VZCZCXRO7238
PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHPW #0360/01 1940357
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130357Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6665
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2258
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0934
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0924
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0471
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0294
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 2442

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/13/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR EAID PK AF
SUBJECT: CORPS COMMANDER AND NWFP GOVERNOR ON FATA ISSUES 
 
REF: (A) PESHAWAR 311   (B) PESHAWAR 255 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Spangler, Principal Officer, AmConsul 
Peshawar, State Department. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C)  On July 10, 11th Corps Commander Lt. General Hamid Khan 
told the Ambassador the Pakistan Army will maintain its 
involvement in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
development, chiefly due to the Governor's lack of civilian 
capacity.  The Army is the only entity with a comprehensive 
presence in the FATA and therefore the only one capable of 
executing projects in all seven agencies.  The Army must also 
play a role in development because it wields the stick but needs 
carrots to win hearts and minds. Khan noted that the situation 
in North and South Wazirstan has calmed down, but he will not 
participate in negotiations with the militants unless they 
accede to his demands.  Both he and the Northwest Frontier 
Province (NWFP) Governor Ali Jan Orakzai hope the current truce 
with militants will lead to a political settlement that 
effectively denies sanctuaries to militants and stops 
cross-border incursions.  Both (1) agreed that military force 
alone cannot address the insurgency and (2) called for more 
coordination to link civilian and military authorities on both 
sides of the Durand line.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
Corps Commander 
-------------------- 
¶2.  (C)  In a July 10 conversation with the Ambassador, 11th 
Corps Commander Lt. General Hamid Khan confirmed his intention 
to maintain a significant role for the Army in FATA development 
programs.  In reference to Governor Orakzai, a former 11th Corps 
Commander, he noted, "All individuals think they can turn things 
around, it's human nature." But Khan criticized the FATA 
Secretariat's capabilities, and explained that the Army is the 
 
SIPDIS 
only entity with the resources and capabilities to implement 
development projects throughout the FATA.  Civilian institutions 
lack the capacity, and "just because the Governor has changed, 
doesn't mean capacity improves automatically." 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Army must play a development role in the FATA, 
according to Khan, because it wields the stick -- and needs to 
offer carrots to maintain its effectiveness.  The Army has to 
"reward" those helping it, offering incentives as well as 
punishment.  Furthermore, the Army has control over a wide area 
of the FATA and knows the terrain.  It is the only institution 
executing projects throughout the seven agencies of the FATA, 
and is already providing transportation and protection to 
civilian institutions. 
 
¶4.  (C )  General Khan opined that North and South Wazirstan are 
quiet at the present time.  When the General first assumed his 
post in October 2005, the militants thought he would be easy on 
them, explained Khan.  However, from January to June 2006 he 
launched several operations and claimed over 400 militants were 
killed.  The Army destroyed the opposition's ammunition dumps, 
and the enemy was in disarray. 
 
¶5.  (C)  More recently, Khan rebuffed calls by the militants for 
negotiations.  He emphasized that the militants were defying the 
law and there would be no negotiations unless they accepted the 
writ of the government.  Khan imposed five non-negotiable 
demands before he would offer talks: 1) no cross-border attacks; 
2) no harboring of foreigners, unless they were registered with 
the government; 3) no attacks on security or law enforcement 
personnel; 4) no parallel governments; and 5) those wanted by 
the Army should be turned over.  (Note:  these conditions 
reflect President Musharraf's own consistent policy.  End note.) 
 
¶6. (C)  As a parallel track to the military strategy, Khan 
agreed with the Governor's plan to have a loya jirga (grand 
council) for the FATA, noting that no insurgency has ever been 
resolved by the use of force alone. There has to be political 
involvement, and the Army supports giving political talks a 
chance, while reserving military force as an option, when 
needed. 
 
¶7. (C)  Lastly, Khan called for better coordination and greater 
interaction with the Afghan National Army.  He noted the 
improvement in cooperation and communications with Coalition 
 
PESHAWAR 00000360  002 OF 002 
 
 
Forces on the Afghan side, but felt there should be more 
flag-level and staff meetings between Pak-Afghan military 
authorities. 
 
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Governor Orakzai 
------------------ 
¶8. (C)  Governor Orakzai expressed optimism about the current 
situation in the FATA, and the civilian authority's capacity to 
implement development projects.  The key to winning the war on 
terrorism in the region is political, military and economic 
stability, and political authority was central to this plan. 
Like General Khan, Orakzai stated that peace in the FATA 
depended on a strong and stable Afghanistan.  If either the 
Pakistani or Afghan side had a political, economic, or military 
vacuum, the other would suffer. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  The Governor agreed to send a team of engineers and 
doctors to Muzaffarabad, in Kashmir, to consult with an arriving 
team of U.S. Army specialists that would refresh the Pakistani 
military's understanding of the power sources of the MASH unit 
left behind after the end of the earthquake relief operations. 
The 84-bed hospital can be split in two, and has been offered to 
the NWFP government.  The governor has not yet made a decision 
on where the hospitals will be located. 
 
¶10.  (C)  The Governor told the Ambassador privately that he is 
continuing his preparations for a tribal jirga, but is not yet 
ready to convene it.  He said that he was pleased with tribal 
reactions so far; the incidence of attacks against Pakistani 
forces has dropped significantly. As he had done with General 
Khan, the Ambassador stressed the criticality of effective 
Pakistani action to prevent cross-border attacks. 
 
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Comment 
----------- 
¶11. (C)  These meetings indicate potential conflicts between the 
11th Corps Commander and the new Governor, as in the past. 
Orakzai plans to take the lead on FATA issues, but General Khan 
doubts the organizational capacity of the Governor's civilian 
institutions.  As a result, General Khan will likely continue to 
seek to carve out a significant role for the Army in FATA 
development.  While Governor Orakzai is rapidly trying to 
increase his capacity, he may need to cede some authority to the 
Army in executing FATA development programs in the near term. 
End comment. 
SPANGLER