VZCZCXRO0447
RR RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLU #0765/01 2061324
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251324Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY LUANDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3089
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LUANDA 000765 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA - CABINDA PEACE ACCORD DISCUSSIONS MOVE TO 
PARLIAMENT 
 
REF: A. LUANDA 00740 
 
     ¶B. 05 LUANDA 00357 
     ¶C. 05 STATE 171983 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CYNTHIA EFIRD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In a July 24, 2006 statement before the National 
Assembly, the Minister of Territorial Administration Virgilio 
Fontes Pereira noted that the final signing ceremony for the 
Cabindan Memorandum of Understanding would be held on August 
1, 2006 and gave details on how Cabinda's special status 
would affect the province.  Opposition party leaders, in an 
attempt to appeal to Cabindan voters, called on the GRA to 
expand the special status from political and economic 
decentralization to autonomy while continuing support for the 
peace accord.  At the same time, European Ambassadors' stated 
that FLEC's external President Nzita Tiago continues to work 
to derail the peace process.  Mplabanda has also opened 
negotiations with the GRA in an attempt to negotiate better 
terms for Cabinda's special status.  Both are concerned that 
after August 1 they will either become completely irrelevant 
or enemies of the state.  All sides are closely analyzing and 
seeking to capitalize on USG statements in Luanda and 
Washington.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Action Request:  See paragraph 7. 
 
CABINDAN PEACE ACCORD DISCUSSIONS MOVE TO PARLIAMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶3. (U) Following the signing of the second cease-fire in 
Cabinda (Ref A), the Angolan Parliament held a June 24-25, 
2006 special session to discuss the Cabindan peace process 
and to pass the Amnesty Law, the only component of the 
Memorandum of Understanding that requires Parliament's 
approval.  During the discussions in the National Assembly, 
Minister of Territorial Administration Virgilio Fontes 
Pereira openly discussed the peace process noting that 
negotiations had been ongoing for twelve months and that 
FLEC, by electing Antonio Bento Bembe as the President of 
Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD), had made him FLEC's key 
interlocutor with the GRA.  He also announced that the final 
signing ceremony would take place on August 1, 2006 in 
south-western Namibe province. 
 
¶4. (U) The debate also touched on the specifics surrounding 
Cabinda's special status.  Pereira noted that while the GRA 
would not allow the special status to go beyond the Angolan 
Constitution, it would create a "system of participatory 
government," especially in the areas of private investment, 
agriculture, health, tourism, and environment issues. 
According to Pereira, a new consultative Council would be 
created that would include "non-governmental organizations, 
traditional authorities, and other social actors."  Various 
opposition parties, including the leadership of the National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the 
Social Renewal Party (PRS), and the Youth and Farmers 
Alliance Party (PAJOCA), pushed the GRA to go even further, 
even mentioning autonomy as an option for Cabinda.  Noting 
their willingness to change the Constitution if necessary, 
these leaders' off-the-cuff remarks do not change their 
overall support for the peace accord, but did highlight the 
fact that the specifics surrounding Cabinda's special status 
were still open to interpretation. 
 
NON-FCD FLEC AND MPLABANDA TRYING TO STAY RELEVANT 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C) The faction of the FLEC, mainly FLEC-FAC led by FLEC 
President Nzita Tiago, that remains opposed the peace accord 
is continuing to work behind the scenes to derail the accord. 
 Although it appeared that Tiago was in discussions with the 
GRA, he has not stopped his efforts to call into question the 
leadership of Bembe.  A number of Ambassadors, including the 
Dutch, the Portuguese, and the Belgian, all noted that Tiago, 
as the leader of the external FLEC, is not in touch with the 
situation on the ground and was fighting, not exclusively to 
derail the process, but to ensure that his international 
sources of funding were not cut off. 
 
¶6. (C) Mplabanda has entered into discussions with the GRA 
and is trying to negotiate the terms of the special status in 
favor of autonomy, not political and economic 
decentralization.  According to the new Director of Open 
Society,  Mplabanda is more concerned about the process than 
the solution, fearing it has lost credibility as a moderate 
civil society group due to past actions, including its 
alleged support to those who violently opposed the seating of 
the new Bishop in Cabinda (Ref B).  The President of 
 
LUANDA 00000765  002 OF 002 
 
 
Mplabanda, Agostinho Chicaia, noted that the GRA has banned 
him from returning to Cabinda, but given that his 
negotiations with the GRA are taking place in Luanda it is 
likely in his interest to remain in the capital.  Mplabanda 
and FLEC-FAC are getting desperate and recognize that after 
August 1, they will either be viewed as completely irrelevant 
or enemies of the state - neither of which they view as a 
desirable outcome. 
 
COMMENT - COHERENT USG POSITION NECESSARY 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) It is likely that the international community will be 
invited to the August 1 signing ceremony.  The Ambassador 
plans to attend the ceremony, but requests instructions on 
how to handle any potential contact with Antonio Bento Bembe. 
 If asked about Bembe's status the Embassy will use the 
points detailed Ref C, but the Embassy prefers to wait until 
after the peace process has concluded to renew discussions on 
Bembe. 
 
¶8. (C) The USG continues to be viewed as an important 
international influence on the Cabinda issue.  Past USG 
statements on issues such as the Cabindan Bishop and the AF/S 
Director Dan Mozena's Congressional testimony have been used 
by both sides of the debate to show our willingness to 
support a "just" peace in Cabinda.  It is critical that all 
USG actors, including those in Washington and European 
capitals, recognize the impact public statements or private 
meetings could have at this point in this process.  This 
Missions recommends that conversations with external Cabindan 
actors, such as FLEC and Mplabanda, especially at higher 
levels, occur only after these organizations agree to 
denounce violence.  A coherent USG message is necessary to 
ensure that our commitment to a peaceful resolution of the 
Cabindan status negotiations, as well as the observance of 
human rights, is unmistakable to all sides. End Comment. 
EFIRD