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RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0287
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RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1906
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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001006 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016 
TAGS: CD PGOV PREL SU
SUBJECT: FRANCE REFUTES OFFICIAL CHAD SUPPORT FOR DPA 
SPOILERS 
 
NDJAMENA 00001006  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Allegations by SLA leader Minni Minawi 
concerning Chad's support for DPA spoilers are false, 
according to the French Ambassador to Chad.  He understands 
that President Deby's brother Daoussa Deby, and Mahamat Ali 
Nasser, Minister of Territorial Administration, are (with 
Libyan support) abetting the National Redemption Front (NRF) 
by channeling weapons from Libya, encouraging Chadian 
deserters to join the NRF ranks, and asking local authorities 
to help with recruitment.  However, with French forces on the 
ground in Eastern Chad, France could say authoritatively that 
regular Chadian army forces were not deploying into Sudan 
against DPA signatories.  The French Ambassador believed that 
Daoussa  Deby and Mahamat Ali should be placed on the UN 
sanction list before President Deby's August 8 inauguration 
in order to ensure that neither would be given a governmental 
position in Deby's next administration. In a separate 
conversation, N'djamena-based SLA/MM representatives claimed 
that GOC pressure against Minni loyalists had increased 
following Minni's visit to Washington.  The SLA/MM 
representatives expected to be evicted from their 
GOC-provided quarters in the near future.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  French Ambassador to Chad Jean-Pierre Bercot called 
the Ambassador July 28 to express his concerns that SLA 
leader Minni Minawi's claims of Government of Chad (GOC) 
involvement in attacks on DPA signatories were being taken at 
face value.  Bercot was further concerned that observers 
(including his own colleagues at the French Embassy in 
Khartoum) were describing the situation as a full-fledged 
proxy war between Chad and Sudan.  On the contrary, stated 
Bercot, as Deby would be the principal beneficiary of peace 
in Darfur, it would be "incoherent" to think that he would 
work to destabilize it.  Furthermore, as verified by French 
troops on the ground in Eastern Chad, there were no National 
Redemption Front (NRF) rebel bases in Chad, nor was the 
Chadian army deploying in support of the NRF in Sudan. 
Furthermore, Chadian helicopters were not picking up NRF 
wounded and flying them back to Chad as has been alleged by 
Sudanese authorities.  Bercot stated that he could provide 
these assurances as France knew at any given time the exact 
location of Chad's armed forces. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Bercot did recognize that President Deby's brother, 
Daoussa Deby, and the Minister of Territorial Administration, 
General Mahamat Ali Nassour, were most likely aiding the NRF 
by encouraging Chadian deserters to join the NRF ranks, 
channeling weapons to them (from Libya), and encouraging 
local authorities (prefets, governors) to recruit for the 
NRF.  President Deby, according to Bercot, did not support 
these actions -- it was clear that he had nothing to gain 
from continued crisis in Darfur -- but he was not strong 
enough domestically to stop them. 
 
¶4. (C) Concerning the Chad/Sudanese relationship, Bercot 
stated that Deby had no intention of implementing the Tripoli 
accords (despite assurances to the contrary that might be 
made). A strong monitoring force on the border would be an 
impediment to the transfer from an AMIS peace-keeping force 
to a UN peace-keeping force -- and there was no confusion in 
President Deby's mind as to which he would prefer to see. 
Bercot believed that it would be better to delete references 
to the Tripoli Accord from the draft UN Security Council 
Resolution for the same reason 
 
¶5. (C) Concerning the role of Sudan, and recent announcements 
that the GOC and the Government of Sudan were on the path to 
reconciliation, Bercot acknowledged that this was the first 
step towards resuming diplomatic relations.  At the same 
time, he cautioned that President Deby had no desire to move 
too fast.  In particular, he had no wish to be upstaged by 
either President Beshir or President Quaddafi at his August 8 
inauguration (he apparently invited neither, but Bercot 
wouldn't put it past Quaddafi to arrive in his plane with 
Beshir on board). 
 
¶6. (C) Delving into Libyan meddling in Chad, Bercot stated 
that Quaddafi wanted to "control Deby" for the next five 
years.  To that end, he was using Daoussa Deby as a wedge to 
 
NDJAMENA 00001006  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
split the Zaghawas.  And he was paying off inhabitants of 
Chad's northern regions -- members of the Goran and Tubu 
tribes, who were disgruntled over perceived favoritism to 
Zaghawas, Arabs and southern Chadians.  Bercot pointed out 
that the northern regions (Borku, Ennedi and Tibesti) were 
risky areas and essentially ungovernable.  It would be 
impossible for the GOC to maintain a position for more than a 
couple of days if those regions chose to rise up. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Bercot concluded by stating that it was "high time" 
that the UNSC added Deby frere and Mahamat Ali Nassour to the 
sanctions list.  This was particularly urgent in order to 
deny them cabinet positions in the new government that 
President Deby is expected to form after his August 8 
inauguration. 
 
¶8.  (C) In a meeting the same day with EconOff, members of 
the Sudanese Liberation Movement faction loyal to Minni 
Minawi (SLM/MM) accused the GOC of denying medical and 
financial assistance, as well as shelter to SLA members loyal 
to Minni in N'djamena.  The members claimed that the GOC had 
frozen all bank accounts belonging to SLA/MM loyalists in 
N'djamena, and were tracking and interdicting any private 
contributions from Sudan to these members.  They also stated 
that members of the Police Intelligence Unit and associates 
of Daoussa Deby were forcing the SLA members and families to 
vacate their current residences shortly.  They claimed that 
pressure against Mini loyalists had increased in the past few 
days, particularly following Mini's visit to Washington. 
 
COMMENT: 
 
¶9. (C) Along with the French, we are skeptical that Chadian 
helicopters are flying missions in Sudan.  However, we feel 
that Ambassador Bercot glosses over the fact that, while 
peace in Darfur is in President Deby's interest, Deby may 
also see it in his interest to allow others to continue to 
support the JEM and the G-19 on the grounds that "the enemy 
of my enemy is my friend." 
 
¶10.  (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
WALL