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Viewing cable 06KABUL2970, NDS DIRECTOR SALEH ON INSURGENCY - CAUSES AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL2970 2006-07-02 13:27 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO7063
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #2970/01 1831327
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021327Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1139
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2647
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2791
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6100
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 1472
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002970 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR PALMER/KILCULLEN 
SCA/FO, SCA/A, SCA/RA, SCA/PB 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2016 
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS AF PK
SUBJECT: NDS DIRECTOR SALEH ON INSURGENCY - CAUSES AND 
SOLUTIONS 
 
REF: KABUL 2703 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S/Rel Aus and GB)  Summary:  NDS Director 
General Amarullah Saleh told visiting S/CT Deputy 
Coordinator and Chief Strategist on June 27 that the 
Taliban insurgency is now focused largely on Zabul, 
Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan.  For the moment it 
is still a "measurable problem," he said.  Saleh 
asserted that the Pakistani ISI had the capability 
to round up Taliban leadership on its side of the 
border and do more to prevent infiltration, but 
lacked the political will to do so.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Asked for his assessment of 
the current situation, Saleh took exception to media 
reports asserting that Afghanistan was losing 
ground.  He praised GOA-Coalition coordination in 
Operation Mountain Lion and in Paktika, Paktia and 
Khost provinces.  He said meaningful Taliban 
activity was now largely confined to Zabul, Helmand, 
Kandahar, and Uruzgan.  On the Pakistan side of the 
border, he declared, the insurgency in Baluchistan 
was mostly just "criminality," with the insurgents 
attacking energy and other government facilities 
rather than trying to destabilize the government. 
He noted that the terrorists who are directing 
insurgent operations in Afghanistan have diversified 
their funding from charities and foreign sources 
(although these are still a factor) by effectively 
taxing narcotics dealers, poppy growers, and local 
businessmen. 
 
3. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh attributed the Taliban 
push in Durrani tribal areas (the four southern 
provinces) to a desire to embarrass and distract the 
President, who as a Durrani (Popalzai) himself feels 
a special sense of responsibility for casualties 
there, many of whom are his kinsmen.  Saleh said 
that the insurgent leaders are deliberately 
concentrating on Karzai,s home territory in order to 
cause a crisis of leadership in Kabul, by putting 
this tremendous pressure on Karzai. 
 
4. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh pointed out, however, 
that there are underlying reasons as well for why 
the insurgency is stronger in the south.  These are 
rooted in the lack of governance there.  Noting that 
there are no political parties or jihadi groups in 
the south, he said that the Taliban in that area 
used to function as an umbrella over tribal 
differences.  When the Taliban collapsed, the tribes 
were reinstated, initially based on power sharing 
between the tribal heads.  But then reform removed 
the power brokers (i.e. warlords), and the vacuum 
has been filled by the Taliban.  In the areas where 
they are now trying to amass support, Taliban are 
promoting a program consisting of Taliban politics, 
Koranic law, recruitment of tribes, and a drug 
economy.  This appeals to villagers, Saleh claimed, 
who have trouble understanding a modern polity that 
is more sophisticated but less immediate in solving 
their problems. 
 
5. (S/Rel Aus and GB) The problem is less pressing 
 
KABUL 00002970  002 OF 005 
 
 
in other parts of the country, he claimed.  In Loya 
Paktia (Paktia, Paktika, and Khost), the Ghilzai 
tribal leaders are less susceptible to Taliban 
Durrani influence.  The Haqqani network has been 
largely contained.  In Khost and Paktia the GOA/CF 
have good intelligence sources and good security. 
On the other side of the border, in Waziristan, 
Pakistan has deployed troops.  Saleh pointed out 
that literacy rates are also higher in that area, 
especially in Khost.  Many Afghans from that region 
have overseas ties, with relatives working in the 
Gulf and elsewhere.  That gives them a better 
perspective of the world and they are less likely to 
be taken in by Taliban ways of thinking.  Jalalabad 
is similar: Ghilzai, with a relatively good economy 
and higher literacy rates.  Saleh pointed out that 
the Taliban were never strong in the Jalalabad area. 
Konar and Nuristan, on the other hand, could become 
worse if the Taliban shifted their efforts there. 
There is a strong Wahabi undercurrent in those 
provinces which could be used by the Taliban to 
their advantage.  However, at the moment the Taliban 
have chosen to concentrate on the south for the 
reasons described above. 
 
6. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh attributed current 
instability in Afghanistan both to the GOA,s 
slowness in asserting government authority but also 
to interference from Pakistan, and specifically from 
ISI.  Asked why Pakistan should want to destabilize 
Afghanistan, Saleh quickly ticked off a few 
possibilities: "geopolitics, a desire for a monopoly 
on natural resources, a desire to dominate 
Afghanistan, or a sense that a strong Afghanistan 
would undermine Pakistani national unity."  He 
claimed that, contrary to what many people think, 
the Pakistan government does not feel threatened by 
Islamic extremists inside Pakistan.  He said that 
Pakistani leaders from Benazir Bhutto to the present 
have used the threat of an Islamic takeover to get 
what they wanted from the West, but that there was 
never any real possibility of it, and that hasn,t 
changed. 
 
7. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Pressed as to which officers 
or branches of the ISI might be complicit in 
allowing Taliban/AQ infiltration into Afghanistan, 
Saleh replied, "The ISI is a very disciplined, 
nationalistic service."  (Comment: the implication 
was that the ISI was acting on orders, not 
functioning as a rogue entity.  End comment.)  He 
said the ISI,s Afghanistan desk, including its 
training and supplies division, was still active. 
Saleh dismissed GOP operational coordination.  "We 
give them actionable intelligence, primarily on the 
Quetta shura," he said, including for example 
recently geospatial coordinates for Mullah Dadullah, 
"but no action is ever taken."  Saleh said he 
attended the meeting at which President Karzai 
passed the dossier on several Quetta-based Taliban 
leaders to President Musharraf, but there had been 
no follow up. "When we give them target lists, we 
are always told the phone numbers are incorrect and 
a day or two later we find they have been 
disconnected."  Saleh said the ISI had turned over 
only "two or three" Taliban operatives, none of whom 
 
KABUL 00002970  003 OF 005 
 
 
proved significant after interrogation. 
 
8. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh professed ignorance of 
President Musharraf,s FATA Plan.  When the S/CT 
visitors outlined it for him, he asserted repeatedly 
that plans like this were meaningless -- "it is a 
question of political will."  He said that the 
Pakistanis have enough resources to contain the 
Taliban or to reduce it to the level of criminality, 
but that "they will use the excuse of lack of 
resources to justify failure, as they have done in 
the past."  Saleh decried the lack of strategic 
consultations with Pakistan on issues of mutual 
concern such as the border, water, and ethnic 
problems.  When asked whether the Government of 
Afghanistan was ready to agree to strategic 
discussions on the political level, he replied: 
"From what I have heard from President Karzai, there 
is willingness.  But when he wants to engage 
Musharraf at a strategic level, Musharraf talks at 
the tactical level."   If the U.S. wants to initiate 
a high-level strategic forum similar to the 
Trilateral Military Commission, Saleh asserted, "It 
will make a difference." 
 
9. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh said the members of the 
international community need to reassure Karzai of 
their nation,s commitment to Afghanistan.  He said 
that Karzai fears the international community,s - 
and particularly the U.S. - commitment to 
Afghanistan is decreasing for two reasons:  because 
of what he reads in the Western media and, more 
importantly, because the ANA is still not able to 
function independently.  Karzai is frustrated with 
the rate of growth of the ANA, Saleh said. 
Moreover, he has the perception that when there is a 
security incident, GOA authorities cannot be 
deployed immediately to restore order.  (CFC-A note: 
The ANA can and has deployed ANA forces immediately, 
particularly during the May riots. End note.)  Saleh 
said that recently the President became angry when 
he asked Defense Minister Wardak to send a platoon 
to Dai Kundi and was told that all ANA moves have to 
be coordinated with LTG Eikenberry.  (CFC-A note: 
ANA movements do not need to be coordinated with LTG 
Eikenberry. End note.  Embassy comment: It may be 
that Saleh was referring to the ANA,s lack of 
airlift capability.  End comment.) 
 
10. (S/Rel Aus and GB)  Saleh also argued for 
reinstatement of deployment pay for the Afghan 
National Army (ANA).  ANA desertions had begun to 
decrease, he said, but since the $2/day hardship 
allowance was discontinued, they have increased 
again. (Note: CFC-A/CSTC-A note:  ANA desertion 
rates have remained relatively constant for the last 
six months.)  Finally, Saleh complained about the 
lack of ANA airlift capability.  (CFC-A Comment: The 
current airlift fleet consisting of a few AN-12s and 
AN-32s, plus Soviet helos, is inadequate for the 
growing ANA.  But the Afghans are doing the best 
they can with old aircraft that are terribly 
difficult to maintain. By late Fall, they will 
achieve Presidential airlift capability.  But in 
order to achieve the air mobility effects the ANA 
needs, an increase in the size of the fleet, and 
 
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modernization to sustainable airframes, is needed. 
End comment.) 
 
11. (S/Rel Aus and GB) With regard to the Afghan 
National Police (ANP), Saleh complained progress was 
too slow.  He said he strongly supported the use of 
"arbakei" (community police) in some Pashtun areas 
where they are a traditional institution.  The 
arbakei are practically responsible for law and 
order at the most local level, he said.  In the 
years before the wars, they used to do neighborhood 
protection and would safeguard the king,s forest. 
Using them now for community protection would give 
the local tribes prestige and would be consistent 
with traditional practice.  Saleh claimed that the 
arbakei are effective because they are locally-based 
and rooted in Pashtun culture.  For example, if a 
member of the arbakai is killed, "badal" (a 
Pashtunwali concept of compensatory justice) 
requires revenge; if an ANP patrolman is killed it,s 
not the same.  "To the local people the ANP 
patrolman is just a name.  He does not have a face 
and does not need to be avenged." 
 
12. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Pressed by polmiloff, Saleh 
acknowledged that militia were inappropriate in 
areas where arbakei did not traditionally exist, 
such as the southern Pashtun provinces, but said 
something similar should be created there, at the 
local, tribal level.  He also said that the arbakei 
must be put under "central command and control" to 
prevent abuses.  The Ministry of Interior made a 
tactical error, he asserted, by announcing support 
for community police without first working out the 
details.  "It,s easy to bring the arbakei into a 
unified command structure.  The MOI should have 
designed the structure and presented it to the 
international community."  (Comment: Despite Saleh,s 
comment, it is not at entirely clear how the 
arbakei, who are recruited by, and responsible to, 
local tribal jirgas, could be brought into a unified 
MOI command structure.  End comment.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh,s primary theme in this 
wide-ranging talk was, "We must not allow confidence 
in the regime to erode," and therefore we must 
strike at the root causes.  While his analysis of 
the underlying domestic reaons for recent Taliban 
activity was in itself thought- provoking, he was 
particularly interested to push for recognition for 
what he saw as Pakistan,s support for - or at least, 
insufficient prohibition of - the insurgency,s 
leadership, training, and financial networks on the 
other side of the border.  This tracks with Karzai,s 
recent public position that the international 
community needs to "go to the root of the problem," 
which he defines privately as getting tougher with 
Pakistan.  Several months back Karzai described to 
General Abizaid the fiasco of trying to share intel 
with Pakistan in almost exactly the same words as 
Saleh used with us.  While we recognize that the 
view is very different from the other side of the 
border (that particular incident is an excellent 
 
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example), Saleh is one of the sharpest, most 
perceptive analysts in the Afghan government, and 
his views are influential within leadership circles. 
 
14. (S/Rel Aus and GB) On the issue of community 
police, there is indeed a difference between arbakei 
and the other forms of militia that have been 
floated by Karzai recently.  In a speech in Baghlan 
late last week, Karzai said he does not support 
militias, and that he wants to work within the 
national police and army to meet the country,s 
security needs.  That said, we have indications that 
in some districts the arbakei are working in close, 
positive cooperation with the ANP.  We cited an 
example in reftel, where arbakei in a remote part of 
Logar province are securing the area as part of 
their tribal duty, in coordination with the ANP, and 
not for pay.  But arbakei do not exist in all parts 
of the Pashtun area - the Durrani tribes in Helmand, 
Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul have never had this 
tradition - so their limited use does not change our 
view on militias (a broader category than community 
policy) as potentially destabilizing and going the 
wrong direction.  From his public statement last 
week as well as his private discussions, Karzai 
appears to be coming around to this position.  End 
comment. 
 
15. (U) S/CT Deputy Coordinator Palmer has cleared 
this cable. 
NEUMANN