VZCZCXRO7974
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPG #0747/01 1821012
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011012Z JUL 06 ZFR
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7585
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000747 
 
SIPDIS 
 
//ZFR ZFR ZFR// 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 
TAGS: PREL ETTC MNUC PGOV EUN EZ IR
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CZECH POLICY TOWARD IRAN, AND 
CZECH OBSERVATIONS ON EU AND IRAN 
 
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years been attracted by the possibility of lucrative 
contracts for Czech firms involved in such services. 
(Hybaskova has also been critical of outgoing PM Paroubek for 
allegedly being more concerned about potential exports of 
Czech trolley cars than non-proliferation threats, although 
admits that this has not had any impact on actual Czech 
policies towards Iran.) 
 
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Czechs Paint a Discouraging Picture of the EU and Iran 
---------------- ------------------ -------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Several Czech diplomats and observers present a 
somewhat pessimistic image of a dissolute EU that is unable 
(and to some extent unwilling) to effectively face the 
Iranian nuclear issue.  MFA Security Policy Director Petr 
Kaiser told Poloff that the vanguard position of the EU3 
countries has allowed other EU members to effectively 
disengage from this difficult and contentious issue. He said 
the structure of various EU meetings and conferences on the 
issue had simply consisted of the EU3 countries briefing 
other states. According to Kaiser, with the EU demanding, at 
most, a passive acquiescence to the EU3 policy direction, 
many states have been willing to adopt more detached and 
circumspect attitudes toward Iran and rely the U.S. and its 
EU3 partners to move the issue forward, with all of the 
potential difficulties that such progress will entail. Kaiser 
stated that, along with the Czechs, he considered Holland, 
Poland, and Slovakia the most assertive and the most 
constructive non-EU3 partners on the issue. 
 
¶7. (C) Conservative MEP Jana Hybaskova essentially mirrored 
Kaiser,s bleak picture of the EU in a separate discussion. 
According to Hybaskova, many EP members are woefully 
uninformed on the issue and unduly influenced and buffeted by 
currents of opinion, some either inaccurate or irrelevant to 
the debate. Several of Hybaskova,s colleagues, for example, 
emerged from meeting with the Iranian Ambassador in Brussels 
parroting the ambassador,s line that "Iran only has 
low-enriched uranium for power plants, not highly enriched 
uranium needed for weapons"; they were evidently either 
unaware or unconcerned that the enrichment process is the 
same for both types. She also indicated that a significant 
number of her colleagues maintained ties and conducted events 
with representatives of PMOI/Mek (People,s Movement of 
Iran/Mujahedin e Khalq) from Paris. Domestic politics within 
member states also exert a heavy influence on EP views of 
Iran. Although many MEPs have been galvanized by 
Ahmadenejad,s fiery recent rhetoric (Hybaskova was gathering 
MEP signatures on a petition to at least symbolically declare 
the Iranian President persona non grata in advance of the 
World Cup in Germany), both Hybaskova and Kaiser stated that 
the Iran crisis would "demand U.S. leadership." 
 
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Some General Czech Views of Iran 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) During the course of our discussions with Czech 
officials working on Iran, several took the opportunity to 
pass on reports and impressions from their staff in Tehran, 
and also other general MFA impressions of Iran. Although the 
Czech Republic is a small country, their long-term commercial 
and diplomatic presence in Iran, their prowess in civil and 
nuclear engineering, and their status as a proactive and 
aggressive USG partner on security issues help frame their 
views. On Iran, as with other security matters, the Czechs 
fight well above their weight class. 
 
¶9. (C) THE INDIA EXAMPLE. Ludvik Mrazek from the MFA 
Department of Middle Eastern and African Affairs expressed a 
sentiment, based upon his close work the Iranians in the 
past, that Iran had drawn some counterproductive conclusions 
from the example of India. In Iran,s view, India,s defiant 
nuclear tests of 1998, far from carrying any substantial 
penalties, have helped India emerge into the top tier of 
regional and even global leaders. Iran views India's 
emergence as a fully declared nuclear power as critical to 
Indian economic and diplomatic achievements in recent years. 
While supportive of recent USG initiatives involving the 
Indian nuclear program, GOCR officials have also privately 
expressed concern about the initiative,s effect on the 
global nonproliferation regime. They see in Iran a strong 
illustration of their apprehensions. 
 
¶10. (C) IRAN,S PUBLIC AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. According to 
Petr Kaiser, the Czech Charge, in Tehran presents an image 
to the GOCR of an Iranian public strongly supportive of their 
country's nuclear ambitions. The Iranians see themselves as a 
historically important power with a destiny to assume a 
leadership position in the region; nuclear power - and even 
nuclear weapons - are inseparable from that status. 
 
PRAGUE 00000747  003 OF 003 
 
 
Discouragingly, the Czech mission related that even 
relatively liberal and reformist elements of Iranian society 
share the conviction that Iran has an unquestioned right to a 
full nuclear program. While some Iranians may see the drive 
to enhance their nuclear capabilities unwise, provocative, or 
a poor use of resources, virtually none see the effort itself 
as illegitimate. In the Czech view, looking for political 
space with which to divide different elements of the Iranian 
body politic on the nuclear issue will be a challenging task. 
 
¶11. (C) INTERNAL STRUGGLES AND THE STABILITY OF THE IRANIAN 
REGIME. Czech diplomats, including both Mrazek and the Czech 
Charge, in Tehran, while mindful of the support the 
government has on the nuclear issue, are not as certain of 
the overall stability of the Ahmadenejad regime. The Czech 
Mission in Teheran sees Ahmadenejad producing a significant 
change in the upper echelons of the government and directly 
challenging the established interests of the clerical 
establishment. In this view, Ahmadenejad is surrounding 
himself with his former colleagues from within Revolutionary 
Guards Corps, the intelligence and security services, and the 
military. Their background and expertise lie within the 
national security apparatus, and their formative experiences 
were the brutal internal and external struggles surrounding 
the Iran-Iraq War. The Czechs see in Teheran signs of veiled 
clashes between the conservative clerics who have ruled Iran 
since the Revolution and Ahmadenejad,s &New Guard8 of 
former security officials.  They consider the likely result 
to be more such hidden power struggles and, along with them, 
significantly reduced flexibility in negotiations involving 
nuclear issues. 
CABANISS