VZCZCXRO3766
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHBI #1332/01 2001329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 191329Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL MUMBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4082
INFO RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 8847
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5362
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1067
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 1166
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0616
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0223
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 0108
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0038
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0510
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0608
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0619
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MUMBAI 001332 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR OPS CENTER, S/CT, SCA/INS, DS, DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/SCA, 
DS/ICI/PII 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/19/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KISL CASC ASEC PK IN
SUBJECT: (C) PAKISTAN'S ISI INVOLVED IN MUMBAI BOMBINGS, TOP POLICE 
OFFICIAL TELLS CONSUL GENERAL 
 
REF: A) KATHMANDU 1918,  B) MUMBAI 1319  C) NEW DELHI 5063 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Owen, Consul General, Consulate General 
Mumbai, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Maharahstra's top police official told the Consul General 
on July 19 that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence 
Directorate (ISI) had a clear hand in the July 7 Mumbai train 
bombings.  P.S. Pasricha, Director General of the state police, 
said the bombs used in the attacks may point to an Al-Qaida link 
as well.  Pasricha acknowledged that investigators had no 
smoking gun linking Pakistan or Al-Qaida to the bombings, but 
said that the planning and execution of the attacks pointed to 
clear ISI involvement.  He said police now believe that material 
and manpower for the operation came from Pakistan via Nepal and 
Bihar to Mumbai, with Bihar playing a key role as a logistics 
hub.  The police have now identified the types of explosives 
used in the bombings, he said.  He shared the results of 
forensic tests with the Consulate.  Pasricha said that his 
political masters were not pressuring the police to deliver 
quick results, an approach that, in Pasricha's view, was 
necessary to ensure that the investigation into the bombings, 
clearly the work of Muslim extremists, did not alienate local 
Muslims and help create more of the terrorists that the police 
were trying to combat. The briefing was the first official 
readout on the bombings that Pasricha had provided to anyone 
outside his immediate circle.  He promised to update us on a 
regular basis.  End summary. 
 
Top State Police Official Points to Pakistan, and Even Possibly 
Al-Qaida 
 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Consul General, RSO and Pol/Econ chief met with P.S. 
Pasricha, Director General of the Maharashtra state police, on 
July 19 to get our first official briefing on the investigation 
into the Mumbai train bombings.  Pasricha told us this was the 
first full readout he provided to anyone outside the circle of 
his immediate political leaders. 
 
¶3. (C) Pasricha said that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence 
Directorate (ISI) had a clear hand in bombings.  He said 
investigators had no direct evidence conclusively linking the 
ISI to the bombings, but modus operandi, tactics, logistics, and 
intercepted communications all pointed to Pakistani and ISI 
involvement.  He also said that the bombs used may be a sign of 
Al-Qaida involvement as well.  The bombs, which forensics 
experts have now confirmed as a mixture of RDX explosives, 
ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, were identical to those used in 
the 2002 Bali bombings and the bombings in Varanasi earlier this 
year.  Pasricha stressed, however, that investigators had no 
direct evidence of Al-Qaida involvement. 
 
The Investigation 
 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Pasricha said investigators were now focusing on three 
different theories about the perpetrators of the bombings, each 
of which pointed to ISI support or backing.  A total of 16 
investigative teams were sifting evidence and leads to determine 
which of the following three theories was most likely: 
 
-- A joint operation of Lashkar-e-Taiba (L-e-T) and Students' 
Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).  (Previously, the local media 
and our lower level police contacts had both pointed to a joint 
 
MUMBAI 00001332  002 OF 004 
 
 
LeT/SIMI operation as the most probable of all theories); 
 
-- A combined operation of a so-called "Gujarat Revenge Force" 
(GRF) and SIMI.  Pasricha said the GRF was a group of Muslim 
extremists intent on revenging the 2002 communal riots in 
Gujarat that left hundreds, most Muslims, dead.  Pasricha did 
not specify whether this group was made up mostly of local 
Muslim extremists, or foreigners. 
 
-- A combined operation of the ISI and the Muslim underworld. 
Pasricha said the police were exploring this possibility on 
account of the key role that underworld kingpin Dawood Ibrahim, 
who our Indian interlocutors widely believe to be hiding out in 
Pakistan, played in the serial bombings that hit Mumbai in 2003. 
 
¶5. (C) Pasricha said that Lashkar-e-Qahar, the group that had 
taken responsibility for the attack, was actually a front for 
LeT.  LeT used such fronts to distance itself from its 
operations, Pasricha claimed, as it wanted to portray a cleaner 
image in the eyes of many of its supporters and sympathizers. 
 
The Pakistan-Nepal-Bihar Connection 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In each case, Pasricha said, all leads were pointing to 
significant foreign involvement in both planning and execution 
of the attacks.  He said police now believed that material and 
manpower for the operation came to Mumbai from Pakistan via 
Nepal and Bihar.  Bihar appeared to play an important role as a 
logistics hub, he said.  Investigators were now searching for a 
man from Bihar whom they believe played the key role in 
facilitating materials, persons and communications to the bomb 
sites in Mumbai.  The police were also searching for two other 
men from Uttar Pradesh, both of whom are related to the man in 
Bihar.  The police had been trailing the two from UP for some 
time before July 7, he said.  On the day of the bombings 
communications between the two and their relative in Bihar 
spiked, he said.  All three disappeared after the bombings. 
Pasricha only gave us given names of the three, but promised to 
follow up with their complete names.  (Comment:  In a separate 
meeting later on July 19, Pasricha asked RSO to withhold 
reporting on the Bihar connection, so we ask that this 
information be kept at close hold.   We are unclear about 
Pasricha's motivation for the request.  The Bihar lead may be so 
key to the investigation that he is afraid we might leak it.  On 
the other hand, it's entirely possible that the Bihar angle may 
be far more speculative than he originally led us to believe, 
and that Pasricha wants to ensure that we don't inflate its 
importance.  End comment.)  India's porous borders were a 
challenge to any investigation, he told us.   He said the police 
believed that Pakistan-based operatives regularly brought in 
materials via Nepal and manpower via the long border with 
Bangladesh. 
 
The Role of SIMI 
 
---------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Pasricha was equally confident that the SIMI played a key 
role in supporting the operation.  SIMI operatives were 
ideologically committed, computer-savvy young Muslim men who 
communicated almost exclusively through e-mail, he said.  After 
the group was banned earlier this decade, many SIMI operatives 
went underground and changed their names.  The group was loosely 
organized, highly compartmentalized and operated on a 
need-to-know basis, he said.   Most SIMI members knew little 
about their cohorts, or about other young men who might be part 
of the organization, he said.  The group's structure made it 
difficult for investigators to penetrate, he said. 
 
The Operation 
 
 
MUMBAI 00001332  003 OF 004 
 
 
------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Pasricha said investigators now believed that all seven 
bombs were planted on the trains before the trains left the 
Churchgate station, the terminus of Mumbai's Western Railway in 
the southern part of the city.  The bombs, placed in the 
overhead luggage racks in first class compartments, were 
equipped with timers to ensure that they all exploded within a 
short period of time.  Pasricha said the police were unsure 
whether operatives were actually in the trains as they departed 
Churchgate heading north.  They could have boarded in Churchgate 
yet disembarked before the bombs exploded.   Investigators were 
also exploring the possibility that one of the operatives may 
have been killed in the explosions.  The remains of only one 
bombing victim have yet to be identified, Pasricha said.  At the 
same time, a group that has taken credit for the attacks, 
Lashkar-e-Qahar, publicly said that 15 of its 16 operatives who 
carried out the attack had escaped safely.  Forensic experts 
were now examining the badly mutilated remains of the one 
unidentified victim to determine whether that person was in fact 
part of the operation. 
 
¶9. (C) Pasricha confirmed that forensic experts were now 
convinced that the bombs were all a mixture of RDX, ammonium 
nitrate and fuel oil, most likely diesel.    Pasricha said the 
police are not yet sure why the perpetrators used the mixture. 
They may have had a shortage of RDX, he said, or they might have 
deliberately chosen the combination to confuse investigators, 
since the mixture left few traces after it exploded.  (Comment: 
Another distinct possibility is that Pasricha, or perhaps even 
his forensic investigators, understand little about this 
particular type of bomb, known by its acronym ANFO.  We 
understand that the recipe is well known, being available both 
online and in publications such as the widely read "Anarchist's 
Handbook."  End comment.)  Pasricha shared a copy of the 
forensics report with us, which RSO forwarded to DS/IP/ITA and 
DS/ICI/PII. 
 
"Don't Read the Newspapers" 
 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Pasricha also told us that he implemented a policy to 
reign in his officers and ensure that lower-tier officers and 
investigators stopped talking to the press.  Since the bombings, 
a hyperactive Indian media has been quick to attribute hot leads 
and accusations to unnamed police sources.  Most of these leads 
turn out to be red herrings and are quickly dropped.   When 
asked about the Pakistani businessmen detained in Kathmandu (ref 
A), a case that the media has played up in a big way, Pasricha 
told us he was unaware of it.  "Don't read the newspapers," he 
told us bluntly without a hint of humor or irony.  He said he 
designated K.P. Raghuvashni, chief of the Maharashtra state 
police anti-terrorism squad, as the sole official public 
spokesmen for the investigation, and said that anything the 
press reported  that is not directly attributable to Raghuvashni 
cannot be believed. 
 
¶11. (C) Pasricha said the Kathmandu case was typical of a press 
that quickly assumed that the police suspected persons simply 
because they were questioning them.  Another case was the 
questioning of 11 young Muslim preachers who were detained near 
the Bangladesh border in the days after the bombings (ref B). 
Pastiche confirmed the police were questioning the group, but he 
acknowledged that investigators had no evidence linking them to 
the bombings, and that it was highly likely that the young men 
were entirely innocent. 
 
Politicians Not Pressuring the Police 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) In contrast to the press, which was already beginning to 
 
MUMBAI 00001332  004 OF 004 
 
 
question the effectiveness of the investigation, Pasricha's 
political masters were not pressuring the police to deliver 
quick results, he told us.  Both Maharashtra Chief Minister V. 
Deshmukh and Home Minister R.R. Patil had given their backing to 
a solid, professional investigation, he said.  Pasricha also 
claimed that Indian President Abdul Kalam, in a July 18 phone 
call, asked him to exercise patience and restraint to ensure 
police have a strong case with solid evidence.  Pasricha said 
that such political backing was also important to ensure that 
the investigation, which is clearly focusing on Muslims, does 
not incite communal passions.  The indiscriminate rounding up 
and killing of many innocent Sikhs in the aftermath of Indira 
Gandhi's assassination alienated that community and created many 
Sikh terrorists, Pasricha (who is himself a Sikh) said.  Careful 
treatment of Mumbai's large Muslim community would be necessary 
to ensure that investigators do not create an environment that 
aids the type of extremism that the police are trying to combat, 
he said. 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
¶13. (C) Like the Indian policy making community (ref C), the 
police officials leading the investigation are convinced that 
Pakistan played a key role in the bombings.  Pasricha is a 
candid technocrat who nonetheless weighs his words carefully. 
Unlike many politicians, media commentators and spokesmen for 
the Hindu right, he does not give the appearance that he has an 
axe to grind with either Pakistan or Muslims in general.  Hence 
his strong conviction that the bombings have a link to Pakistan 
is noteworthy.  At the same time, Pasricha acknowledged that the 
police have no evidence directly linking the ISI to the 
bombings.  Like much of what we hear from other contacts, the 
police seem to believe that the ISI plays more the role of 
facilitator and trainer, providing capacity-building types of 
services to other groups that enable these groups to carry out 
attacks on the scale of that which hit Mumbai on July 7. 
 
¶14. (C) Pasricha's view that the police need to tread softly 
with western India's large and diverse Muslim community is in 
line with what we hear from Muslim leaders (ref B).  Muslims 
tell us that the police, even when rounding up hundreds of young 
Muslim men, appear to have a clear focus, and are not 
indiscriminately targeting the Muslim community.  Such a police 
approach reflects the general mood in Mumbai, where most people 
are not interested in laying blame on the entire Muslim 
community.  Whether such a police approach remains tenable in 
the medium run will depend on the progress of the investigation 
and on the patience of Pasricha's political masters. End 
comment. 
OWEN