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Viewing cable 06MUMBAI1261, MAHARASHTRA POLICE UPDATE ON ISLAMIC TERRORISM IN WESTERN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MUMBAI1261 2006-07-06 10:29 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Mumbai
VZCZCXRO0281
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHBI #1261/01 1871029
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 061029Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL MUMBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3976
INFO RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 8738
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5279
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1027
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 1117
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0586
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0193
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 0078
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0020
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0483
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0578
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0597
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MUMBAI 001261 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/6/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KIRF KISL CASC ASEC PK IN
SUBJECT: MAHARASHTRA POLICE UPDATE ON ISLAMIC TERRORISM IN WESTERN 
INDIA 
 
REF: A:  NEW DELHI 3835; B:  MUMBAI 847;  C. MUMBAI 890 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Owen, Consul General, Consulate General 
Mumbai, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
------- 
 
1. (C) A top Maharashtra anti-terrorist official has told us 
that the three suspected terrorists killed in the foiled June 1 
attack on the RSS headquarters in Nagpur were probably 
foreigners.  J.J. Singh, Additional Chief of Police in the 
Maharashtra Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS), also acknowledged that 
the Nagpur incident might be connected to the earlier seizure of 
weapons and arrests of nine persons in other cities in 
Maharashtra, and to the bombing of a Gujarat train station in 
February.  Singh said that the young Muslim men arrested in 
connection with the weapons seizure were a sleeper cell of 
couriers.  Some of the men had received training abroad, and the 
modus operandi pointed towards a Pakistan or Kashmir connection, 
but the ATS had no clear evidence of such a linkage, he said. 
Sleeper cells in Maharashtra's large and diverse Muslim 
community had become the "biggest headache" for the state's 
anti-terrorist police, Singh said.  The recent events in 
Maharashtra and Gujarat were not, in his view, necessarily a 
sign that Islamic terrorism was on the rise in western India. 
Terrorists needed only a few local contacts to provide logistics 
for their operation, he said.  The incidents were more likely a 
signal that outside groups were becoming more successful in 
tapping existing resentments, which ran high among Muslims in 
western India, to recruit young men to act as couriers or to 
provide logistical support.  Singh and local Muslim leaders told 
us that the 2002 carnage in Gujarat had become a rallying cry 
for terrorist recruiters infiltrating Muslim communities in 
western India.  Singh described the recruitment and training 
process in some detail.  He said madrassas had become a common 
recruiting ground, where the recruiting process was so subtle 
that many poorly educated and impressionable young men did not 
realize that they were being targeted.  End summary. 
 
Were RSS Attackers Foreigners? 
 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) J.J. Singh, Additional Chief of Police in the Maharashtra 
Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS), told Congen officers on June 22 that 
Indian authorities believe the three suspected terrorists killed 
in the foiled June 1 raid on the RSS headquarters in Nagpur (Ref 
A) were foreigners.  If they had been residents of India, the 
police would expect someone to come forth to collect the 
remains, or the bodies would match the description of persons 
missing somewhere in India, Singh said.  The attackers carried 
no identification, and forensic tests had not linked the bodies 
to those of known missing persons.  Singh would not speculate on 
their nationality, but said they were of south Asian origin. 
 
3. (C) Singh acknowledged that the weapons found in Nagpur were 
identical to the weapons seized in Aurangabad and Malegaon in 
May (Refs B, C).  Investigators in the seizures believed that 
terrorist operatives got away with some weapons, yet the police 
had no direct evidence connecting the Nagpur weapons to the two 
seizures.  He cautioned about jumping to conclusions about a 
linkage, pointing out that assault rifles and hand grenades like 
those found in Nagpur and Aurangabad had been used in other 
terrorist attacks elsewhere in India.  He did acknowledge, 
however, that the modus operandi in both cases was so similar 
that a link was not unlikely. 
 
Detainees Speak Openly 
 
---------------------- 
 
4. (C) Singh said the ATS had kept the nine persons arrested in 
 
MUMBAI 00001261  002 OF 004 
 
 
Aurangabad and Malegaon under surveillance and monitored their 
phone calls for several weeks.  Many of those arrested were now 
speaking freely with interrogators.  The police now believed 
that the men, all young Muslims, were a sleeper cell of 
couriers.  Sleeper cells were becoming the ATS's "biggest 
headache," he said.  The police assumed that similar sleeper 
cells existed in Aurangabad and elsewhere in western India. 
About half of the suspects were educated, the remaining were 
what Singh called semi-literate "blue collar" poor.  Some had 
received training in either Pakistan or Pakistan-controlled 
Kashmir, where they had traveled via the Gulf, Nepal or 
Bangladesh.  The group appeared to know little about their 
mission, despite the foreign training and travel.  Nor were they 
able to give investigators solid leads to those who were 
actually behind the operation.  He called the recruitment 
process and the weapons run highly professional, "polished" 
operations, as documented by the compartmentalized information 
of the couriers and the quality and packaging of the weapons 
into individual terrorist "kits" consisting of an AK-46/T-56 
rifle, 4 magazines, 200 rounds of ammunition, 3 hand grenades 
and 3 kg of RDX explosives. 
 
Terrorists Trained in Pakistan or Kashmir? 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) Investigators did not know the final destination of the 
weapons seized in Aurangabad, or their source country.  He said 
the authorities had leads on the perpetrators and their intended 
targets, but he refused to elaborate.  He did acknowledge, 
however, that the training received by the young arrestees 
pointed towards what he called a "PoK" or Pakistan or Kashmir 
connection.  (Note:  In a separate conversation, Sundeep 
Waslekar, President of the Strategic Foresight Group, a Mumbai 
think tank, said he's convinced that the attacks have a Pakistan 
connection.  Waslekar told us that, several years ago, the 
Pakistan's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
modified its strategy of supporting terror groups operating out 
of Kashmir.  ISI was now helping Kashmiri terrorists extend 
beyond Kashmir into the Indian heartland.  Waslekar said he had 
no reason to believe that the ISI itself was directly behind the 
Gujarat and Nagpur attacks.  More likely, the ISI trained and 
outfitted Kashmiri groups to carry out such attacks on their 
own, he said.  End note.) 
 
Aurangabad Arrests Linked to Gujarat Bombing? 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The group arrested in Aurangabad may also be connected to 
the February 19 bombing at a train station in Kalapur, Gujarat, 
which injured at least 25 persons.  Singh confirmed media 
reports that the Maharashtra ATS recently transferred two of the 
suspects to the Gujarat ATS for questioning in connection with 
the Kalapur bombing. Investigators had discovered that the two 
had information of possible relevance to the investigation in 
Gujarat.  However, Singh stressed that the Maharashtra police 
did not have clear evidence firmly linking the Aurangabad and 
Gujarat events. 
 
7. (C) Singh said the police still had no motive for the Kalapur 
bombing.  In the days following the incident, the media cited 
intelligence sources as claiming that the bomb, hidden in a 
suitcase, was actually meant to explode at Mumbai Central 
Station, but was inadvertently removed from a train at an 
earlier stop in Kalapur.  Recently the media quoted Gujarat 
police source as saying that the bomb was in fact intended for 
Kalapur.  Singh disagreed with the conclusion of his colleagues 
in Gujarat, however, saying that investigators still didn't have 
enough information to draw firm conclusions. 
 
A New Terrorism Trend in Western India? 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Singh doubted whether the three incidents signaled a new 
 
MUMBAI 00001261  003 OF 004 
 
 
trend towards Islamic terrorism in the western Indian heartland. 
 The incidents may simply be a sign of external groups' improved 
ability to use local Muslim communities as instruments for their 
purposes, he said.  Singh said the police believe that the 
terrorist presence in Maharashtra consisted mainly of sleeper 
cells for courier operations.  The actual operatives normally 
came from elsewhere.  Terrorists needed only a handful of local 
operatives; these were always easy to find in any large Muslim 
community, he said.  The vast majority of Muslims did not 
support terrorism, Singh said.  He estimated that "99 percent" 
of Shia Muslims, a minority among Muslims in western India, were 
opposed to terrorism, as were as the vast majority of Sunni 
Bareli Muslims.  Subgroups within the Deobandi sect of Sunni 
Muslims provided the most fertile soil for recruiting young men 
into terrorist operations.  The influence of the Ahl-e-Hadeeth 
movements was growing as well, Singh said. 
 
9. (C) Singh placed Muslim extremists in western India into two 
groups.  About half were true zealots, he said.  The rest were 
disaffected youth.  The severe economic disparity between 
Muslims and the Hindu majority had created an environment that 
extremists were actively exploiting.  In addition, the Gujarat 
massacres of 2002 had become a rallying point for many Muslims, 
much like Indira Gandhi's storming of the Golden Temple had 
become a catalyst for Sikh terrorism in the 1980s.  Recruiters 
harkened on the images of the massacre to recruit young, 
impressionable Muslims. 
 
Muslim Views on Terror Sympathies in Their Communities 
 
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10. (C) In separate conversations, leading members of Mumbai's 
Muslim community also said that Gujarat had become a rallying 
cry for disaffected young.  Mohib Nassar, a Mumbai-based 
businessman and respected member of the city's Shia community, 
said most Muslims were appalled by terrorist acts committed 
under the name of Islam, yet estimated that "about 20 percent" 
of the city's Sunni Muslims, mostly Deobandis, openly 
sympathized with Islamic terrorism around the world.  He claimed 
that terrorist groups from both Kashmir and Arab countries were 
actively seeking to get a foothold in the city's Deobandi 
community.  Majid Memon, a respected Sunni trial lawyer and 
human rights activist, told us that most Muslims felt a growing 
sense of humiliation that grew out of discrimination and denial 
of opportunity in Indian society.  Terrorist recruiters tapped 
into this sense of humiliation to recruit young, impressionable 
men.  Memon said many in his community refused to believe that 
Muslims were actually behind the attack on the RSS headquarters. 
 Naseem Khan, a deputy in the Maharashtra state parliament, said 
that Muslims were also feeling increasingly threatened by the 
Hindu majority.  Young men could easily be recruited by a "call 
to arms" to defend the community against a perceived outside 
threat posed by the Hindu majority. 
 
Foreign Training 
 
---------------- 
 
11. (C) Singh said terrorist recruits looked for young, 
semi-educated men as their "raw material."  Recruiters would 
identify boys with the particular qualities needed to be 
couriers or operatives.  The foreign training that the 
Aurangabad arrestees received was common.  Many young men, once 
identified as potential operatives, were sent to the Gulf to 
work, where they were mentored and developed.  Often the young 
men were unaware that they were being screened.  Those with less 
potential would be dropped to look after themselves, while 
others were sent to Pakistan or Kashmir for training.  The men 
received about six weeks of training; those who showed 
particular promise received an additional nine months.  (Note: 
Singh said that terrorist operatives received more training than 
many of his ATS officers.  End note.) 
 
Madrassas: Recruitment Ground For Terrorists 
 
 
MUMBAI 00001261  004 OF 004 
 
 
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12. (C) Singh said madrassas were a common recruiting platform 
for terrorists.  The number of madrassas in Maharashtra was 
increasing rapidly, he said.  Both state education and security 
services found it impossible to keep track of all of them.  Many 
madrassas were simply a single room where boys and young men 
spent entire days alone with a single teacher.  A boy's 
development depended much on the teacher, who could spend many 
formative years with young boys and men and became an important 
figure of authority in their lives.  A madrassa could change 
from good to bad, or vice versa, with a change of the teacher, 
Singh said.   Most new teaching recruits come to Maharashtra, a 
relatively developed state, from the poorer states of India such 
as Bihar and UP.  The police are also noting an increasing 
number of teachers from African and Arabian countries, Singh 
said. 
 
13. (C) The identification and recruitment in madrassas was so 
subtle that many of the young men did not realize they were 
being recruited.  Many young men are recruited by persons asking 
them to "do something positive for the community," or to "act as 
good Muslims."  Those approached were normally so limited in 
their horizons, so impressionable and had so many figures of 
authority around them asking them to do good things that they 
followed without question, Singh said.  Many of those in sleeper 
cells do not even realize that they are part of a larger 
organization. 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
14. (C) Singh was careful not to make any formal linkages 
between the events of Nagpur, Aurangabad and Kalapur in the 
absence of formal evidence, yet it was clear from his 
description of the incidents that the ATS assumes that they are 
all in fact interconnected.  His balanced assessment of the 
terrorist threat emanating from western India's Muslim 
community, and his description of the mood among Muslims, 
matches closely what we hear from Muslim leaders.  Both the 
police and Muslim leaders tell us that Muslim communities in 
western India appear, at the moment, to serve primarily as 
logistics hubs for the operations of outside groups.  They 
believe that home-grown Islamic terrorism is less of a threat. 
Our interlocutors agree in their assessment of what must be done 
to ensure that indigenous Islamic terrorism does not grow roots 
in the region:  Muslim communities must do more to ensure that 
their children receive a modern, high quality education, and 
government at all levels must work with the communities and 
civil society to address the denial of opportunity that is the 
seed for the anger and animosities that exist in the minds of 
many young Muslims in the region.  End comment. 
OWEN