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DE RUEHPU #1389/01 2121914
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P 311914Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3661
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1154
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0996
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001389 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016 
TAGS: PGOV HA
SUBJECT: PREVAL AND THE GOH WRESTLE WITH HOW TO DEAL WITH 
CITE SOLEIL, PROPOSES "GLOBAL PLAN" IN COORDINATION WITH 
DONORS AND MINUSTAH 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson, reason 1.5(b) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary. President Preval told the core Ambassadors, 
SRSG Mulet and UN aid officials that persuading the gangs of 
Cite Soleil to lay down their guns would work only if coupled 
with a more vigorous effort to improve the slum's conditions. 
He called for better coordination of assistance programs in 
Cite Soleil, ensuring that they support and enhance GOH 
disarmament efforts. He stated that small projects did not 
have sufficient impact at this time, given the immediate 
needs of the slum.  He asked for the establishment of a joint 
GOH/donor/MINUSTAH task force to ensure that disarmament and 
assistance issues are worked in parallel. Donor reaction to 
the proposal was mixed. Although we are pleased to see that 
GOH is beginning to tackle the issue of Cite Soleil, Preval's 
proposal, unless managed carefully, runs the risk of making 
the international community responsible - at least at the 
outset - for the success or failure of the GOH's Cite Soleil 
policy. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) President Preval convoked Core Ambassadors, SRSG Mulet 
and UN aid officials to a two hour meeting at the Presidency 
on July 28 to discuss Cite Soleil. In a meandering 
presentation, Preval said that persuading the gangs to lay 
down their guns would work only if coupled with a more 
vigorous effort to improve the slum's conditions.  He argued 
that current assistance programs in Cite Soleil and other 
"hot zones" suffered from a lack of donor coordination, 
project overlap, and limited vision. What was needed, the 
president stated, is "a coordinated, targeted and coherent 
global plan" where disarmament and assistance are 
complementary and reinforce each other. Preval called for a 
task force, comprised of GOH, MINUSTAH and donor 
participants, to develop policy options for Cite Soleil and 
asked MINUSTAH to organize the group under the leadership of 
the Prime Minister. 
 
¶3. (C)  Preval was clearly uninterested in discussing any 
programs in Cite Soleil (including those of the USG) 
currently underway, contending that they were too small in 
scope to address the slum's pressing needs. He was dismissive 
of "basketball courts and playground" projects, saying the 
residents want now something which more immediately will 
improve their lives. With regard to my presentation of OTI 
activities in Cite Soleil, Preval suggested that we had spent 
more than dols 1 million with little visible impact to date 
and he requested a detailed read out of our current 
activities. The international community needed to do better 
by Cite Soleil, he said.  When I suggested that the security 
situation has hampered our and other donors' ability to work 
in the slums, Preval got testy. 
 
¶4. (C) Preval stressed that his decision to develop a globl 
plan in no way constitutes "negotiation" with the gangs. 
Rather, he said,  it indicates the "seriousness" of the 
government's intent. Assistance projects will not be a 
"reward" to gangs, but rather a means to wean the slum 
populations from the grip of the criminals. The President 
also noted that while the government wants to "cut the head" 
of the gangs, it must find ways to integrate other members 
back into society. Preval stated that most do want to lay 
down their weapons, "they know they cannot continue like 
this."  Thus, he said, a carrot and stick policy is in order. 
 
 
¶5. (C) The President's presentation caught most donors, as 
well as the SRSG (who Preval unexpectedly asked to chair the 
session), by surprise.  Indeed, Prime Minister Alexis had 
told me the previous day that Preval would likely tell us 
that he had decided to appoint a joint GOH/MINUSTAH committee 
to deal with the gangs. Donor reaction was decidedly mixed. 
SRSG Mulet welcomed Preval's approach, saying the lack of a 
coordination mechanism had indeed hampered implementation of 
activities in Cite Soleil. The Canadian Ambassador cited the 
lack of an overall GOH plan for the area as a major 
impediment in dealing with the slum's many problems and urged 
the President to engage the private sector.  Our French 
colleague noted that he was responsible to his Parliament for 
the use of his aid funds and could make no blanket 
commitments.  SRSG and UNDP rep promised to follow up with 
 
PORT AU PR 00001389  002 OF 002 
 
 
GOH. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment. Preval confidant Bob Manuel later explained 
to me that Preval called the meeting to find out what tools 
he would have at his disposal when the government and 
MINUSTAH moves on disarmament. (Manuel added that Preval did 
not  not intend to diss our OTI projects.) Stressing that 
this is a particularly sensitive time in the evolution of GOH 
 government policy on the gangs, he said that the President 
did not want to show his hand at this stage with specifics 
about what he intends to do with the gangs. He acknowledged 
that perhaps the President should have floated this trial 
balloon of a task force a little earlier. Be that as it may, 
Preval's idea of a donor/GOH/MINUSTAH task force runs the 
risk of putting the international community out front on Cite 
Soleil policy if not carefully managed. Preval knows he has 
to act, but the ever cautious president clearly is trying to 
surround himself with as many buffers (and carrots) as 
possible. 
SANDERSON