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Viewing cable 06MUMBAI1375, A $5-$6 BILLION "NUCLEAR PARK" FOR U.S. REACTORS IN INDIA?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MUMBAI1375 2006-07-26 08:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Mumbai
VZCZCXRO1298
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI
DE RUEHBI #1375/01 2070808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260808Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL MUMBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4135
INFO RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 5398
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1079
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 1176
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 8903
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0624
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0627
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0616
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0045
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0041
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0047
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0072
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0167
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0001
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0083
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MUMBAI 001375 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. OF ENERGY FOR U/S GARMAN, S. JOHNSON, T. CUTLER, A. 
SCHEINEMAN 
DEPT. OF COMMERCE FOR U/S FRANK LAVIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/26/2016 
TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY PGOV BEXP IN
SUBJECT: A $5-$6 BILLION "NUCLEAR PARK" FOR U.S. REACTORS IN INDIA? 
 
REF: New Delhi 3706 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael S. Owen, Consul General, Consulate 
General Mumbai, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) The head of India's state-run nuclear power company told 
visiting Charge on July 21 that U.S. nuclear suppliers could get 
their own "nuclear park" of five to six reactors worth $5-$6 
billion if the U.S./India civil nuclear agreement becomes 
reality.  S.K. Jain, MD and Chairman of the Nuclear Power Corp. 
of India (NPCIL), said the "American park" would be one of three 
-- the others would likely house French and Russian reactors -- 
that the NPCIL hoped to build as part of its plan to create 40 
Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear generation capacity by 2020.  That 
target, announced by PM Singh after the historic July 18, 2005 
summit in Washington without apparent consultations with NPCIL, 
was "very ambitious," Jain said, and would not allow NPCIL the 
luxury of conducting individual tenders for each new foreign 
reactor it purchased.  Instead, NPCIL would enter into direct 
bilateral negotiations with selected suppliers, most likely from 
the U.S., France and Russia.  Bundling imported reactors in 
parks would also reduce both costs and construction times, Jain 
said.  India would need to import 750 tons of lightly enriched 
uranium annually to fuel 40 GW of generation capacity, he added. 
 The NPCIL was open to joint ventures with U.S. companies once 
India's laws were changed, he said, although he did not appear 
optimistic that the enabling legislation would be enacted soon. 
The company was also keen to take advantage of the commercial 
opportunities offered by the USG's decision to de-license 
certain exports to India, yet U.S. companies had found India's 
needs too small to be commercially viable, Jain said.  He 
reacted enthusiastically to Charge's suggestion to use the large 
scale USDOC-led trade delegation to India, scheduled for late 
November, to introduce NPCIL to more U.S. companies involved in 
the civil nuclear sector, and also proposed the establishment of 
a US-India working group to cultivate channels of cooperation 
between NPCIL and U.S. civil nuclear technology companies. End 
summary. 
 
 
NPCIL's "Very Ambitious" Expansion Plans 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) In his July 21 meeting with Charge Geoffrey Pyatt, Jain 
outlined NPCIL's plans to create 40 Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear 
generation capacity by 2020.  Jain, who called the target "very 
ambitious" acknowledged that India could not achieve the goal on 
its own, but would depend on significant imports of both 
reactors and fuel.  (Note: Prime Minister Singh announced the 40 
GW target, apparently without prior consultations with the Dept. 
of Atomic Energy and NPCIL, following his July 18 2005 meeting 
with President Bush in Washington.  Before Singh's announcement, 
the NPCIL had planned to build 20 GW capacity by 2020.  End 
note).  To reach the goal, Jain said, India needed 21-24 foreign 
reactors over the next 14 years, each with 1 GW of generation 
capacity.  India will also need to import about 750 tons of 
lightly enriched uranium annually to meet the 40 GW target, Jain 
said.  (In its earlier planning, the NPCIL hoped to import 6 
foreign reactors by 2020 in addition to the two Russian reactors 
now under construction in Kudankulam). 
 
A "Nuclear Park" for U.S. Reactors 
---------------------------------- 
 
MUMBAI 00001375  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
3. (C) Jain explained in greater detail the company's plans, 
mentioned in earlier discussions with the press (ref A), to 
create "nuclear parks" to house the new reactors.  He stated 
openly that NPCIL would like to create "American, French and 
Russian" parks, each of which would house reactors built by 
companies from one of the three countries.  Bundling reactors of 
similar origin in a few locations would reduce both construction 
costs and times, he said.  Ideally, each would be home to a 
cluster of 5 to 6 foreign reactors.  The NPCIL expected each 
reactor to have a capacity of 1 GW and cost about $1 billion, 
Jain said.  The company was now identifying coastal sites for 
the parks.  Responding to the Charge's question, Jain 
acknowledged that the Russian park would be located at the 
Kudankulam site in southeast India where two Russian 1 GW light 
water reactors (LWRs) were currently under construction. 
Coastal sites in Gujarat and Maharashtra in western India were 
the most likely locations for the other two parks, Jain said. 
NPCIL hoped to get approval for the sites by the end of the 
year, he added. 
 
4. (C) Jain said that the ambitious time frame did not allow for 
open tenders.  Instead, NPCIL planed to conduct direct bilateral 
negotiations with selected foreign suppliers from the three 
countries.  He acknowledged that significant price differences 
existed between the suppliers, yet the NPCIL would operate all 
the reactors at a profit because the company could easily sell 
all the power it generated in India's rapidly growing power 
markets, he said. 
 
5. (C) This approach was only the first step in NPCIL's long 
term plans to import reactor technology, Jain said, and was 
predicated by the urgent need to meet the Prime Minister's 
target.  The NPCIL was also interested in other forms of 
cooperation, such as joint ventures, Jain said.  Charge asked 
Jain about the state of draft legislation which, if enacted, 
would allow private participation in India's civil nuclear power 
sector.  Jain said that the legislation would permit 
public/private partnerships but stipulate that the state 
maintain a majority shareholding in each case.  The draft 
legislation did not specifically mention foreign direct 
investment, yet it was drafted in a manner that would enable 
foreign stakes in Indian nuclear power companies subject to 
certain conditions laid out by the GOI, he said.  Jain said the 
NPCIL was open to joint ventures.  Foreign companies could 
contribute their technology while NPCIL could offer its 
knowledge of the Indian market and the regulatory environment, 
he said.  He hinted that the legislation may be facing obstacles 
in the Indian parliament.  He declined to speculate when the 
bill, originally submitted by the NDA government, might pass, 
and only stated that the legislation was currently the object of 
"coalition politics." 
 
NPCIL Interest in Foreign Cooperation 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Jain said that foreign firms, sensing the opportunities 
opened by the civil nuclear agreement, had approached NPCIL with 
increasingly regularity.  He recounted the recent visit of GE 
Chairman and CEO Jeffrey Immelt, whom Jain quoted as saying that 
GE wasn't interested in India if it meant only selling a small 
number of reactors.  GE, Jain said, wanted to establish a major 
manufacturing presence for nuclear hardware in India that would 
also service export markets, including the U.S.  Jain also said 
that foreign banks such as Bank of America and France's BNP had 
approached NPCIL about the possibility of providing financing 
for the purchase of nuclear hardware from the U.S. and France. 
 
 
MUMBAI 00001375  003 OF 004 
 
 
USG Sees India as Nuclear Partner, and As Customer 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
7. (C) Charge told Jain that the U.S. sees India not only as a 
strategic civil nuclear partner, but also as a customer.  In 
addition to well-known suppliers such as General Electric and 
Westinghouse, many small and medium sized U.S. companies were 
well positioned to help the NPCIL meet its ambitious expansion 
plans.  The competitiveness of U.S. nuclear suppliers would only 
increase in the coming years, Charge pointed out, since the U.S. 
was seeing a renaissance of nuclear energy that would lead to 
growth and innovation throughout the entire industry. 
 
No Luck in Buying License-Free U.S. Hardware 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Jain said that the NPCIL had approached selected U.S. 
companies last year after the USG lifted licensing requirements 
on certain nuclear technologies not subject to international 
controls.  The response was muted, Jain said, since U.S. 
suppliers found the Indian requirements to be too small to be 
economically viable.  Jain suggested that the U.S. and India 
establish individual working groups to improve bilateral 
commercial nuclear ties.  U.S. firms would always be welcome, 
and they would always get priority, Jain said.  He pledged that 
NPCIL would always guarantee post-installation verification and 
transparency of all licensed technology it was allowed to import. 
 
9. (C) The Charge told Jain that USDOC was bringing a sizable 
trade delegation, possibly the largest in U.S. history, to India 
in late November.  Jain responded positively to his suggestion 
to include U.S. firms that might be of interest to the NPCIL and 
other Indian companies that supply civil nuclear technology. 
Charge also suggested that NPCIL's interest in procuring 
de-licensed U.S. technology could be an action item for the High 
Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG).  Jain offered his support 
for the suggestion as well. 
 
 
NPCIL's Current Operations 
-------------------------- 
 
10. (C) With the Tarapur unit 3 having come on line earlier this 
year, NPCIL was now operating 16 reactors with a capacity of 3.8 
GW, Jain said.  Another six reactors now under construction -- 
four indigenously designed pressurized heavy reactors (PHWR) and 
the two Russian LWRs -- would bring capacity to 6.8 GW by 2008 
at the latest, he said.  By 2020, the NPCIL hoped to generate 10 
GW of power via PHWRs and 2 GW via fast breeder reactors (FBR). 
The test FBR in Kalpakkam was already generating power, he said, 
and the first prototype FBR was on schedule to go commercially 
operational in 2011.  Domestic natural uranium supplies were 
only sufficient to power the 10 GW of PHWRs, Jain said, hence 
the NPCIL could not meet the Prime Minister's goal even if it 
were capable of building far more domestically designed PHWRs. 
Reliability of fuel supplies was a serious concern, he said. 
Currently India was exploring the option of establishing joint 
commercial ventures with foreign mining companies as part of its 
efforts to secure fuel supplies, Jain admitted.  It had already 
had initial discussions with both Canadian and U.S. companies, 
including U.S. energy mining and energy company USEC. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C) Jain clearly acknowledged that the USG decision to seek 
full civil nuclear cooperation with India is the linchpin to his 
company's future expansion plans, since the NPCIL cannot even 
 
MUMBAI 00001375  004 OF 004 
 
 
achieve its old plan of 20 GW by 2020 without imported reactors 
and fuel.  He was therefore eager to stress that India sees a 
significant role for U.S. firms in the country's ambitious civil 
nuclear plans, mitigating concerns that the civil nuclear deal 
might primarily benefit France and Russia, both of which appear 
to have enjoyed a more intimate relationship with NPCIL in the 
past than U.S. companies.  USDOC's trade delegation, scheduled 
for late November, offers a timely opportunity that should not 
be missed.  We encourage USDOC to target as many U.S. companies 
as possible that could have an interest in participating in 
India's aggressive civil nuclear expansion plans.  End comment. 
 
12. (U) Charge Geoffrey Pyatt cleared this cable. 
OWEN