VZCZCXRO8063
RR RUEHGI RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0906/01 1841407
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031407Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4011
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1197
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0813
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0679
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1115
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0262
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1464
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2734
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1861
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1257
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0593
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0875
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1200
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0755
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0818
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0258

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000906 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM, S/CRS 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
NAIROBI FOR OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD/DARFUR: NEW PATTERNS IN EASTERN CHAD'S 
INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE 
 
 
SUBJECT: CHAD/DRFUR: NEW PATTERNS IN EASTERN CHAD'S 
INTER-ETHNIC ATTACKS. 
 
--------- 
SUMMARY: 
--------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Human rights groups and international NGOs point to 
an apparent shift toward ethnically or racially motivated 
attacks in eastern Chad in the area bordering Darfur.  The 
period of September 2005 through May 2006 saw numerous such 
attacks; the month of June has been relatively quiet. 
Allegations point to Janjawid fighters as the perpetrators, 
but the distinction is blurring among Sudanese Janjawid, 
"Arabs" from either Sudan or Chad, and allied Chadian ethnic 
groups.  "African" victims from particular ethnic groups are 
sustaining repeated attacks until they are robbed of all 
possessions and either displaced en masse or killed.  Chadian 
security forces, focused on confronting threats to the Deby 
regime or shielding allied ethnic groups, provide no 
protection to the victimized populations.  Attackers may be 
motivated by a quest for land, a desire to enrich themselves 
through simple criminality, the obstruction of transit routes 
for SLA and JEM activities, or Sudan's use of Janjawid and 
Chadian groups as proxies in the simmering conflict with 
Chad's Deby regime.  END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------- 
NGOS PERCEIVE NEW 
PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Reports published in June from Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) on violence in the 
region of eastern Chad bordering Darfur reach strongly 
similar conclusions regarding the upsurge in attacks seen 
since at least December 2005.  HRW states in "Violence Beyond 
Borders: The Human Rights Crisis in Eastern Chad" notes "... 
an evolution in the pattern of attacks on civilians since 
January and February 2006 that raises serious concerns about 
the potential for inter-ethnic or communal violence in 
eastern Chad."  AI's report, "Chad/Sudan - Sowing the Seeds 
of Darfur - Ethnic targeting in Chad by Janjawid militias 
from Sudan" states that "... the Janjawid ... have targeted a 
diverse range of ethnic groups who identify themselves and 
are identified by others as "African" rather than "Arab" ... 
while others have been exempted or have become active 
participants with the Janjawid in attacking their neighbors." 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The rights groups state first that these attacks 
have reached a new intensity that goes beyond one group 
seeking to pillage from another.  They report that attacks on 
a given village or group are now often conducted over several 
days, until the victims are stripped of everything of value, 
and either displaced en masse away from the Chad/Sudan border 
-- in either direction -- or are killed.  This differs from 
attacks prior to at least December 2005, which were 
characterized by simple robbery, with victimized populations 
left alive if they did not actively resist. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Second, AI and HRW note that particular ethnic 
groups from among those generally considered to be "African" 
rather than Arab" are the targets of the attacks.  AI 
described on June 13 to Ambassador and POL/ECON Officer three 
zones along the border, in each of which the victimized 
populations appear to be drawn from different ethnic groups, 
who have in common (a) relative wealth, (b) sedentary 
lifestyles, and (c) little direct connection to either Chad's 
Deby regime, or to the largest rebel forces confronting Deby. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000906  002 OF 004 
 
 
 According to AI, the victims in the northern-most area, 
following the Chad/Sudan border from the Chadian town of Adre 
south to Ade, hail largely from the Masalit and Wadai tribes. 
 Continuing south from Ade to the Wadi Azoum watercourse, in 
the Dar Silla administrative area, the targeted communities 
are mostly of Dadjo origin.  In the southern-most area, from 
the Wadi Azoum to the Chadian town of Tissi, it is again the 
Masalit, Wadai, and Dadjo, along with the Fur, who are 
sustaining most of the attacks. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Lastly, the rights organizations point to a number 
of Chadian ethnic groups who appear to be (a) exempted from 
attack, (b) helping the attackers with information, or (c) 
actively participating in the violence.  Some are generally 
seen as "Arab" in the region, but others were in the past 
considered "African" -- either in Chad, or among the same 
ethnic populations in Sudan, or both.  In AI's analysis, the 
"African" communities in the northern Adre-to-Ade area that 
seem to have allied themselves with Janjawid fighters are the 
Mimi and Tama; heading south, there are reports of Mimi and 
Wadai (the latter group often among the victims in other 
areas).  Farther south, the Tama seem to be joined by the 
Gimr and Fellata clans in attacking their neighbors with the 
cross-border raiders. 
 
--------------------------- 
ICRC CONFIRMS, SEES THREAT 
TO HUMANITARIANS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Head of Delegation for the International 
Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), Thomas Merkelbach told us 
that he and his staff perceive the pattern of attacks in much 
the same way as AI and HRW.  His staff note as well hearing 
criticisms of humanitarian agencies working in the region 
that are reminiscent of those heard in Darfur as the violence 
there began to intensify.  Local populations seen to be 
assisting the Janjawid attackers complain that aid 
organizations are assisting only particular ethnic groups, 
implying some kind of discrimination in the allocation of 
aid.  Merkelbach said the echoes of these complaints now 
heard inside Chad were causing him to more carefully 
calculate how he was sending ICRC Delegates into the field, 
and trying to enlarge contact networks in the affected areas 
to enhance his staff's security. 
 
-------------------------- 
SULTAN OF DAR SILLA: OUR 
MEDIATION ROLE IS IGNORED 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ambassador met June 30 with Seid Ibrahim Mustafa 
Bakhit, the Sultan of Dar Silla region (a traditional 
hereditary title).  The Sultan, of the Dadjo group, holds 
court over the middle and southern areas in the AI construct. 
 He confirmed the broad outlines of the HRW and AI analyses, 
placing the emphasis on the helplessness of his people in the 
face of (a) well armed, marauding thieves; (b) equally well 
armed Chadian rebel groups looking westward, and Sudanese 
rebels looking east; and (c) the Chadian and Sudanese 
governments, intent on carrying out their feud at the expense 
of their people.  He said that attacks had indeed fallen off 
in June, but attributed that to the lack of anything else to 
steal, and any more people to displace in the area accessible 
to the Chad/Sudan border. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Sultan painted a clear picture of the scorched 
earth tactics of the raiders, as well as the cooperation they 
receive from local Mimi, Tama, and Wadai "visitors" (these 
groups having arrived in the area from the north during the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000906  003 OF 004 
 
 
famine of 1984, and intermingled with the indigenous Dadjo 
peoples).  He regretted the fact that the environment had 
become so poisoned among peoples who had lived quietly 
together for decades -- in the case of the 1984 migrants -- 
and sometimes centuries, when speaking of the local Arab 
groups.  "It was our traditional role as Sultan to mediate 
conflicts among the different groups.  But it required a kind 
of balance of power.  We cannot mediate now, because our 
Dadjo people are armed with arrows and spears, while the 
raiders and their Chadian allies have sophisticated automatic 
weapons.  How can we assure the security of the border in 
such circumstances?  That is the Chadian Government's task." 
 
--------------------------- 
WHERE IS CHADIAN SECURITY? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The absence of protection from attack from the 
Government of Chad's security forces seems tied to slightly 
different factors in each of AI's three zones.  In the 
Adre-to-Ade area, groups ethnically tied to President Deby's 
clan of the Zaghawa have been left largely in peace.  In 
fact, most large-scale attacks north of Adre, into the 
Zaghawa heartland from which both Deby and the rebel group 
FUCD draw their recruits, ceased as long ago as March 2006, 
given these populations' ability to call on armed defenders. 
In addition, SLM/A forces around the towns of Bihari and Tine 
have helped to provide a buffer against vengeance and other 
attacks.  Further south, however, the Masalit and Dadjo are 
not important to Deby's power base.  This fact makes it 
easier for the GOC to position its forces outside the areas 
of Dar Silla and Dar Masalit, between Ade and Tissi. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The GOC may also be calculating from where the next 
concerted attack on the Deby regime is likely to come, and 
keeping its forces along those axes, facing the threat. 
Conventional wisdom and past history would lead those forces 
to be positioned outside of AI's two southern-most zones, 
leaving the populations there exposed and vulnerable to 
marauders.  According to the Sultan of Dar Silla, that area, 
especially south of the Wadi Azoum, is now "ungovernable". 
 
------------ 
MOTIVATIONS 
------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) As noted above, there seems to be a shift in the 
intensity of the attacks in the region, away from relatively 
straightforward banditry, and toward clearing the regions of 
the long-settled "African" populations.  Although theft is 
still a common theme to the attacks of the last 6-10 months, 
it seems to be theft with a vengeance -- whole populations 
are reportedly attacked again and again until they are forced 
to flee -- then attacked again in their place of refuge, 
until they are far enough away from the border area as to 
have abandoned their traditional homes.  These tactics seem 
to be born of the ethnic elements mentioned above, but also 
may have roots in the broader political-military environment 
of the region -- the spilling over of the conflicts between 
(a) Chadian President Deby and Sudan's Khartoum regime; (b) 
the Chadian rebels seeking to oust Deby; and (c) the SLA/SLM 
and the Khartoum regime in Darfur -- including the internal 
fighting among the SLA/SLM factions.  A key element among 
these influences is certainly Khartoum's use of the Janjawid 
as a proxy in efforts to destabilize President Deby's 
government in N'Djamena. 
 
¶12. (SBU) AI points to other, more localized elements that 
may be at play, such as the need for land of pastoralists 
whose traditional migratory routes are dirupted by the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000906  004 OF 004 
 
 
movement of armed Chadian and Sudanese rebel groups such as 
the FUCD, the SLA or the JEM.  Lastly, a purely ethnic 
element may be involved, with conflicts among competing 
groups that had in the past been resolved through mediation 
by elders and traditional authorities now being left to 
explode, given the disproportionate power relationships among 
the groups, and the marginalization of the traditional 
leaders. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) While AI and HRW make strong calls for Chadian and 
Sudanese authorities to protect the helpless, stop the 
wicked, and halt their feud, the reality is that both the 
solutions to the problems underlying these vicious attacks, 
and the problems themselves, are anything but obvious.  It 
would be unhelpful to single out any one influence in the 
upsurge of violence -- such as Sudanese use of the Janjawid 
as their proxy combatants -- as the only cause, and expect 
that simply pushing for an end to that will resolve the 
situation.  Perhaps AI has it most right: this appears to be 
the sowing of the seeds of the conflict in Darfur in Eastern 
Chad, and the crop that comes up threatens to have similarly 
pernicious results for the surrounding environment as those 
now festering in Western Sudan.  END COMMENT. 
WALL