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FM REO KIRKUK
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RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0649
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0715

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIRKUK 000128 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/15/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PNAT PREF PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: (U) KRG VP KOSRAT RASUL: KRG CHALLENGES, REFORMS, 
CORRUPTION 
 
KIRKUK 00000128  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Tim Uselmann, Political Officer, IPAO, Department 
of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: KRG Vice President Kosrat Rasul told IPAO in a 
July 1 
meeting in Sulaymaniyah that the biggest challenge facing the 
newly 
unified KRG was public dissatisfaction over government services 
and the 
subsequent appeal of the Islamic movement.  In his first address 
to the 
KNA as KRG Vice President, he highlighted rule of law, social 
equality 
and democracy as priorities.  Finally, he stated corruption 
became a 
regional epidemic with the flood of CPA funds in 2003.  End 
Summary. 
 
(C) Challenges Ahead for the new KRG 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) KRG Vice President Kosrat Rasul said he saw both external 
and 
internal challenges for the unified KRG.  Externally, conditions 
in 
Baghdad had a significant negative impact on the region. 
Internally, 
the biggest problem was public dissatisfaction and resulting 
demonstrations over electricity, water, gas, and problems in 
daily life. 
Rasul felt recent protests in Rania, involving over 500 people 
disgruntled with public services, were normal in a democratic 
system; 
however sometimes people blamed the KRG when the real guilt lay 
on the 
central government.  For example, electricity was a central, not 
a 
regional, issue. 
 
¶3. (C) Rasul felt that if the government could meet people's 
basic 
needs, they could fight the well-organized Islamic groups who 
capitalized on the discontent.  Islam was extremely strong in the 
countryside where services were the worst.  He estimated the 
region was 
15-20% religious. 
 
¶4. (C) The KRG had not developed a plan to fight Islamic 
extremism, nor 
projects to implement for the people.  He suggested the KRG 
develop 
smaller towns and provide public services and organizations such 
as 
sports clubs and youth activities.  Also, investment in 
factories and 
farms where men and women would work together would help counter 
perspectives taught by the mosques.  In villages, people 
listened to the 
mullahs, because there were no teachers. 
 
 
(C) Reform Platform for the KNA 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Rasul said that in his first address to the KNA he 
outlined the 
platform below, prioritizing rule of law, social equality and 
democracy. 
 
 
- Transparency in government budgeting and finance; 
- Power distribution around the region; 
- Rule of law; 
- Social equality; 
- De-politicize the peshmerga, taking control of them away from 
the 
parties; 
- Activate the role of the KNA; 
- Encourage the private sector and establish a free market; 
- Facilitate foreign investment; 
- Establish a committee to monitor the ministries and fight 
corruption; 
 
- Make leadership salaries commensurate with the private sector; 
- Protect freedom of speech and prohibit detainment of 
journalists 
without due process; 
- Improve the education system; 
 
KIRKUK 00000128  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
- Capitalize on the region's human resources; 
- Encourage civil society; 
- and make Kurdistan Region a model for Iraq. 
 
(C) CORRUPTION - CPA's Child 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Rasul said the introduction of CPA funds in 2003 caused an 
epidemic of corruption throughout the Kurdistan Region.  Before 
Liberation, all of Sulaymaniyah had only ten millionaires; now 
there 
were over 2,000 between Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah.  The 
international focus on Iraq for reconstruction and oil revenues, 
and the 
central government's lack of power to control the situation, 
allowed 
these businessmen to benefit from the transition.  Rasul agreed 
that the 
senior leadership was part of the problem and made reforming 
from the 
top almost impossible. 
 
¶8. (C) During his tenure as KRG Prime Minister from 1993 to 1996, 
corruption was nonexistent.  From 1996 to 2002, while Rasul 
served as 
Prime Minster of the KRG in Sulaymaniyah, corruption was 
introduced 
through the black market and smuggling, by-products of UN 
programs such 
as the Oil For Food program.  Smuggling from neighboring Iran, 
Syria and 
Turkey into Kurdistan contributed to corruption. 
 
¶9. (C) In his eight years as Prime Minister (in both Erbil and 
Sulaymaniyah), there was no budget to run the government but the 
people 
were happy.  Today, the budget was good but the people were not 
satisfied.  Rasul said the best solution to combat corruption 
within the 
government was to treat it as a contagious disease and 
quarantine the 
corrupt.  He said he intended to use the law to fight corruption 
from 
within. 
 
(C) Recommended Reforms for the KRG 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Rasul said among his recommendations to the KRG was a 
forced-retirement from the government at age 50.  He said there 
were 
historical reasons why the Kurdish leadership, including Iraq 
President 
Jalal Talabani and KRG President Barzani, would not step down 
and/or 
face elections.  Rasul said at 54 he was too old to resolve the 
issues 
facing the party, but would continue to work after retirement to 
investigate the affairs of the government.  He also recommended 
that the 
peshmerga, police, and security forces change their role in the 
government to prevent their intervention in election matters. 
 
¶11. (C) When he was Prime Minister in Erbil there was a law 
allowing the 
investigation of questionable private wealth.  Today, a 
parliamentary 
committee should be created to do the same.  After the popular 
uprising 
people had great respect for the government leadership. 
Presidents 
Talibani and Barzani returned to the Kurdistan Region without a 
single 
vehicle between them.  Nowadays, people accepted that the 
leadership 
would have a car, a house, etc., but they did not accept the 
extreme 
wealth most had acquired.  People did not accept that so much 
could have 
been gained legitimately in such a short period of time.  Rasul 
added 
rhetorically that Barzani, for example, was unemployed beyond 
being a 
leader - so how did he acquire so many homes? 
 
COMMENT: 
----------------- 
 
¶12. (C) KRG Vice President Kosrat Rasul appears to remain loyal 
to his 
own agenda, being neither a peacemaker nor arbiter for reform. 
 
KIRKUK 00000128  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
He is 
definitely an advocate for the people, enjoying 96% popularity 
among the 
Kurds, and therefore is an important partner for pushing reform 
and 
fighting corruption. End comment. 
JBIGUS