VZCZCXRO9784
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL
DE RUEHKUK #0125/01 1961433
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 151433Z JUL 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0681
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0643
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0709

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/15/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PNAT PREF PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: (C) PUK CHANGES; KIRKUK MUST JOIN KDP; IRAN NO ALLY 
 
KIRKUK 00000125  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Tim Uselmann, Political Officer, IPAO, Department 
of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. PUK party leader Noshirwan Mustafa informed IPAO 
on July 
1 in Sulaymaniyah that the PUK had undertaken major reforms, 
including 
the re-election of all PUK leaders, beginning with the villages, 
districts, and sub-districts.  Also, he said the Article 140 
referendum 
was necessary to the KRG's strategic position for protecting 
Sulaymaniyah and Erbil from insurgents.  Finally, he said the KRG 
maintained formal relationships with Kurdish cities in Iran, but 
not 
with the national Iranian government. This is the second of two 
cables 
from this meeting. (REFTEL) End Summary. 
 
(C) Iran - Not a Friend of the Kurds 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. (C) The KRG and the Iranian security bureau had "a gentleman's 
agreement" to prevent internal insurgents from attacking each 
other's 
border areas.  The PUK also had a formal relationship with 
leaders from 
three Iranian Kurdish cities.  However, the KRG and the Iranian 
national 
government had nothing in common, including differences in 
language, 
national goals, ideology, and religion.  Mustafa said the 
Iranians 
actively worked against Iraq.  For example, the Iranians had 
given safe 
haven to 600 Sunni members of the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group 
before 
returning them to the southern areas of Iraq. 
 
(C) Article 140: Control of Kirkuk Protects KRG 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Mustafa insisted the Kirkuk referendum take place on time 
in 2007 
because the KRG needed the increase in national budget pie that 
co-opting Kirkuk province brought.  The KRG could then spend 
more on the 
poverty-stricken IDP areas of Kirkuk, where currently Arabs 
categorized 
KRG funding as akin to strategies used by the Jews in Palestine. 
Controlling Kirkuk was also key to the KRG's strategic position 
for 
protecting Sulaymaniyah and Erbil from insurgents.  The KRG 
could take 
over the management and protection of sensitive sectors, 
including the 
oil facilities and pipelines. 
 
(SBU) Changes Within the PUK 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The two-month process of re-electing PUK leaders in 
villages, 
districts, and sub-districts of Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, 
began 
July 1st.  Mustafa said the bottom-up shake-up of party 
leadership was 
intended to invigorate the party, diversify the leadership with 
younger 
members, and redistribute power horizontally by ending the 
Central 
Committee and Politburo's monopoly on decision-making. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Mustafa said the minimum age to run for election to the 
party 
leadership was lowered from 30 to 16 years old. Minimum 
membership was 
also lowered from 15 years to 6 months and the requirement for a 
university degree was eliminated.  They hoped more women would 
run for 
office however it was difficult at the village level.  In 
theory, each 
central organization (district) would have one woman. 
 
¶6. (C) The PUK also adopted Mustafa's initiative to establish a 
bureau 
of inquiry to combat corruption within the party.  The bureau 
could 
investigate any member or rumor and had free reign to ask about 
any 
 
KIRKUK 00000125  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
matter.  It was not meant to address historical crimes, but 
corruption - 
e.g. to examine the source of new wealth.  The internal 
committee would 
include three members: a judge, a financial manager, and a 
member of the 
PUK leadership.  The bureau could revoke party membership and 
decisions 
could not be appealed. 
 
 
 
 
(C) COMMENT: 
---------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Mustafa's effort to distance the KRG from the Iranian 
government 
comes after a local paper leaked a secret meeting between the 
Iranian 
Intelligence and the PUK and KDP politburos. Many of the changes 
in the 
PUK are Mustafa's, particularly those that fight corruption and 
attempt 
to include a younger audience.  He is a strong advocate for party 
adaptation to the new Iraq for the sake of survival and an 
important PUK 
supporter of KRG Prime Minister Barzani.  End Comment. 
JBIGUS