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72557
2006-07-25 16:59:00
06MEXICO4100
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 004100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: PRI BOSS HOLDS FORTH ON ELECTION, PARTY'S FUTURE 
  
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL CHIEF ALAN MELTZER, REASONS: 1.4(B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
Federal Deputy Manlio Fabio Beltrones, recently elected to 
head the PRI faction in the incoming Senate, told poloff that 
his party would be willing to cooperate on specific issues 
with the administration of Felipe Calderon, although he 
doubted Calderon would offer a formal coalition on terms the 
PRI could accept.  Notwithstanding its willingness to 
cooperate, he said the PRI would not forget how it had been 
"wronged" by the Fox Administration during the campaign, 
particularly by the Administration's alleged role in 
releasing information about the wrongdoings of prominent 
PRIistas that hurt the party's electoral fortunes.  He said 
the PRI did not agree with Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's 
post-electoral strategy for challenging the election results, 
and that the PRI would support any decision pronounced by the 
electoral tribunal (TEPJF).  He made the less-than-convincing 
argument that the PRI had learned a lesson from its 
devastating defeat, and that it would seek to regain its 
credibility with the Mexican electorate by presenting itself 
as a reasonable, centrist option, tempering the extremes of 
the left and right.  Beltrones is likely to be an effective 
advocate for PRI interests in the Senate.  Nevertheless, the 
selection of this old-style political operator -- and one 
tainted by rumors of corruption at that -- as faction 
president belies the party's claim that in the wake of its 
electoral rout, the PRI seeks to remake its image.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On July 19, poloff met with Manlio Fabio Beltrones, a 
member of the outgoing Chamber of Deputies who on July 2 was 
elected to the Senate.  One of the PRI's most influential 
members and perhaps Roberto Madrazo's closest political 
operative during the campaign, Beltrones was recently elected 
unanimously as head of the PRI's incoming Senate delegation. 
Beltrones reflected on the reasons underlying the PRI's 
defeat, the PRD's efforts to impugn the electoral results, 
the future of the PRI, and its posture in the upcoming 
sexenio. 
 
Forgive But Do Not Forget 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Beltrones bitterly criticized President Fox for 
allegedly interfering in the campaign on behalf of PAN 
candidate Felipe Calderon, and for his administration's 
alleged use of state resources in support of the Calderon 
campaign.  He attributed the PRI's poor performance in large 
measure to the "inequities" the party faced in the campaign. 
He said he had no doubt the Fox Administration was 
responsible for the release of incriminating information 
about the apparent illicit enrichment of former Mexico State 
Governor Arturo Montiel, and the release of recorded phone 
conversations that incriminated Puebla State Governor Mario 
Marin; he noted that the ensuing scandals severely hurt 
Madrazo's credibility, especially in those populous states. 
(Note:  Many observers believe that Madrazo himself released 
the incriminating information on Montiel, in order to 
eliminate his only real primary challenger; likewise, 
Madrazo's first response to the release of the tapes 
incriminating Marin was to defend Marin.  End note.) 
Beltrones also blamed the Fox Administration for leaking to 
the press the rumor that the PRI gubernatorial candidate in 
Jalisco, Arturo Zamora, was under suspicion by the DEA for 
alleged ties to drug traffickers.  He disingenously repeated 
that although the PRI bore no rancor towards the PAN, it 
would not forget how it had been "wronged." 
 
Not Going to Play the PRD's Game 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Notwithstanding its grudges against the PAN, 
Beltrones made clear the PRI "was not going to play the PRD's 
game," and that it would not offer the PRD any support in its 
impugnation of the electoral process.  He conceded that even 
if the election campaign had been unequal, he was aware of no 
evidence of fraud on Election Day or in the vote retabulation 
that followed.  He said the PRI had not contested the results 
in the presidential race because it did not want to give the 
PRD's position any additional support or credibility. 
Beltrones said he was convinced the magistrates would decide 
the PRD's impugnation independently and that the PRI would 
support whatever decision the magistrates reached.  He 
argued, however, that it would be very dangerous for the 
TEPJF not to order at least a partial recount, as to do 
otherwise would convince AMLO's supporters that the entire 
process had been rigged against their candidate.  He said the 
wisest course would be for the TEPJF to order a recount in 
the approximately 50,000 precincts specifically impugned by 
the PRD. 
 
IFE Counselors: Watch Out! 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Beltrones opined that although the PRI respected IFE 
as an institution, its counselors had done a "mediocre" job 
of managing the election, adding that their post-electoral 
performance had been "erratic."  He said one issue on which 
he expected the PRI to cooperate with the PRD was in 
"strengthening" IFE; he said that if the IFE counselors did 
not agree to resign, the PRI would support the PRD's expected 
attempt in the next Congress to impeach them (juicio 
politico). 
 
Cooperation Yes, Coalition No 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Beltrones said he saw little possibility of the PRI 
forming a formal coalition with the PAN, assuming the TEPJF 
confirms Calderon as President.  He dismissed as insincere 
Calderon's comments during the campaign about forming a 
coalition or national unity government, as he doubted 
Calderon would be willing to offer significant positions or 
concessions to the PRI in return for its support, and the PRI 
would not be willing to join a coalition on the PAN's terms. 
He said that given the highly polarized post-electoral 
climate, he expected AMLO loyalists to be critical of 
Calderon throughout his sexenio and that the PRI did not want 
to be seen as "complicit" in a discredited administration 
while receiving little in return.  Nor would the PRI be 
satisfied by Calderon's inclusion in his cabinet of PRI 
"deserters" such as Senator Genaro Borrego or former 
Secretary of Energy Luis Tellez.  He said, however, that in 
 
SIPDIS 
the unlikely event that Calderon offers the PRI a genuine 
coalition, including several influential cabinet spots, the 
PRI would consider such an offer seriously.  He said the PRI 
especially sought positions like the Secretariat for Social 
Development and the Federal Auditing Service, that would 
enable it to ensure that GOM social programs were not being 
used for political purposes.  Notwithstanding the PRI's 
reluctance to join a coalition on unfavorable terms, he said 
it would be willing to cooperate with the PAN on a range of 
legislation, particularly those structural reforms that the 
PRI itself had proposed in the outgoing Congress. 
 
PRI Has Learned a Lesson 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Echoing the refrain often used by PRIistas after 
their historic 2000 electoral defeat, Beltrones said the PRI 
had learned a lesson from this year's electoral thrashing and 
that it would emerge stronger for it.  He said the party 
would seek to position itself as a reasonable, centrist force 
between the right and left, emphasizing both economic growth 
and equality, along the lines of a European social democratic 
party.  He optimistically predicted that if the PRI were able 
to remake its image in this manner, it would double its 
legislative faction in the 2009 elections. 
 
¶8.  (C) Beltrones minimized the continued reports of party 
infighting, asserting that it was no worse in the PRI than in 
other parties.  He said there was no longer a dominant 
faction in the party, observing that the party had been 
defeated on virtually every level and that party factions 
understood they needed to stick together to survive.  He 
predicted the party would turn to an interim leadership when 
the terms of the current party President and Secretary 
General, Mariano Palacios Alcocer and Rosario Green, expired 
in September, and that a longer term leadership would not be 
selected until the party convened a national convention. 
 
Biographical Notes 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) Born on August 30, 1952, Beltrones received a degree 
in economics from the National Autonomous University of 
Mexico.  His career trajectory is that of the consummate PRI 
insider, having held important positions in the party's 
national apparatus from an early age.  At the age of 30, he 
was elected to represent his home state of Sonora in the 
federal Chamber of Deputies, and thereafter worked in the 
Secretariat of Government.  Although he was elected to the 
 
SIPDIS 
Senate in 1988, he served only a short time, as President 
Salinas tapped him to serve as Undersecretary of Government. 
He served as Governor of Sonora from 1991-97.  He served as 
head of the PRI's National Confederation of Popular 
Organizations, one of the party's key corporatist sectors, 
until July 24, when he resigned to devote himself to his 
responsibilities in the Senate. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) As Governor of Sonora, Beltrones was rumored in 
the press to have connections to drug traffickers, a rumor he 
denied in an April 5, 1997 letter to the editor of the New 
York Times.  The Mexican press has published rumors of his 
past involvement in money laundering, an allegation he also 
has denied. 
 
¶11.  (C) Extremely smooth in manner and impeccably coifed and 
groomed, Beltrones exudes self-confidence.  He tends to speak 
in a deliberate, intense manner and low tone of voice, 
interspersing his conversation with frequent pregnant pauses 
and making very direct and prolonged eye contact with his 
interlocutors.  He often appears with a retinue of aides in 
tow.  He has the reputation of a hardball political operator 
who thrives in an atmosphere of closed-door political 
deal-making. 
 
Comment:  Back to the Future for the PRI? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) That Beltrones managed to emerge from the debacle of 
the Madrazo campaign with his prestige sufficiently intact to 
win election unopposed as the head of the PRI's Senate 
delegation is testimony to his considerable political skills. 
 Given these skills, we expect him to be an effective 
legislative leader for the PRI, managing to extract from the 
PAN the highest possible price for PRI support. 
Nevertheless, it will take more than political deal-making 
skills if the PRI is to restore its credibility among Mexican 
voters.  Indeed, the election of this backroom operator to 
such a prominent position belies the party's claim that it 
seeks to reinvent itself.  At this point, what the PRI really 
needs is a period of genuine introspection, and with 
Beltrones placing virtually all the blame for the party's 
defeat on the Fox Administration, introspection may be one 
skill he lacks. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity 
 
BASSETT