VZCZCXRO8099
RR RUEHGI RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0950/01 1941627
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131627Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4069
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1209
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0824
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0689
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1215
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0029
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1133
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0274
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0887
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1476
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0605
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2744
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1881
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1273
RUEHGV/USMISSION ENEVA 0773
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0836RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 068

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000950 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM S/CRS 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
NAIOBI FOR OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS PHUM CD
SUBJECT: CHAD/DARFUR: FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFS ON KHARTOUM 
TALKS 
 
 
--------- 
SUMMARY: 
--------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Chad's Foreign Minister says he proposed to Khartoum 
a kind of reciprocal withdrawal of sanctuary for armed 
groups.  Sudan suggested joint Chad/Sudan patrols of the 
common border.  Neither side gave formal responses to the 
other's proposals.  Chad awaits a follow-on mission from 
Khartoum in the near future, though no date has been set. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------ 
TALKING TO THE SUDANESE 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador called on Chad's Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and African Integration, Ahmed Allam-mi for a 
briefing on recent bilateral discussions the Minister had 
undertaken with his Sudanese counterpart.  Allam-mi reported 
that, on the margins of the AU Summit in Banjul, President 
Idriss Debi Itno, Libya's al-Qadhafi, and Sudan's al-Bashir 
had met in an attempt to relax the atmosphere between the 
Chadian and Sudanese leaders.  The two were able to engage 
with each other, and agree to begin exchanging high-level 
missions to explore resolving their difficulties along their 
common border. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Allam-mi undertook the first such mission to 
Khartoum, arriving on/about July 10.  The Chadian was 
instructed to reiterate N'Djamena's official positions: that 
Chad supports the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), and has 
encouraged Darfur's rebel groups to sign on to it; and as 
such, Chad was committed to helping ensure that those 
Sudanese groups that do not join in the DPA do not use Chad 
as a rear base for military moves against those who have 
signed the agreement. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Minister said he had proposed a kind of 
reciprocal withdrawal of support for armed groups using 
territory of one country to launch attacks into the other. 
Practically speaking, this would mean that Chad would 
continue to pursue all available support to make secure 
refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in 
Eastern Chad, including the deployment in Chad of foreign 
peacekeepers or other forces if such were to come available. 
Chad would not allow those people who were essentially 
"political activists" rather than refugees to carry out 
activities in Chad against either Sudan or the DPA -- they 
would be given over to AU hands.  Chad would make every 
effort to secure its border, with the help of the 
international community, if possible.  In exchange, Chad 
expected Sudan to do the same -- provide protection to 
Chadians who requested refugee status, but cease paying 
Chadian "mercenaries" to create instability, and end support 
to Chadian "defectors" in Sudan. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Allam-mi reported that his interlocutors responded 
to the proposals with their own.  He said Sudan again stated 
opposition to AU or any other foreign deployment in Chad, as 
an intervention in Chad's internal affairs (never mind that 
Chad was quite ready to cede sovereignty to obtain help in 
securing the area and the border).  The Sudanese preferred to 
organize joint Chad/Sudan border patrols to secure the area. 
Sudan committed to send a high-level mission to N'Djamena 
soon (no date set) to continue the dialogue. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Minister stressed that he had listened to 
Sudanese proposals, but not made a formal reply.  He 
 
NDJAMENA 00000950  002 OF 002 
 
 
expressed his opinion to Ambassador that the likelihood was 
slim that Sudanese and Chadian forces could jointly patrol 
the border.  He noted the close family and clan ties of 
forces originating in these regions would create significant 
tensions among such troops -- and that forces drawn from 
other regions of either Sudan or Chad would be ineffective 
working in the border area.  He said he could imagine 
Sudanese and Chadian military observers working along 
international peacekeepers, but not armed joint patrols. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Allam-mi suggested that the Sudanese seemed to be 
searching for a way out of their current predicaments, and 
came to the Chadians as "demandeurs".  He said that Chad is 
"condemned" to talking with Khartoum, but would be extremely 
skeptical of Sudanese offers -- "We remain vigilant." 
Nonetheless, Allam-mi thought that perhaps the first step 
toward more normal dialogue had begun, and said he awaited 
word from Khartoum as to when they would be ready to send a 
mission to N'Djamena. 
 
------------------------------- 
WHAT ARE THE DARFURIANS DOING? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Allam-mi touched briefly on recent activities of 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM), saying he could not figure out where 
Minni Arkou Minawi's actions were taking him and his 
movement.  "They seem intent on killing each other; we have 
some influence with them, through family ties, but only some. 
 In the end, we may have to let them fight it out among 
themselves."  The Minister said it seemed the JEM fighters 
were intent on battling all the way to Khartoum, a goal he 
could not imagine them having any chance of achieving. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ambassador again questioned the Minister regarding 
reports of support to SLM/A factions opposed to the DPA. 
Allam-mi's answer was much more direct than during past 
discussions.  He said "support" was a matter of 
interpretation: The President had charged his half-brother 
Daoussa Deby, and the Minister of Territorial Administration, 
Mahamat Ali Abdallah Nassour, with managing relations with 
the factions of the SLM/A -- drawn largely from Deby's own 
Zaghawa ethnic group.  They had made and maintained contacts 
with the Sudanese side of "the family", and those contacts 
were in conflict with Minni Arkou Minawi.  Allam-mi said that 
Chad thought the SLM/A should have united behind Abdel Wahid 
Mohammed Nour, and never imagined that he would have led a 
faction away from signing the DPA.  Thus, although Chad's 
national interest and stated policy was to support the DPA, 
Daoussa Deby's and Mahamat Ali's key contacts were in the 
faction that did not sign.  "It's a complicated situation," 
he concluded. 
 
¶10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL