VZCZCXRO4400
RR RUEHGI RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0929/01 1911631
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101631Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4043
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1206
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0820
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0686
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1211
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1126
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0271
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0884
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1473
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0602
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2741
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1870
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1270
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0764
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0827
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0265

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000929 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM, S/CRS 
ALSO FOR DS/IP/AF AND DS/IP/ITA 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
NAIROBI FOR OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS ASEC PHUM CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: MARAUDING YOUTH THREATEN HUMANITARIAN WORKERS 
 
--------- 
SUMMARY: 
--------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) A tense day of stand-off between local youths 
ostensibly demonstrating for employment, and humanitarian 
NGOs working in the Sudanese refugee camps outside the 
eastern Chadian town of Bahai ended July 7 with one locally 
engaged staff member of the International Rescue Committee 
injured.  The incident was a culmination of growing tensions 
in the town.  NGOs have suggested a set of concrete actions 
they expect of the Chadian authorities, without which they 
may have to pull back to only essential activities.  Although 
relatively simple actions might address the security of the 
NGO staff, the broader issue of the location of the 
Bahai-based refugee camps also needs to be addressed.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
--------------------- 
UNDER SIEGE IN BAHAI 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Field offices of humanitarian organizations in the 
eastern Chad town of Bahai reported to headquarters in 
N'Djamena July 7, 07:30 local time, that their compounds were 
surrounded by "marauding youth" and that they were being 
"held hostage" in their compounds.  Post's Democracy and 
Development Officer was also telephoned with the news.  The 
organizations under threat included the French NGO ACTED, the 
U.S.-based International Rescue Committee (IRC), the World 
Food Program (WFP), and the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR).  Youths demanding employment, as well 
as some individuals in military uniforms, in groups of 15-20, 
blocked access to the compounds, effectively trapping the 
occupants inside.  The youth threatened violence, and some 
were armed with batons and knives.  Some appeared to be 
communicating among themselves and among the groups with 
hand-held two-way radios.  IRC reports that the youths beat 
up one of IRC's locally engaged staff members. 
 
¶3. (SBU) This incident was the culmination of a sequence of 
events that had begun on June 30, when youths demanding 
employment had demonstrated against the humanitarian 
organizations in Bahai, again blocking ACTED staff in their 
compound as quasi "hostages".  UNHCR, IRC, and ACTED Heads of 
Mission met on July 4, and issued a joint letter to the local 
authorities (at the "Prefet" level) to express their opinion 
that such a situation was unacceptable.  They held a 
four-hour follow-up meeting with the local authorities and 
youth representatives on July 6, only to find themselves 
confronted with even more virulent demonstrations the next 
day. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The July 7 standoff continued throughout the day. 
Over time, international and locally engaged staff were able 
to depart individual organization compounds to group together 
at the UNHCR facility.  Post's RSO, acting on reports from 
the Democracy and Development Officer, made contact with 
IRC's head in Bahai, as well as with security officers for 
UNHCR.  He intervened with the National Gendarmerie Director 
in N'Djamena and requested immediate action.  Ambassador Wall 
discussed the situation in the course of the day with the IRC 
head, and then met with the UNHCR's Director for Chad to 
coordinate our eventual responses.  The UNHCR Director had 
himself intervened at the level of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and African Integration, and of National Territory, 
and met with the French Ambassador.  The Delegation of the 
European Commission (EC) urgently demarched the Government of 
Chad (GOC), noting that the local authorities appeared unable 
to control the situation, expressing its deep concern, and 
 
NDJAMENA 00000929  002 OF 003 
 
 
asking that immediate measures be taken to ensure the safety 
of the NGOs and UN organizations.  By evening, locally based 
gendarmes had dispersed the youth, and two-officer units had 
been placed at each of the ACTED, IRC, and UNHCR compounds 
for the night. 
 
¶5. (SBU) IRC was informed that evening that the GOC had 
redeployed some troop units from Tine (south of Bahai) to 
secure the town.  Stand-by evacuation flights were organized 
in Abeche.  The weekend of July 8-9 has passed without 
further incident. 
 
--------------------------- 
ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES ONLY 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The affected organizations' field office heads 
gathered later on July 7 to discuss the security constraints 
under which they were working, and to outline short- and 
medium-term measures they believe must be taken in order for 
them to resume normal operations.  They have presented these 
recommendations to the UNHCR Director.  The IRC head provided 
them to post.  They state that: 
 
(a) An increase in security is necessary to continue normal 
operations. 
 
(b) The return of the Prefet to Bahai to restore order, and a 
visit from the regional Governor to address continuing 
attacks and demonstrations, are required. 
 
(c) The environment of impunity must be addressed, with the 
aggressors who had attacked staff members, whose identities 
are known to the authorities, arrested and brought to justice. 
 
(d) If security cannot be guaranteed through these and/or 
other actions, IRC and ACTED will decrease their expatriate 
and locally engaged staff, and will conduct only essential 
activities. 
 
------------- 
WHAT WORKED; 
WHAT DOESN'T 
------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) It would appear that RSO's intervention with the 
National Gendarmerie command structure, and that of the UNHCR 
Director at the Ministerial level, may have been the deciding 
factors in getting GOC action to defuse the situation on July 
¶7.  That said, the essential problems facing NGOs and UN 
organizations in Bahai remain unresolved.  At the micro 
level, there are real questions that can be asked about 
hiring practices among these organizations.  While 
well-meaning Chadians agree that merit must govern the 
employment of locally engaged staff, they have pointed out 
that there are positions that may not require much in the way 
of qualifications.  Setting some of these aside for 
individuals hailing form the region might engender better 
will. 
 
¶8. (SBU) However, stepping back, it is clear that the 
authorities have been insufficiently responsive to the 
overall security concerns of these organizations, whose staff 
are providing services to camps of Sudanese refugees located 
outside Bahai.  And at the macro level, the UNHCR Director 
points out that these camps are in no way placed 
geographically so that they can be properly managed in any 
other than a short-term, maintenance-oriented fashion.  He 
noted that their close proximity to the Sudanese border made 
them vulnerable to both attack and recruitment, as had been 
 
NDJAMENA 00000929  003 OF 003 
 
 
recently seen.  He suggested that, while this might be 
tolerable for a short time, it was untenable in the longer 
term.  He wondered within what time frame he should 
realistically be working -- one which saw the refugees 
returning home to Sudan as part of a successfully implemented 
Darfur Peace Agreement, or one that took a longer view, more 
in keeping with typical patterns of refugee flows. 
 
¶9. (SBU) This longer time frame, in keeping with broad 
African and international patterns, implied planning for the 
refugees in this area of Chad to be encamped for the next 10 
or more years.  The UNHCR Director noted that the area around 
Bahai was totally unacceptable with such a time frame in 
view.  He reported that the Minister for Territorial 
Administration had brought up the same question, noting that 
Chad simply could not provide security to the refugees camped 
so close to the Sudanese border.  The UNHCR Director felt 
that, while some limited improvements to Gendarme coverage in 
Bahai (and local authorities' attitudes) could address the 
immediate security concerns of humanitarian NGOs, much more 
would be needed to make a significant change to the 
environment of the camps they served. 
 
¶10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL