VZCZCXRO6641
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #1099 1931303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121303Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6407
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0992
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0588

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 001099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP EUN TU CY
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN IN CYPRUS: FIRST, DO NO HARM 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 1088 
     ¶B. LIBBY-SILLIMAN EMAIL (7/11/2006) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
This is an action request.  See paragraph 5. 
 
¶1. (C) Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's planned July 20 visit 
to the "TRNC" comes at a potentially awkward moment, given 
the just-concluded Gambari agreement (ref a) and the looming 
likelihood of a Cyprus-related crisis between the EU and 
Turkey over accession this fall.  The official purpose of the 
visit is to participate in celebrations marking the 32nd 
anniversary of the 1974 "Peace Operation" (he will also open 
a school and sign a financial aid protocol) but because this 
is Erdogan's first Cyprus trip as prime minister, his 
presence on the island takes on an added symbolic 
significance. 
 
¶2. (C) From our perspective, and that of our Turkish Cypriot 
contacts, Erdogan's visit seems intended as a gesture to 
protect his nationalist flank at home by demonstrating 
solidarity with the "TRNC."  Fresh pictures of Erdogan, 
standing shoulder to shoulder with military brass, Rauf 
Denktash, and the "TRNC" cabinet as fighters fly overhead, 
may indeed help Erdogan at home.  But they could place 
Turkish Cypriot leader Talat in an awkward position by 
feeding the suspicions of Greek Cypriots and others that he 
is fully subordinate to Ankara -- at the very moment he needs 
to be seen as a credible interlocutor who can deliver in 
upcoming UN-brokered talks. 
 
¶3. (C) Yet, some good could come of Erdogan's visit if he 
uses the opportunity to express unequivocal support both for 
Talat and for the upcoming UN-brokered process.  Sources 
close to Talat tell us that they have gotten some "mixed 
signals" from Ankara (ref b) about the Gambari process. 
Talat is aware that he has angered some on the mainland by 
agreeing to a joint statement that did not mention the Annan 
Plan and "gave into Greek Cypriot demands" to discuss both 
substance and day-to-day matters.  The Turkish Cypriot 
leadership took nervous note of Namik Tan's remarks about the 
Gambari visit, which was spun in the local press as "Turkey 
does not support the technical talks."  Talat plans to use 
his time with Erdogan to "explain" the Gambari agreement to 
the Turkish PM; the Turkish Cypriots' number-one deliverable 
for the visit will be to ensure Erdogan's support of both the 
agreement and the man who negotiated it. 
 
¶4. (C) In addition to using his visit to reinforce Talat's 
position in Cyprus talks, Erdogan could do himself a world of 
good with the Europeans by avoiding harsh rhetoric about 
ports and planes.  This may require some intestinal 
fortitude; both nationalists at home and Turkish Cypriots 
here will no doubt be anxious to hear, once again, that the 
GOT is not planning to "abandon" the Turkish Cypriots.  But 
the GOT's tired, give-no-quarter soundbites on this issue 
play right into the hands of Greek Cypriot hard-liners and 
crypto-opponents of Turkey's EU-accession process, who would 
like to see Papadopoulos stick it to Turkey this fall. 
Resident European ambassadors will be watching Erdogan's 
visit closely; he needs to give Turkey's beleaguered friends 
in the EU something to work with. 
 
¶5. (C) Post requests that the Department and Embassy Ankara 
approach the GOT (at both the AKP/political and technocratic 
levels), to reinforce this message.  Erdogan's visit to 
Cyprus should be used to bolster Talat, support the UN 
process, and do no harm with the EU. 
SCHLICHER