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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLO #5371/01 2011630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201630Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7601
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 005371 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM, NEA, NEA/I, EUR/UBI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL MOPS UK IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: HMG EXPRESSES HOPE FOR IRAQ COMPACT AND 
REQUESTS COORDINATION ON UNSCR MANDATE 
 
Classified By: Acting PolCouns Rick Bell, reasons 1.4, b/d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a July 18 meeting in London, FCO and MOD 
officials told Assistant Secretary of State for Political 
Military Affairs John Hillen they were disappointed in the 
deteriorating security situation in Iraq and that they 
supported using the Iraq Compact as a mechanism for obtaining 
expanded international commitment to Iraq, 
although they doubted additional military contributions were 
possible while the UK and U.S. were drawing down troop 
levels.  British officials also requested further discussions 
"during the summer" on how to handle the extension of the 
UNSC mandate in the autumn, given the legal difficulties HMG 
would face if the UNSC mandate was scaled down.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military 
Affairs John Hillen met with Nigel Casey, FCO's Acting Iraq 
Director, and Dr. Richard Vincent of MOD's Iraq Commitments 
Team July 18 along with a couple members of 
their staffs.  Casey lamented the deterioration in the 
situation since he had arrived in his current position six 
months previously, during which time the weekly attack 
figures had more than doubled.  He believed the violence 
was a result of the loss of credibility from PM Maliki's 
having taken so long to form a government.  Casey 
speculated that if Maliki failed to deliver a reconciliation 
plan as well as security plans for Baghdad 
and Basrah, he would lose all credibility and the situation 
would worsen.  Casey criticized Maliki for supporting 
counter insurgency operations in various areas and then 
complaining when key figures were detained, indicating a 
lack of will in reining in the various militias. 
 
¶3. (C) Casey said HMG shared the concern that transition in 
certain areas of Iraq would allow some members of the 
Coalition an excuse to leave.  HMG came to the conclusion 
that the Iraq Compact could be used as a means of 
reinvigorating the coalition and possibly retooling which 
types of assistance were needed.  In the meantime, HMG was 
trying to develop a picture of what the future of Iraq might 
look like so partners will know how they can 
contribute.  Casey believed that attracting new partners in 
the coalition would be virtually impossible as the UK and 
U.S. were trying to draw down. 
 
¶4. (C) Hillen said the USG was looking to expand 
international commitment to the future of Iraq, possibly by 
attracting partners with niche capabilities.  The U.S. was no 
longer measuring contributions through the metric of 
"boots on the ground" but rather through outcomes, although 
international assistance would obviously have a military 
flavor for a while, and he asserted that the Coalition needed 
to do the same.  Casey said international commitment 
to NTM-I was quite popular, as was protection for the UN.  He 
believed additional support might be obtained through 
those two mechanisms.  In addition, the Jordan International 
Police Training Center (JIPTC) was a good vehicle for 
contributors who do not want to go into Iraq.  Unfortunately 
HMG had not seen very many JIPTC graduates emerge in useful 
roles in Iraq.  Given that and HMG's urgent need for people 
in Basrah, Casey hoped the U.S. could find someone to replace 
the British JIPTC contribution.  Vincent said MOD was 
skeptical of expanding any assistance before determining that 
the current plan was on the right track. 
 
¶5. (C) Casey expressed hope that the Iraq Compact would also 
contain a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR 
program) for militias, which the Iraqis did not seem focused 
on, but which was necessary and would inevitably be very 
expensive.  He hoped some "deep pockets in the Gulf" might be 
able to assist in that effort, but noted the Gulf states have 
been reluctant to support Maliki until they determine he can 
deliver.  In addition, HMG hoped the Compact would produce 
more contributions for ministries such as agriculture and 
justice. 
 
¶6. (C) Casey expressed concern about rumors that the Iraqis 
did not want to extend the UNSCR mandate in Iraq and urged a 
UK-U.S. agreement on the way forward.  While the Iraqis would 
like to show that they are fully sovereign, the UK legal 
system allows HMG to detain people in Iraq based on the UNSC. 
 If that function were removed from the 
UNSCR, the UK would have no legal basis for detention and its 
force protection would fall apart.  Casey opined that 
if some of the smaller partners had to negotiate status of 
forces agreements to obtain immunities for their forces, 
they might just leave Iraq, rather than bother with it.  In 
 
LONDON 00005371  002 OF 002 
 
 
order to make it easy for partners to maintain their 
contributions, we should make it easy for them and extend the 
UNSCR.  Casey noted that U.S.-UK agreement this summer 
on how to handle this problem was essential before the issue 
came up in the autumn. 
 
¶7. (C) Finally, Casey noted the British PRT in Basrah was up 
and running, albeit without as much international 
support as HMG had hoped for. 
 
¶8. (U) This cable has been cleared by PM Assistant Secretary 
John Hillen. 
 
Visit London's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm 
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