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C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002885 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA A HAS-BEEN, SAYS FORMER ADVISOR, NOW 
ADVERSARY 
 
REF: A. LIMA 0086 
 
     ¶B. LIMA 04854 (05) 
     ¶C. LIMA 49...

id: 72567
date: 7/25/2006 19:37
refid: 06LIMA2885
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06LIMA86
header:
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DE RUEHPE #2885/01 2061937
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1502
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3686
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6903
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9681
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUL QUITO 0559
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0747
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL

----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002885 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA A HAS-BEEN, SAYS FORMER ADVISOR, NOW 
ADVERSARY 
 
REF: A. LIMA 0086 
 
     ¶B. LIMA 04854 (05) 
     ¶C. LIMA 4968 (03) 
 
Classified By: A/POL David C. Brooks, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d) 
 
-------- 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Former radical, anti-system presidential candidate 
for the Union por el Peru (UPP) and Peruvian Nationalist 
(PNP) parties Ollanta Humala will neither be able to control 
the 43-person Congressional bloc elected with him nor will he 
succeed in electing political allies in November's regional 
and municipal elections, ex-Humala political advisor Carlos 
Torres Caro told Ambassador on 7/21.  Torres Caro added that 
Humala lacks "leadership" and that the quality of the 
Congress representatives in his group is low.  Torres Caro 
took credit for peeling away the action wings of Humala's 
movement -- both the cocaleros and the "Reservists" of Humala 
brother Antauro's Ethnocacerist group -- when he broke with 
Humala shortly after the 6/4 runoff presidential election. 
Though he may overestimate his influence and could be too 
eager to write off Humala, the crippling cleavages Torres 
Caro describes in Humala's post-presidential movement track 
with what others have been telling us.  They indicate that a 
post-election Humala might not be the threat in November's 
regional and municipal balloting that many had feared.  End 
Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Ambassador Meets Ex-Humala Top Advisor 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador met with ex-Ollanta Humala advisor Carlos 
Torres Caro and his political ally, Congressman-elect Gustavo 
Espinoza, on 7/21/06.  Torres Caro recently broke with 
Ollanta Humala and has announced plans to form his own 
Congressional group and political party (to be named the 
Democratic Party, PD).  Torres Caro knows the inside of the 
Humala movement well and spoke of its internal dynamics 
during the campaign, the reasons for his own rupture with 
Humala, and Humala's prospects for continuing as a force in 
Peruvian politics. 
 
¶3.  (C) Torres Caro reviewed his participation in the Humala 
movement, which began when he represented the Humala brothers 
as their attorney after the failed putsch they organized 
against former President Fujimori in 2000.  This culminated 
with Torres Caro's selection as Humala's second vice 
President and his congressional candidacy at the top of the 
PNP-UPP's congressional list.  (Torres Caro won his seat with 
the highest vote total of any candidate on the UPP-PNP 
ticket.) 
 
¶4.  (C) Looking back on the campaign, Torres Caro said a 
variety of voices had vied for Humala's ear.  He identified 
the three main groups around Humala as: the far left, 
Humala's ex-military contacts, and the democrats.  The last 
group was the one Torres Caro led.  Torres Caro described how 
he and Humala's wife, Nadine Heredia, had tried to keep the 
radicals at bay.  He also noted that campaign planning 
proceeded in secret.  When Humala made his lightning visit to 
Caracas in January, for example, Torres Caro was unaware of 
the trip until hearing about it in the media (Ref A). 
 
¶5.  (C) In retrospect, Torres Caro concluded, Humala had 
played with all of the factions around him, all along 
secretly favoring the far left.  Torres Caro implied that 
 
SIPDIS 
Humala's capture by the far left explained the candidate's 
inability to stop Hugo Chavez from intervening in the 
campaign even though Chavez' ham-handed attempts to influence 
Peruvian voters were backfiring.  He also noted Humala's 
financial dependence on Chavez, stating that so much money 
was coming in from Venezuela to finance Humala that the 
candidate had to purchase a large safe for his house.  Torres 
Caro said that a considerable portion of  the campaign's 
funds remained unspent. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Post-Election Humala: Garcia Will Fall "In Six Months" 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Torres Caro repeated public claims that he broke with 
 
Humala right after the 6/4 presidential runoff when Humala 
chose the path of radical opposition to President-elect Alan 
Garcia.  Humala, he said, expected Garcia to fall &in six 
months,8 a conclusion with which Torres Caro disagreed. 
Instead, the latter proposed that the Peruvian National Party 
(PNP) and Union por el Peru (UPP) alliance that had supported 
Ollanta Humala get itself organized, form a solid 
Congressional bloc, and push for development programs for the 
south and the sierras (regions like Ayacucho and Arequipa 
that Humala carried overwhelmingly) with an eye toward 
building an electoral base for the 2011 presidential race. 
 
¶7.  (C) Humala rejected this strategy, opting instead to try 
to destabilize the Garcia Government.  Seeing that his 
candidate had been &completely captured8 by the radical 
left, Torres Caro left the Humala movement.  Since leaving, 
Torres Caro claims to have  developed close relationships 
with both Antauro Humala (Ollanta's brother, now in jail 
along with over one hundred of his followers ) called 
&Reservists8 -- for having launched an abortive rebellion 
against the Toledo Government on New Year's Eve 2005 -- Refs 
B,C) and the cocaleros.  He said that both these groups felt 
betrayed by Humala, who seems more interested in launching a 
political party loyal to him than in addressing their issues. 
Torres Caro noted that Ollanta Humala's brother, Antauro, was 
particularly concerned for the health of the Reservists, many 
of whom are languishing in prison as their families suffer. 
Torres Caro claimed that by breaking with Ollanta Humala, he 
had pulled these two groups away from the ex-candidate, 
denying him his political "artillery" (i.e. the ability to 
create disturbances) and contributing to governability in 
Peru.  Alan Garcia, Torres Caro maintained, was well aware of 
the positive role he had played in diminishing Ollanta 
Humala's ability to cause trouble. 
 
------------------ 
Humala's Prospects 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Torres Caro said that the prospects for the Humala 
movement continuing are grim.  He gave a scathing appraisal 
of the quality of the 43-person PNP-UPP Congressional bloc, 
which he said was divided into several factions that he 
characterized in the following way: radical cocaleros or 
radical leftists with limited, if enthusiastic, political 
bases in marginal areas (about 7 members); country folk with 
no political experience and, even more important, little if 
any experience with either urban life or office work (Torres 
Caro said some in this group were getting their first cell 
phones or offices; about 26 members); and sophisticated 
opportunists, people who know urban life, have some personal 
resources, but are totally lacking in political experience 
(about 10 members).  He said there was no way these three 
groups would stay together, and he predicted that 6-7 more 
congress representatives would eventually join his movement. 
 
¶9.  (C) Torres Caro took a similarly dim view of the 
Humalistas' prospects in upcoming regional and municipal 
elections.  Some had feared that PNP candidates might 
dominate in Humala's base areas, creating a "solid south" and 
"solid sierras," blocs of anti-Lima, anti-system regional 
governments that could have made life difficult for 
President-elect Alan Garcia. 
 
¶10.  (C) Torres Caro discounted this scenario.  He said that 
Ollanta Humala has "no real leadership" qualities, that he 
"only knows how to boss people" but not how to lead.  Humala, 
he said, is trying to impose his personal candidates on his 
party in the regions, with very poor results.  Torres Caro 
indicated that the winners in regional and municipal 
elections would be strong local candidates, as has been the 
case in the recent past. 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Torres Caro likely overestimates his own role in 
breaking up the pro-Humala forces and may be too sanguine 
about the prospects for Humala's disappearance from the 
political scene.  That said, his insights into the basic 
cleavages in the Humala movement and his commitment, however 
opportunistically motivated, to promoting governability in 
Peru could be helpful.  Torres Caro is a flexible, capable 
actor with, so far, a good sense of timing.  His decision to 
 
jump from Humala's ship could be an indication of things to 
come. 
STRUBLE 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================