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P 250459Z JUL 06
FM REO HILLAH
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INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0671
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0738

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HILLAH 000124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/25/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KISL PROP IZ
SUBJECT: HOW THE SOUTH WAS WON - TALLYING UP ELECTION DAY FRAUD 
 
REF: HILLAH 0121 
 
HILLAH 00000124  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO Al 
Hillah, US Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: For perspective on potential problems in 
upcoming provincial council elections, REO Staff spoke to 
representatives of the South Central Iraqi National Accord 
(INA), Communist Party, Iraqi Election Commission (IECI), and 
other contacts about ballot tampering and other forms of voter 
manipulation that were alleged to occur during last year's 
January 2 provincial council elections, October constitutional 
referendum, and December 15 Council of Representatives CoR) 
elections. Contacts claimed that while the provincial IECI heads 
and professional staff were in general trustworthy, temporary 
election workers engaged in widespread vote tampering.  Moderate 
party officials  detailed the alleged methods in which the "555" 
(aka "candle") United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) religious party slate 
applied social coercion, allegedly violated election campaigning 
regulations, and changed vote tallies.  END SUMMARY 
 
Background: Secure Elections and Robust Participation 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2. (C) The three national elections held since the fall of 
Saddam Hussein were undoubtedly a significant accomplishment, 
given a daunting security challenge and the difficulties in 
organizing free and fair elections in a war torn country without 
proper infrastructure.  Elections were further complicated by 
the challenges of training staff outside the country and the 
lack of international observers during the election themselves. 
 
¶3. (C) Despite the obstacles, the January, 2005 Transitional 
National Assembly (TNA) and Provincial Council elections, the 
October, 2005 constitutional referendum, and the December, 2005 
Council of Representatives (CoR) elections were generally judged 
to be successful by two important criteria; overall turnout (58% 
- 72%) and a moderate incidence of election day violence. 
However, REO contacts in the moderate and secular parties 
continue to insist that January and December majority victories 
in the South Central region for the "555" Shi'a religious party 
slate were turned into landslide victories by UIA dirty tricks 
and ballot fraud. To this day, Iraqi National Accord (INA) and 
Communist Party contacts insist that this fraud occurred 
throughout the region and was pervasive enough to serve as 
grounds for determining that the TNA/PC and CoR elections were 
not free and fair. 
 
¶4. (C) While REO staff lack the data to rigorously evaluate the 
scale and frequency of voter fraud by UIA partisans, we do 
believe that the descriptions of how fraud was committed are 
credible.  As a reference for upcoming provincial elections, REO 
staff spoke with representatives from moderate parties, 
journalists, Iraqi Election Commission provincial heads, and 
other contacts to compile a partial listing of the many types of 
voter fraud that are alleged to have been used. 
 
Pre-Election: Violence, Red Tape, and Social Coercion 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶5. (C) Moderate party complaints about an unequal playing field 
in the weeks leading up to elections fell into two categories; 
assassination and intimidation, and restrictions on 
disseminating campaign materials. 
 
¶6. (C) Specifics were lacking on allegations of assassination. 
Overall, the INA slate reportedly had thirteen party workers 
killed during voting for the CoR.  Allawi supporters and 
Communist Party contacts stated that they were unable to recruit 
candidates and field election observers because of widespread 
intimidation.  Communist Party contacts in Babil Province stated 
that the night before CoR elections, the campaign posters on 
their Hillah headquarters were torn off the walls by a mob.  A 
Karbala INA politician claimed that on two occasions, his poster 
hangers and militia members exchanged gunfire.  He also reported 
that party offices had been attacked and trashed by mobs.  A 
Communist Party member related how in the important Mahmoumdiya 
district in Babil Province, leaflets were distributed 
door-to-door that warned people to vote "Iraqiya," (the "555" 
slate).  The leaflets were ominously signed by the "Fair 
Punishment Committee." 
 
¶7. (C) Our contacts noted that they frequently had difficulty 
receiving permission to post campaign materials.  The Karbala 
INA politician noted that some municipalities would encourage 
the religious parties to hang banners and posters, but refused 
to grant permission to secular parties. 
 
¶8. (C) Moderate parties complained about the pervasive 
integration of church and state that created an atmosphere of 
 
HILLAH 00000124  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
social coercion.  For example, during the final week, mosques 
throughout the South Central region frequently used their 
loudspeakers to broadcast the message that if you vote for the 
"555" slate, under Islamic law, you would not be able to sleep 
with your wife.  Another commonly broadcast message, "If you do 
not vote UIA, you are a Baathist." INA and Communist Party 
contacts noted that UIA campaign materials commonly used 
religious imagery. 
 
¶9. (C) While not an illegal advantage, many moderate contacts in 
the South Central region have complained about the proliferation 
of religious satellite television channels that allow religious 
parties to target families within the home.  Satellite 
broadcasting and mosques loudspeakers create a sizable media 
advantage, they complain. They also noted that UIA media outlets 
broke a mandatory 24-hour period of silence before the election 
to spread news about the famous Al-Jazeera television program 
that was said to be insulting to Ayatollah Sistani. 
 
¶10. (C) Perhaps the most serious allegation made about 
pre-election day tampering concerned IECI voter registration 
rolls.  "Tamper-proof" voter lists were compiled and printed in 
secure facilities outside of Iraq.  Our contacts claim that the 
lists were never secure and had been seriously compromised 
before printing.  Over and over again, books contained the same 
mocking phrase in Arabic inserted into voter lists, "Die 
American dogs." COMMENT: REO has digital photos of this Arabic 
phrase appearing in registration books. END COMMENT 
 
Election Day: Multiple Voting, Ballot Tampering 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶11. (C) Social coercion intensified on election day, according 
to our contacts.  Loudspeakers broadcast, "Sistani calls you to 
vote."  "Fake sheikhs" or clerics stood in the approaches to 
polling stations, stamping people's hands with the slogan "From 
Sistani" (a reference to Shi'a Ayatollah Ali Sistani). A 
mid-ranking Babil Province police officer, himself from a rural 
village, who had been in charge of security in Babil rural 
districts during the December 15 election, recalled how rural 
voters in village after village seemed to believe that the 
marjaya'iya (Shi'a clerics) had directed them to vote for a 
religious party. COMMENT: Ayatollah Sistani did not endorse 
specific candidates or parties before the CoR elections. 
However, his fatwas urging Shi'a to vote were often taken as an 
admonition to vote for a religious party.  The religious 
parties, particularly the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) frequently invoked Sistani's name. 
END COMMENT 
 
¶12. (C) Municipalities also seemed to selectively restrain 
movement.  Communist Party representatives related how one field 
worker had called in, saying that the religious parties were 
shuttling voters to the polls in ten buses, but he was not 
allowed to drive down the street in his car.  A Mayor of a 
southern Babil Province town allegedly issued an order 
forbidding the issuance of gas to secular party vehicles. Other 
contacts noted that the religious parties were allowed to hang 
posters inside polling stations, a privilege not granted to 
secular parties. 
 
¶13. (C) Provincial Council members and high-ranking provincial 
officials appeared to frequently cross the line between 
campaigning and inappropriate influence.  A Communist Party 
contact noted how in the sixteen districts he supervised, civil 
service provincial department heads fanned out with their 
bodyguards to direct voters to vote for the UIA. Allegedly, 
several PC members sat in larger polling stations all day, 
reminding people standing in line to vote for the "555" slate. 
 
¶14. (C) All contacts, including two IECI provincial directors 
(reftel), agreed that while provincial heads and UN-trained 
staff were generally reliable, temporary election workers were 
either religious party operatives or highly susceptible to 
outside pressure.  This seemed to be a serious problem in rural 
villages. 
 
¶15. (C) Contacts outlined many types of balloting infractions 
and fraud allegedly carried out or facilitated by local polling 
station workers.  These include: 
 
-- Multiple voting at larger polling stations that had put 
voting booths into several separate rooms.  Electoral workers 
would stand by and do nothing while religious party 
representatives took voters who had just completed voting and 
put them into a line for a ballot station in another room so 
they could vote again. 
 
-- Voting for illiterate elderly (a significant chunk of the 
electorate, particularly in rural areas) and often for their 
family members as well. 
 
 
HILLAH 00000124  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
-- Using removable ink to mark fingers. (Contacts also 
complained that the official, supposedly indelible, ink was also 
easily removable). 
 
-- Closing polling places early in urban districts despite a 
last-minute IECI order of a one-hour extension.  Some polling 
places closed at 1730, 30 minutes before the scheduled closing 
time. 
 
-- Closing the doors and asking voters who they intended to vote 
for.  If the answer was the UIA, the voters were let in.  If the 
answer was for a moderate party, the voter was told that the 
polling place was closed. 
 
-- Taking a single vote by a member of a household and marking 
additional ballots for all other members of that household. 
 
-- Forcing moderate or secular party observers to leave polling 
stations or asking the police to remove them. 
 
-- Overruling observers' objections and allowing out-of-district 
voters to vote. 
 
Post-Election:  Ballot Stuffing and Rejecting Valid Ballots 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶16. (C) The most significant form of ballot tampering seemed to 
be "double-checking" of ballots.  Contacts complained that 
throughout the region, it was common for electoral workers to 
open ballot boxes and mark those ballots cast for moderate 
parties twice, rendering that ballot invalid.  The Karbala 
Allawi party head stated with frustration that his observers had 
called in 93,000 votes in the province.  After the ballots were 
counted, the official count was only 36,000. A Babil contact 
noted that the IECI initial tally of moderate party votes in his 
Babil district was 1400.  The final count announced in Baghdad 
was only 800. 
 
¶17. (C) There appears to have been some ballot-stuffing. A 
Communist Party representative accused the UIA of importing 
ballot boxes pre-stuffed with ballots from Iran.  They also 
noted accusations that Iranian Shi'a were issued Iraqi ration 
cards and told to cross the border into Basra and vote.  More 
reliably, there were some rural villages in the South Central 
region where the final number of ballots cast significantly 
exceeded the number of voters registered in the electorate 
rolls.  The Communist Party in Babil plausibly claims that 
left-over ballots in some areas were marked with "555" votes by 
IECI workers and put into ballot boxes before transfer to 
Baghdad. 
 
¶18. (C) REO local staff recall telephone calls from moderate and 
secular party observers who had been tossed out of polling 
stations just after voting ended, but before ballot tallying. 
Journalists here relate stories about how boxes of ballots were 
taken away for two hours and then brought back to the polling 
place.  During elections, the national media reported some cases 
of discarded ballots, largely in Baghdad and northern Iraq. 
 
Conclusion: Lessons Learned, Lessons for the Future 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶19. (C) Different set of contacts draw different conclusions 
from anecdotal evidence outlining the above patterns of fraud. 
All concur that even if the IECI and international community had 
concluded that election fraud was widespread enough to warrant 
discounting the results, ultimately, only the margin of victory 
by the "555" slate would have changed in South Central. However, 
they charge that if fraud had been restrained, moderate parties 
today would have a much more active voice on both the national 
and local levels. 
 
¶20. (C) Moderate party officials here conclude that the fraud 
they saw during the elections points out the need to push for 
international observers in the next election.  An INA contact 
told us that the ratio of "555"-affiliated observers to moderate 
party poll workers was roughly 20:1. Intimidation makes it 
difficult to recruit poll watchers, he commented, adding that 
the presence of international observers would encourage ordinary 
Iraqis to participate. COMMENT: No one has an answer as to how 
security could be put in place for international observers. END 
COMMENT 
 
¶21. (C) The IECI provincial heads in Diwaniyah and Wasit agreed 
with political party contacts that temporary workers were a 
serious problem in the 2005 elections.  They argue that the IECI 
should retain its UN-trained core staff, and the CoR should 
refrain from replacing commissioners and line staff with 
political party operatives (reftel).  On the provincial level, 
they see more training for temporary workers as a useful 
investment in raising consciousness about what poll workers can 
and cannot do. They also suggest that training and orientation 
 
HILLAH 00000124  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
for Iraqi observers be expanded prior to the next election. 
 
¶22. (C) Our moderate political contacts are more inclined to 
throw out the existing IECI altogether, instead tasking the 
judiciary sector to oversee elections.  They agree with IECI 
professional staff that the current attempt by the CoR to revamp 
the IECI is a charade aimed at bringing the institution under 
direct political party control. 
 
¶23. (C) All of our moderate and secular contacts would prefer to 
see more, not less UN involvement with the next set of national 
elections.  They warn that SCIRI provincial leaders are 
increasingly insecure about holding onto majority control of 
provincial councils and governorships, given their acute lack of 
tangible success in providing basic services in their 
communities.  They also (optimistically) believe that the 
marjaya'iya will likely clearly annunciate that they stand aside 
from the religious parties, and hope that regardless of where 
Sistani stands, voters will be more willing to consider the 
moderate/secular party alternative.  This, they conclude, may 
provoke an even-higher probability of fraud and violence in the 
elections to come. 
 
¶24. (C) COMMENT: With serious CoR debate beginning about the 
shape of elections to come, this may be an opportune time to 
consider modifications to the by-laws that could strengthen 
security and diversity in voting.  For example:  1) "rolling" 
elections that would occur sequentially by province(s), making 
the most of limited international observers and helping to 
concentrate security; 2) electronic voting; 3) stepping up, not 
diminishing UN involvement; 4) more programs to combat what one 
contact here termed "pervasive civic illiteracy."  END COMMENT 
FONTENEAU