a letter from the entire 
negotiating team inviting a follow-on international presence 
after UNMIK's mandate expires.  Gjini told those present that 
his strategy group is working on a draft letter (forwarded to 
EUR/SCE) from the negotiating team to the Contact Group, the 
OSCE and NATO describing the achievements of the Kosovo 
government, its vision of an independent Kosovo and its ideas 
about a future international presence here.  The Kosovo 
government envisions a smaller number of international 
personnel -- mainly from EU countries and the United States 
-- but Gjini quickly added that Pristina does not wish to get 
into a bargaining session concerning this.  He added the 
Kosovo government hoped this letter will help in the final 
status negotiating process.  COM stated that the government's 
proposal for such a letter would show the Kosovo government's 
commitment to implementing the final status agreement and 
that Kosovo buy-in would be essential in making the 
 
PRISTINA 00000576  002 OF 002 
 
 
arrangement work.  He emphasized again that the USG was 
committed -- with its allies in the EU, the OSCE and NATO -- 
to be very much a part of the implementation effort. 
 
¶5. (C) Torbjorn Sohlstrom, the head of the EU liaison mission 
in Kosovo, told the negotiating team that the EU has begun to 
intensify its post-status planning and that this intensified 
effort will become more visible and its discussions with the 
Kosovo government more concrete.  He added that although the 
future international presence will be based on a UNSC 
resolution, the EU also wants it to be based on prior 
discussions with the Kosovo government.  He enumerated five 
components the EU sees will comprise the future international 
presence in Kosovo: joint capacity building through 
assistance programs, including a proposed donor's conference 
shortly after status; a continuing NATO military presence; 
the OSCE mission; the EU-led police and justice mission; and 
an international office mandated to ensure implementation of 
the status agreement.  Sohlstrom said this international 
office will differ crucially from the current UNMIK mission 
because it will be much more limited in size, scope and power 
and it will be developed by the international community 
together with the Kosovo government. 
 
¶6. (C) Prime Minister Agim Ceku then asked several questions. 
 Who, he wondered, would be in charge during any interim 
period between the determination of final status and the 
setting up of this new international office.  He also asked 
who is planning the follow-on NATO presence and asked that 
the Kosovo government be involved in this planning too. 
(NOTE: He specifically asked that the name of follow-on 
international civilian presence not/not contain the word 
"mission" so as to make a cleaner break with UNMIK and 
similarly that the follow-on NATO presence be renamed along 
the lines of NATO's "Headquarters" in Macedonia and Albania. 
END NOTE.).  He said there should be a sixth component to the 
future international presence in Kosovo, the proposed 
international administrator for Mitrovica.  He concluded with 
a request that when UNMIK departs, most of its current 
competencies be transferred to the Kosovo government, and not 
the follow-on international civilian presence. 
 
¶7.  (C) In response, COM reminded Ceku that NATO planning, 
although linked to the current effort, is on a separate 
planning and decision track.  On competencies, COM remarked 
that the prime minister might want to keep in mind the adage 
to "be careful for what one wishes for because it might come 
true."  The international community fully expects Kosovars to 
take responsibility for the bulk of running their own affairs. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT:  This meeting showed that the Kosovo 
government too has given some thought to the UNMIK follow-on 
mission and is anxious to contribute to its success.  Sejdiu, 
Ceku and others in the government understand that selling a 
continued international presence to a population yearning for 
independence will be politically sensitive.  Conspicuously 
absent during the meeting was any response from the two 
opposition members of the negotiating team present for the 
briefing.  They, especially Hashim Thaci from the Democratic 
Party of Kosovo, have the ability to make the planning for 
any post-UNMIK international civilian presence more difficult 
by making it a domestic political issue. 
 
¶9. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release in 
its entirety to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti 
Ahtisaari. 
GOLDBERG