VZCZCXRO1888
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHPC #0737/01 2071509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261509Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY LOME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7252
INFO RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 8824
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0465
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LOME 000737 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM TO
SUBJECT: TOGO: NATIONAL DIALOGUE ROUSES FROM SOJOURN WITH 
COMPAORE'S APPOINTMENT AS FACILITATOR 
 
REF: A. LOME 452 
     ¶B. LOME 591 
 
Classified By: Poloff Rona Rathod for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.   (SBU)  Summary.  Following an extended break in 
discussions caused by the contentious adoption of an interim 
agreement, the national dialogue process is suddenly back on 
track with the nomination of Burkinabe president Compaore as 
facilitator.  The nine delegations unanimously agreed to cast 
Compaore in the role of facilitator during the initial 
meeting to discuss the matter.  Parties seem to have put 
behind them the acrimony from the controversial interim 
accord that pervaded the process over the past few weeks. 
That accord offered little new substance as compared to the 
draft agreement of June.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
NATIONAL DIALOGUE AWAKES FROM FITFUL SLUMBER 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.    (U)  A prolonged pause in the national dialogue 
resulting from the controversial adoption of an interim 
agreement (misleadingly called a "Basic Political Accord") 
(see below) on July 6came to an abrupt end July 25 when all 
nine participating delegations unanimously selected Burkina 
Faso president Blaise Compaore to mediate a second round of 
talks.  The group (consisting of several prominent opposition 
parties, two civil society groups, the ruling party, and the 
government, who are conducting negotiations as the key part 
of the Togolese government's twenty-two governance- and human 
rights-related commitments to the European Union) reconvened 
in a plenary session to discuss the appointment of a 
facilitator to help them find consensus on remaining points 
of disagreement.  Responding to a letter sent by dialogue 
chair and CAR (Action Committee for Renewal) president Yawovi 
Agboyibo requesting each delegation to submit names of 
candidates for facilitator, the two parties that had not 
agreed to the Basic Political Accord of July 6, UFC (United 
Forces for Change) and CDPA (Democratic Convention of African 
Peoples), proposed Compaore, among others, to occupy the 
post. 
 
¶3.    (C) On the day they met to discuss the issue of the 
facilitator, the delegates collectively agreed to appoint 
Compaore.  During private discussions over the past week, 
Agboyibo, CDPA president Leopold Gnininvi, and presidential 
advisor Pascal Bodjona all seemed relatively unruffled by the 
prospect of needing to select a facilitator for the dialogue, 
previously a neuralgic topic.  Moreover, we have heard that 
several of the party leaders have been in Ouagadougou 
recently.  All of this suggests that the decision to settle 
on Compaore was predetermined and that the July 21 meeting 
was a formality to consecrate the appointment.  To our 
knowledge, Compaore has yet to react publicly to the 
announcement. 
 
¶4.    (C)  The discussion will now turn to the mandate of the 
facilitator.  According to Gnininvi, who has been meeting 
bilaterally with the other parties and acting as something of 
a bridge builder, the facilitator's terms of reference will 
consist of the July 6 accord and the points of disaccord that 
each delegation submitted as part of the dialogue process. 
During an interview on RFI, Bodjona hinted that the role of 
the facilitator would be limited and that only Togolese would 
and could make decisions.  But the ease with which Compaore 
was appointed may mean that a deal was also struck on his 
authorities and prerogatives. 
 
-------------------------- 
ACCORD INDUCES DISSONANCE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.    (U)  Before the revelation of the name of facilitator, 
the national dialogue had come to an interim conclusion with 
the adoption of the Basic Political Accord on July 6.  Only 
seven of the nine participating delegations initialed the 
agreement, which chairman Agboyibo claims was necessary to 
preserve the accomplishments made since the dialogue began on 
April 21.  Both the UFC and the CDPA refused to initial the 
document with the other delegates. 
 
¶6.    (U)  UFC leaders Jean-Pierre Fabre (Secretary General) 
and Patrick Lawson (Third Vice-President), who boycotted the 
discussions the day the accord was adopted, held a press 
conference after its release, stating that the document was 
tantamount to political fraud and contrary to the spirit of 
consensus driving the dialogue.  The UFC's primary contention 
about the agreement is that it did not also include points 
 
LOME 00000737  002 OF 003 
 
 
about which the delegates were unable to reach consensus, 
thus making it seem as though the document that was signed 
was the definitive agreement. 
 
¶7.    (U)  For its part, the CDPA objected to signing this 
accord with points of disagreement outstanding.  President 
Gnininvi, who also was not present during the initialing of 
the accord, suggested that the document be called an interim 
report, to which he would have signed his name.  He also 
requested two or three day's time to discuss the accord with 
others for the purpose of maintaining consensus.  The board 
rejected both of his pleas. 
 
¶8.    (SBU)  In his first press conference following the 
acceptance of the agreement, dialogue chairman Agboyibo 
explained that the dialogue process was not able to bring a 
resolution to each point of discussion.  However, the board 
(composed of chair Agboyibo, a representative of civil 
society, Professor Kissem Tchangai-Walla as vice-president, 
and rapporteur Gilbert Bawara, the minister delegate of 
cooperation in the MFA) decided to formulate a foundational 
agreement to prevent the risk of participants backsliding on 
certain issues in the future.  Furthermore, most participants 
were, from the outset, mindful of the likelihood of the talks 
stalling due to disagreements and had always allowed for the 
possibility of appointing a facilitator to help them work out 
the remaining points of disaccord.  In what has turned out to 
mirror Agboyibo's own scheme, outlined long before the 
dialogue began (see ref A), the talks will now enter a second 
phase with the assistance of a facilitator. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM ACCORD 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.    (SBU)  With regard to the electoral process, the 
opposition has made little headway with this agreement since 
the formulation of the draft accord (see ref B).  The 
"radical" opposition, consisting of UFC, CAR, and CDPA, was 
unable to convince the ruling party to place it on equal 
footing with respect to the highly-contentious composition of 
the electoral commission.  The ruling RPT (Rally of Togolese 
Peoples) maintains its five seats to two advantage over the 
other political parties and will continue to benefit from the 
two places accorded to the government.  Despite the fact that 
the dialoguers designated the electoral commission as the 
body responsible for organizing elections (as opposed to 
having to collaborate with the GoT), the imbalance in the 
composition of the commisouon, with only six of the nineteen 
seats going to the real opposition, will give the government 
a continuing influential role in organizing elections. 
 
¶10.   (U)  The signatories to the Basic Political Agreement 
did consent to quash a residency requirement imposed by 
former president Eyadema to prevent certain of his foes from 
qualifying as contenders in previous legislative elections. 
As with the prior draft accord, this July 6 agreement leaves 
the particular features of the next ballot and possible 
redistricting to be determined by an as yet imprecise special 
committee.  The delegates have also devised a means of 
appealing election results that does not involve the 
electoral commission and essentially allows any trial court 
with subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. 
 
¶11.   (U)  The delegates have determined that constitutional 
reforms are best left in the hands of a newly elected 
parliament (presumably to include a much larger opposition 
presence, if not a majority), and have thus deferred on 
issues such as how the prime minister is selected, 
eligibility conditions for presidential candidates, and 
restructuring the constitutional court.  All sides seem 
content to entrust the modalities of military reform to a 
commission created for this purpose, so long as the military 
promises to abstain from interfering in politics.  The 
interim accord explicitly calls for external assistance with 
this process. 
 
¶12.   (C)  Comment.  The UFC's acceptance of Compaore strikes 
us as odd because of party leadership's distrust of anyone 
perceived as having close ties to former Togolese colonizer 
France.  It appears that Compaore won over UFC's exiled 
president Gilchrist Olympio during recent visits by the 
latter to the region.  We are pleased to see UFC rejoin the 
talks after weeks of denouncing the process, especially since 
it is the sole party consistently demanding fundamental 
changes needed to move Togo away from the political crisis 
that has gripped the country for decades.  The fact that only 
UFC and CDPA responded to the appeal for nominating a 
facilitator points to a tacit understanding among the other 
 
LOME 00000737  003 OF 003 
 
 
parties that to get the UFC and CDPA back in the game would 
require selecting a mediator they proposed.  This sense of 
inclusion bodes well for the future of the national dialogue. 
 
 
¶13.   (C)  Another promising development is the tacit 
underlying compromise that appears to have evolved.  The 
opposition will respect President Faure Gnassingbe's 
five-year mandate in return for the government's giving 
ground on opposition demands related to the other major 
governing institutions.  However, confidence among the 
parties remains fragile, and much hard negotiating remains to 
be done.  End comment. 
DUNN