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O 311035Z JUL 06
FM USDEL SECRETARY
TO RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
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INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARTO 000001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/26 
TAGS: OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA PREL MY US
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Rice's July 27, 2006 conversation 
with Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah 
 
 
PARTO 00000001  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
(U)  Classified by:  Arnold Chacon, Deputy Executive 
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(b) and 
 
SIPDIS 
(d) 
 
¶1.  (U)  July 27, 2006; 4:45 PM; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
 
¶2.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Secretary 
Amb. Christopher J. LaFleur 
U/S Karen Hughes 
A/S Chris Hill 
NSC Senior Director Dennis Wilder 
 
Malaysia 
Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi 
Foreign Minister Hamid 
Amb. Rajmah Hussein 
MFA Deputy Secretary General I Othman Hashim 
Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime 
Minister 
 
¶3.  (C) Summary:  The Secretary reviewed her efforts to 
achieve a ceasefire in Lebanon based on a more stable, 
permanent solution to the crisis.  Prime Minister Abdullah 
expressed disappointment with the results of the Rome 
Conference and urged the U.S. pressure Israel to implement 
a cease fire.  He welcomed efforts to shape a peacekeeping 
force and reiterated Malaysia's offer to send Malaysian 
peacekeepers.  In a broader discussion of the Palestinian 
issue, Prime Minister Abdullah said he thought that Hamas 
could be persuaded to support a two state solution but not 
while they were fighting.  They agreed that "we could not 
lose" Abu Mazen.  The Secretary concluded that some 
movement had been achieved on Lebanon and the 
international community needed Malaysia's support to 
strengthen the chances that a ceasefire would be approved 
by both sides.  End Summary. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Secretary reviewed the results of her recent 
discussions in Beirut, Jerusalem and Rome.  In 
conversations with both sides, she had assessed the 
situation and discussed possible bases for a ceasefire. 
She left NSC Middle East Senior Director Abrams and 
Assistant Secretary Welch behind in the region to continue 
discussions. 
 
¶5.  (C) Abdullah said he had been disappointed that the 
Rome Conference couldn't agree to call for an immediate 
ceasefire.  The Secretary said that this was something on 
which the parties to the conflict themselves had to agree. 
Abdullah asked whether she thought the Lebanese didn't 
want a ceasefire.  The Secretary said it was not clear if 
Hezbollah wanted one.  Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora was 
not able to extend his authority into the southern part of 
the country.  We did not want simply to return to the 
previous situation.  Abdullah said Siniora had told him he 
wanted a ceasefire.  Siniora was suggesting there be a 
simultaneous return of the two prisoners and a ceasefire 
monitored by the UN.  The European Union could also 
participate and Malaysia was prepared to send 
peacekeepers. 
 
PARTO 00000001  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶6.  (C) The Secretary said the way out of the crisis was 
to make sure there was a more stable, permanent solution. 
The Government of Lebanon should be able to send its army 
south with a UN mandate and an international stability 
force.  Hezbollah had to be moved far enough back from the 
border so that it couldn't fire rockets into Israel.  When 
Hezbollah crossed the border to capture the two Israeli 
soldiers, it had also started firing rockets into Israel. 
Israel wanted to eliminate that threat; it had no other 
reason to be in Lebanon.  We wanted to see a ceasefire but 
that required that the circumstances on the ground 
wouldn't lead to more attacks.  We hoped to see 
international support for Siniora to extend the Lebanese 
government's authority to the south. 
 
¶7. (C) Abdullah asked whether a ceasefire was dependent on 
deployment of international forces.  The Secretary said 
the key was to get a mandate for the force.  Abdullah said 
he hoped we would not veto a ceasefire.  The Secretary 
replied that, on the contrary, this was our proposal.  It 
was one thing to make statements, another to actually get 
the fighting stopped.  We can't just talk about it, we 
have to do it, she said. 
 
¶8.  (C) Abdullah said the US had the strength to bring 
about a ceasefire, and Israel would have to go along.  He 
hoped the US could wield its power to stop the war. The 
situation had become very bad.  He had talked to Siniora, 
who confirmed that the situation was very bad.  He had 
also talked to Indonesian President Yudoyono.  Indonesia 
and Malaysia were not anti-US, but they believed that a 
ceasefire would occur if the US wanted one.  News that the 
US was selling smart bombs to Israel made the public even 
more angry about the US role.  On the one hand, the US was 
vetoing a ceasefire; on the other hand it was sending 
smart bombs. 
 
¶9.  (C) The Secretary said the US had not vetoed a 
ceasefire.  She reminded Abdullah that this crisis had 
started with Hezbollah shelling of Israel.  Israel must be 
convinced that Hezbollah won't be able to continue doing 
this.  This was why an international force was needed. 
She noted that Siniora also didn't want continuation of 
the current situation in which Hezbollah could plunge 
Lebanon into war at any time.  She knew it was difficult 
to see the photographs of the destruction in Lebanon.  It 
would be helpful if other parties in the Islamic world 
would help Hezbollah recognize that they must accept a 
ceasefire and dissuade the Iranians from interfering.  The 
long-range missiles that Hezbollah were firing came from 
Iran.  We hoped that everyone could use our its offices to 
rein in the extreme elements. 
 
¶10.  (C) Abdullah said Hezbollah was a manifestation of 
the same problem as the Palestinian crisis.  There was 
anger there also over Israel's illegal walls and borders 
and atrocities against Palestinians.  The Secretary 
replied that PA President Abbas had told her the 
Palestinians didn't need Hezbollah to defend them. 
Abdullah said Abbas must succeed.  But if nothing happened 
[to advance the Palestinian cause] he would be in trouble 
himself.  He recalled President Bush telling him that he 
supported the Palestinians people's right to choose their 
 
PARTO 00000001  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
would help Hezbollah recognize that they must accept a 
ceasefire and dissuade the Iranians from interfering.  The 
long-range missiles that Hezbollah were firing came from 
Iran.  We hoped that everyone could use our its offices to 
rein in the extreme elements. 
 
¶10.  (C) Abdullah said Hezbollah was a manifestation of 
the same problem as the Palestinian crisis.  There was 
anger there also over Israel's illegal walls and borders 
and atrocities against Palestinians.  The Secretary 
replied that PA President Abbas had told her the 
Palestinians didn't need Hezbollah to defend them. 
Abdullah said Abbas must succeed.  But if nothing happened 
[to advance the Palestinian cause] he would be in trouble 
himself.  He recalled President Bush telling him that he 
supported the Palestinians people's right to choose their 
leaders in free elections and would work with whomever 
they chose.  However, we refused to work with Hamas.  The 
Secretary reminded Abdullah that Hamas was a terrorist 
 
SIPDIS 
organization and that US officials were legally barred 
from working with them.  However, all Hamas had to do was 
to renounce terrorism and commit to the peace process. 
Abdullah said that we should engage with them first, and 
then they could change. 
 
¶11.  (C) The Secretary said that part of the problem was 
that the Hamas leadership was divided between those in 
Damascus and those in Palestine.  Haniya may want to do 
some things, bit he doesn't control the military.  He 
tells others that he doesn't know what Hamas' military is 
doing.  Under these circumstances, it is very difficult 
for their government to function.  However, if Hamas 
accepted the Quartet principles, there would not be a 
problem.  But we could not have a peace process if one of 
the parties doesn't accept peace as the objective. 
 
¶12.  (C) Abdullah thought that Hamas could come to terms 
with a two state solution.  They would be happy to secure 
a solution after years of fighting.  But if we put too 
much pressure on them, they would react negatively.  He 
wanted to help Abbas.  But the Palestinian government 
couldn't function without money.  The Secretary responded 
that she was Abbas's chief fundraiser, noting our efforts 
to get other governments to live up to their aid pledges. 
We had been doing everything we could to assist him. 
Abdullah said the problem was that this was not the 
perception.  He stressed that we could not lose Abbas. 
The Secretary agreed. 
 
¶13.  (C) Returning to the Lebanon crisis, the Secretary 
said that we were making progress step by step.  We needed 
help from others as well, especially countries such as 
Malaysia, to strengthen the chances that a ceasefire would 
be approved by both sides. 
RICE 
 
PARTO 00000001  004 OF 004 
 
 
would be embarrassed if its draft Resolution on 
North Korea lingered in the Security Council 
while a Resolution on Iran moved forward.  The 
Secretary noted that China and Russia might be 
 
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convinced to abstain on a North Korea 
resolution.  The period before the G-8 presented 
a good opportunity in the Security Council to 
act.  France supports Japan's draft resolution 
by believes that it will be a good idea not to 
force a vote on it.  France would like to come 
to a consensus on North Korea and agreed that 
the period before the G-8 was the best time to 
convince the Russians and Chinese not to veto 
Japan's resolution. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶11. (S) The Secretary urged Douste-Blazy to 
consider the Iraq Compact, which entails serious 
commitments by the Iraqi government.  Douste- 
Blazy said France "noted with pleasure" that the 
Iraqi government was much more inclusive than in 
the past, and France is ready to help.  Still, 
Douste-Blazy said he was preoccupied by the 
daily violence, by the corruption, and by the 
need for Iraq to create public services.  He 
emphasized the importance of a regional meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on Iraq that would include the Arab League and 
countries such as Russia and Turkey.  The 
Secretary said it was important to include these 
 
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countries, but that the international community 
should first concentrate on the Iraq Compact. 
Douste-Blazy said France had worked with Iraq on 
its debt and on training civil servants, police 
and officials in the justice sector.  The 
Secretary urged Douste-Blazy to consider 
 
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infrastructure projects, given Iraq's great need 
in this area.  Douste-Blazy said that if the 
Iraqi government made a specific request, France 
would certainly consider it.  Still, he said 
France was reticent because of past experiences 
in Iraqi mismanagement of assistance funds, and 
because of the security situation. 
 
RICE 
RICE