VZCZCXRO9263
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1778/01 2051235
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241235Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3868
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0006
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0046
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0016

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001778 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER PREL UG SU
SUBJECT: SANT'EGIDIO ANALYSIS OF LRA/GOU TALKS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1675 
 
KHARTOUM 00001778  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: P/E Eric Whitaker for reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Representatives of the Community of 
Sant'Egidio (CSE) assisting with the mediation of talks 
between the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/LRM) and the 
Government of Uganda (GOU) have provided a detailed readout 
on where the talks now stand.  After long discussions, the 
groups agreed on rules of procedure and established a 
sequential agenda with cessation of hostilities as the first 
item.  The GSE also rated the performance of the various 
actors, including a competent and hard-working Riek Machar, a 
LRA leadership that knows negotiation may be their only 
option, an incompetent LRA negotiating team that cannot speak 
for the leadership, a patient, professional, and skeptical 
Ugandan delegation, and an angry and tired southern 
population.  The CSE believes that the talks could yield a 
negotiated settlement, although this is by no means a 
foregone conclusion.  End summary. 
 
----------- 
The Process 
----------- 
 
¶2. (C) Mario Giro and Dr. Stefano Carmenati met with CG on 
July 18 to discuss LRA/GOU mediation initiative.  They 
provided background on CSE role in brokering contact with the 
LRA, including their earlier meetings with Joseph Kony and 
Vincent Otti at LRA camps.  They said that after a rocky 
start, the parties had agreed to ground rules.  Each side is 
represented by seven delegates permitted to speak.  The 
president of each delegation normally speaks for his side, 
although the president could designate other speakers from 
among the seven at his discretion.  Five other members of 
each delegation may observe, but not speak.  Observers from 
religious and tribal groupings cannot attend the talks, but 
are available on the margins for discussions with interested 
parties.  Riek Machar is the chief mediator, assisted by 
Telecommunications Minister Gier Chuan Aluong and Health 
Minister Theophilus Ochang Lotti, who comes from Eastern 
Equatoria. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On July 17, both sides reportedly agreed to a 
five-point agenda covering the following issues.  They have 
initiated discussion of the first point. 
 
(1)  Cessation of Hostilities:  This is not a ceasefire per 
se, but rather an agreement in principle to halt all 
offensive military action. 
 
(2)  Political Issues:  This agenda item includes 
participation of all Ugandan parties in national 
institutions, including the military.  In addition, 
socio-economic conditions in Northern Uganda and the plight 
of IDPs will be discussed. 
 
(3)  Reconciliation and Accountability:  The most important 
point here is the unilateral amnesty offered by the GOU.  The 
LRA side initially demanded that any amnesty be negotiated 
rather than offered unilaterally, but appear to have backed 
off that position. 
 
(4) Formal Ceasefire:  The LRA pressed for an immediate 
ceasefire, which the Ugandans refused on the grounds that 
international verification and separation forces are not 
available, making a formal ceasefire impracticable. 
 
(5) Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR): 
The concluding point would determine the method and timing of 
DDR and the return of combatants to Uganda. 
 
------------------------ 
Parties and Performances 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) The CSE described who are involved in the talks and 
rated their performance.  The following individuals/groups 
have been the key actors: 
 
(1) Riek Machar:  Giro said that Machar had performed well to 
this point.  He has been well prepared and patient and has 
dealt equitably with both sides.  Carmenati complimented 
Machar's work ethic and said that the only major mistake 
Machar committed in the run-up to the talks was the filmed 
delivery of USD 20,000 to Kony.  Giro said that he believed 
the money involved was from the Dutch, and not SPLM coffers. 
Clearly embarrassed by his misstep, Machar seemed unwilling 
to even admit the incident had occurred. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001778  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
(2) LRA leadership:  Giro described his meetings in the bush 
with Kony and Otti and said that he was not convinced of the 
sincerity of either man.  It was obvious, however, the LRA 
leadership realized that its military fortunes were waning 
and that a negotiated settlement might be the best way out. 
Despite bellicose talk from the LRA delegation, the fact 
remained that the LRA had retreated into the Garamba National 
Park due to mounting military pressure in Sudan.  Giro said 
that despite its relative weakness, the LRA was in his 
judgment still well armed and large enough to pose a threat 
to South Sudan. 
 
(3) LRA/LRM Delegation:  Carmenati characterized the term LRM 
as a misnomer - there was no political wing of the LRA.  The 
purported delegation was in fact a collection of political 
dissidents from the Ugandan diaspora who had only visited the 
LRA leadership twice, and briefly, and who were unable to 
commit Kony and his senior commanders to any negotiated 
conditions.  The CSE facilitators assumed that they would 
need to travel to Kony's camp as the talks progressed to make 
sure that Kony accepted various proposed positions. 
Carmenati described the LRA delegation as amateurish and 
disorganized, learning by doing.  The putative president, 
Martin Ogul, had been completely mute during the first two 
sessions, as had the five LRA officers who joined the 
delegations.  The other delegates frequently contradicted 
each other or requested long time outs to argue among 
themselves about what position to take.  Giro said that they 
appeared to have no coherent political agenda.  He said that 
the first two pages of the eigh 
teen-page LRA policy paper was a convoluted argument that the 
LRA in fact had a political master plan. 
 
(4) Ugandan Delegation:  Giro praised the comportment of GOU 
Internal Affairs Minister Rugunda, who spoke almost 
exclusively for the GOU delegation and who had shown himself 
to be firm but calm.  Giro said that he was aware that many 
of the Ugandans were not enthused with the entire negotiation 
process.  He said that this was a sentiment shared by many in 
Kampala, including Minister Mbabazi, who was staunchly 
opposed to the talks.  CSE nonetheless felt that the GOU 
would be unable to walk away from the negotiations without a 
good faith attempt to forge an agreement. 
 
(5) Others:  Giro said that he and Carmenati had just 
concluded a series of meetings with the Ugandan religious 
community, Acholi chiefs, commissioners and politicians from 
Eastern and Western Equatoria, and traditional leaders from 
other groups from those two states.  He said that the tribal 
leaders had attributed 90 percent of the atrocities, which 
they described in detail, to the LRA.  Giro observed that the 
South Sudanese were particularly furious with the LRA.  The 
Sudanese tribal leaders were also critical of the UPDF for 
refusing to fight the LRA.  Several tribal leaders said that 
they had informed the UPDF of the exact location of LRA 
bands, but the Ugandans had taken no action until the LRA had 
attacked villages, and then engaged only in half-hearted 
pursuit.  Giro said that this lack of zeal for the fight was 
due to the large number of former LRA fighters who had been 
pressed into the ranks of the UPDF expeditionary force based 
in Sudan.  Carmenati offered that the GoSS was also tired of 
the UPDF pr 
esence and wanted to end the conflict so that their erstwhile 
allies would return home. 
 
----------- 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
¶5. (C) The CSE mediators admitted that they negotiations 
would be difficult.  Giro said that it was similar to peace 
negotiations in Liberia, but in some ways worse.  Despite the 
difficulties, the current perceived weakness of the LRA and 
the apparent willingness of Museveni to negotiate an end to 
the conflict created the circumstances under which an 
agreement became possible.  CSE realized, however, that there 
was no guarantee for a successful negotiated peace. 
STEINFELD