VZCZCXRO5515
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL
DE RUEHKUK #0135/01 2121023
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 311023Z JUL 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0700
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0662
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0728

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000135 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR BAGHDAD POL, POLMIL, NCT, IRMO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/31/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PNAT PREF PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: (C) PUK ASAYISH HEAD - KIRKUK SECURITY WORSENING 
 
KIRKUK 00000135  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Bigus, PRT Leader, POL, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.      (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY:  Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) Asayish head, Hallkawt Abdullah Aziz, said on 
July 24 that the security situation in Kirkuk was getting worse. 
 He said terrorists had sympathizers among the Iraqi Police (IP) 
officers and checkpoint guards who facilitated transit of 
explosives into the city.  He claimed Iraqi Army (IA) commanders 
did not trust half their officers and that the majority of 
people in Kirkuk believed the IA and IP in the city were 
cooperating with terrorists in Baghdad.  Aziz said he favored 
replacing certain ineffective leaders and assigning Asayish to 
checkpoints along the Baghdad-Tikrit-Kirkuk highway to increase 
security.  He claimed that if Kirkuk were annexed into the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) the Asayish could solve the 
security situation in ten days.  END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 
 
(C) KIRKUK SECURITY GETTING WORSE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) PUK Asayish head, Hallkawt Abdullah Aziz, told IPAOs on 
July 24, 2006, that security in Kirkuk was getting worse due to 
several factors.  He said first among them was the weakness of 
the IP in Kirkuk Province.  For example, he said the Asayish had 
information that terrorists were going to attack the courthouse 
and gave this information to the IP but the attack still 
occurred.  (Note:  A cafi adjacent to the courthouse was bombed 
on July 23.  End note.) Aziz claimed the problem was not in the 
northern parts of Kirkuk, where Kurdish security forces 
predominated, but in the southern, Arab parts of the city and 
province where terrorists continued to do whatever they wanted. 
He also claimed that each government director in Kirkuk had 
10-20 bodyguards who assumed no responsibility for protecting 
the buildings where they operated or its inhabitants.  Aziz said 
the majority of terrorists came from the city of Kirkuk and Amal 
al-Sha'bi in Hewija. 
 
(C) WEAK LEADERS, NO TRUST IN IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶3.  (C) Aziz said there was growing confusion between legitimate 
IP and terrorists because it was easy to get uniforms and 
impersonate IP at checkpoints.  For this reason, he claimed, the 
public was just as afraid of the IP as they were of the 
terrorists.  The majority of people in Kirkuk, according to 
Aziz, believed the IA and IP were cooperating with the 
terrorists, and he claimed explosives have been found in the 
homes of senior police who had been arrested.  He added IA 
commanders in Kirkuk did not trust half their officers because 
many of them were Arabs or suspected former Bathists.  Aziz 
asserted that the current Police Chief, General Sherko Shirku, 
was weak and ineffective, but continued to remain in his 
position thanks to President Talabani's support. 
 
(C) SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING SECURITY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Aziz said security on the Baghdad-Tikrit-Kirkuk highway 
needed to be tightened and that some captured terrorists 
confessed they had received IP assistance to smuggle bombs 
through the checkpoints on this route.  He suggested sending 
Asayish to oversee these vital spots outside Kirkuk.  In 
addition, Aziz said he would favor replacing IP and IA with 
private security companies.  These companies would be assigned 
to protect specific cites and buildings, such as the hospital or 
courthouse, which Aziz said would decrease terrorist attacks 
because these guards were professionals trained for this 
purpose.  He said the purpose of the IP was to eliminate crime, 
not terrorists.  Aziz also claimed that if Kirkuk were annexed 
into the KRG, the Asayish could "solve the security problems in 
ten days."  Aziz also said he favored sending the IA generals in 
Kirkuk to Sulaymaniyah, and vice versa, to control terrorist 
sympathizers in the IA.  Finally, weak leaders in the security 
sector, such as General Sherko Shirku, must be replaced. 
 
(C)     NO COMPARISON BETWEEN KIRKUK AND BAGHDAD 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Although some Shia citizens were recently kicked out of 
Hewija, their small numbers in Kirkuk would prevent the 
Shia-Sunni conflict in Baghdad from spreading to Kirkuk, Aziz 
claimed.  The majority of Kirkuk's Arab and Kurd population was 
Sunni; he said the city lacked enough Shia to fall into the 
sectarian struggles currently seen in the south. 
 
(C) "DUE PROCESS" RELATIONS WITH IP AND PESHMERGA 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
KIRKUK 00000135  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Aziz said it had taken four years, but the Asayish in 
Kirkuk finally had an official liaison position between the 
Peshmerga and the IA and IP to help with security.  He claimed 
IP and IA had authority to carry out arrests and that the 
Peshmerga did not arrest suspects in Kirkuk. However, he said 
the Peshmerga could send a letter to the IP or IA Brigadier 
Commander to request an arrest, and that the majority of 
arrested suspects were sent to Sulaymaniyah for trial.  He 
claimed many Arab families had fled to Sulaymaniyah due to poor 
security and that the Asayish had taken their information and 
had agents in every neighborhood to watch them. 
 
(C) KDP-PUK ASAYISH RELATIONS IN KIRKUK 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The PUK and KDP Asayish were both official forces, 
according to Aziz, and shared in monitoring security in Kirkuk 
and in providing the IP with information.  Aziz said both 
parties' Asayish operated everywhere in Kirkuk Province and 
worked separately.  He claimed the KRG merger would resolve this 
and did not anticipate problems but acknowledged the KRG 
ministries of Interior and Peshmerga would remain separate for 
now because these were the most sensitive of all KRG ministries 
and many obstacles for their merger remained.  Aziz opined the 
merger of the two would not happen until after next year. 
 
(C) ASAYISH PRESENT BELOW 'GREEN LINE' 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.   (C) Aziz claimed the PUK had 1800 active Asayish officers, 
with an additional 400-500 assets gathering intelligence.  He 
said the Asayish had branches in all districts and sub-districts 
of Kirkuk Province, and also had offices in other locations 
outside the formal KRG administrative borders.  In Mosul the 
Asayish performed full security services, while in other places, 
such as Diyala, they worked secretly and limited their 
activities to collecting information, which was then forwarded 
to the Director General in Sulaymaniyah.  He claimed there were 
Asayish in Tuz Khurmatu as well, but that these fell under the 
control of the Asayish office in Kalar.  Asayish would monitor 
polling centers in the disputed areas during the upcoming 
provincial elections, he said, to inform the IP and IA of any 
"irregularity." 
 
 
(C) BIOGRAPHIC NOTES 
-------------------- 
 
¶9.   (C) Halkawt Abdullah Aziz:  Head of PUK Asayish, Kirkuk 
Province Office, located in Qarahanjer (north of Kirkuk); born 
in Kirkuk, 1959; joined the PUK in 1982; graduated from 
Qalachalan College for Military Science, 1998; Aziz claimed he 
led PUK Peshmerga forces into Kirkuk during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and held the city for 72 hours until ordered to leave by 
Coalition Forces. 
 
(U) COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Neither the PUK nor the KDP Asayish leaders seemed 
enthusiastic about merging their security services and 
cooperated more out of allegiance to merger efforts within the 
KRG Erbil administration than any real commitment to a unified 
Asayish in Kirkuk (Septel).  Post has noted Kurdish leaders 
talking more about privatization of security services in Kirkuk, 
by which the Kurds probably mean that Peshmerga would assume 
full responsibility for patrolling the city.  The Kurdish 
leaders are also calling for Asayish to be posted at checkpoints 
south of the city, where we have heard reports of Arabs being 
turned away from coming to Kirkuk. 
JBIGUS