VZCZCXRO5998
PP RUEHAG
DE RUEHHE #0733/01 2121545
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311545Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2229
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4628
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0245

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000733 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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STATE FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/NB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MEPP EUN FI
SUBJECT: TFLEO1: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES LEBANON CRISIS WITH 
FOREIGN MINISTER TUOMIOJA 
 
 
Classified By: Poloff David Allen Schlaefer for Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Ambassador Ware met with Finland's Foreign 
Minister, Erkki Tuomioja, on July 31.  Tuomioja said that his 
just-completed trip to the Middle-east confirmed his view 
that Israel could not achieve its military goals, and that an 
immediate cease-fire followed by a comprehensive settlement 
along the lines of UNSCR 1559 were essential.  Tuomioja 
called the Rome Conference a success, and indicated that the 
EU was poised to move quickly on plans for an international 
stabilization force once  a cease-fire was in place.  France, 
Spain, and Italy had agreed to contribute significant forces 
to the proposed new UN mission.  Tuomioja also said that 
Damascus has indicated it was ready to help defuse the 
crisis, perhaps by agreeing to the removal of Hizballah's 
large rockets and launchers to Syria where they can be 
monitored and neutralized.  The Ambassador expressed regret 
that Tuomioja had made offensive remarks in a Finnish news 
magazine about American concern for Lebanese civilian 
casualties; Tuomioja apologized for the remarks, stating that 
he had been caught off-guard by reporters and did not mean to 
imply any lack of American concern for the tragedy in 
Lebanon.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Tuomioja told Ambassador Ware that he has been very 
affected by his trip to the region last week.  He said that 
the suffering in Israel, Lebanon, and Gaza was 
"extraordinary," and that a comprehensive solution was 
imperative.  He had met with myriad senior Israeli officials 
and tried to correct any misinterpretation that Tel Aviv had 
carte blanche from the international community to continue 
offensive operations for another two to five weeks.  Tuomioja 
opined that although he was no military expert, he had to 
believe that Israel would not (and could not) achieve its 
military goals, and that a political solution was necessary. 
Moreover, he feared that each new errant missile or bomb only 
generated more sympathy in the Arab street for Hizballah and 
Muslim extremism, and that moderate Arab leaders in the 
region were increasingly anxious about this.  The FM said 
that he was displeased with media coverage of the Rome 
Conference.  In his opinion, it was not a failure, but useful 
because "we focused on all the things that we needed to in 
any case," and laid the groundwork for the meetings that were 
taking place in New York and Brussels this week.  Tuomioja 
thanked the Ambassador for the important role the Secretary 
had played. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Ambassador expressed condolences for death of 
the Finnish peacekeeper in Lebanon, and then addressed 
preparations for the Extraordinary Meeting of the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council tomorrow in Brussels. 
She agreed with Tuomioja about the efficacy of the Rome 
Conference, and emphasized the broad agreement in Rome that 
any cease-fire must be permanent and sustainable; it is 
important that the cycle of violence be broken, and that any 
agreement must include the disarming of Hizballah.  If it 
doesn't, the cycle will continue, and any cease-fire brokered 
today would only be broken again in the near future, with 
further civilian suffering and tragedy on all sides.  Any 
comprehensive settlement must address this, and incorporate 
actions, not mere words.  Citing the President's and 
Secretary's expressions of concern for the suffering of the 
 
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Lebanese people, the Ambassador reiterated U.S. regret for 
the loss of civilian lives in both Lebanon and Israel.  She 
said the U.S. was looking forward to discussing the 
composition of an international stabilization force with our 
EU partners and asked the FM what his views on such a force 
were. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The FM agreed with the Ambassador that any lasting 
settlement should be in line with UNSCR 1559; but he opined 
that the civilian tragedy unfolding in Lebanon was such that 
it was necessary to call for an immediate cease-fire first. 
The details of any comprehensive settlement would be 
difficult to negotiate, but the first step in resolving the 
crisis was to stop the immediate violence, and that there was 
broad agreement within the EU on this.  Tuomioja remarked 
that while it was impossible to physically eliminate 
Hizballah, the group could be neutralized.  Neither Syria nor 
Iran had any interest in the current situation continuing or 
escalating; in fact, the EU had "indications" that Damascus 
was looking for an opportunity to help defuse the crisis, 
perhaps by pressuring Hizballah to move its heavy missiles 
and launchers into Syria where they could be effectively 
controlled and further provocations stopped.  The FM said 
that he was encouraged by the Secretary's remarks that she 
 
HELSINKI 00000733  002 OF 002 
 
 
was hopeful that a cease-fire could be brokered by the end of 
the week.  He also repeatedly emphasized that any lasting 
solution for Lebanon had to include Gaza as well. 
 
¶5.  (C)  On the international stabilization force, Tuomioja 
said that he had seen estimates of the amount of troops 
needed ranging from 10,000 to 15,000;  if indeed close to 
20,000 troops are needed, it may be difficult to find them. 
France, Spain, and Italy have indicated willingness to 
contribute significant "battle-ready" forces.  Turkey will 
also likely contribute troops, but Tuomioja believed it 
unlikely that Egypt or any other Arab country would 
participate, although Indonesia and other non-Arab Muslim 
countries might.  Germany (due to historic sensitivities) and 
the US and UK (due to political and security realities) could 
not play leading roles in the stabilization force, and this 
hurt the international community's ability to put a solid 
force together.  The FM said that it was imperative for the 
force's credibility that it be a new UN mission (not UNIFIL), 
and that the troops be properly equipped and trained to 
defend themselves;  EU publics should realize the danger 
involved in the operation and the real possibility of further 
casualties. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Ambassador then turned to media reports (first 
reported in the Finnish news magazine Suomen Kuvalehti and 
subsequently picked up by Reuters) that Tuomioja had alleged 
that Americans were less worried about the fate of Lebanese 
civilians than Europeans were.  She said that the remarks 
saddened and offended her, reminding the FM that more than 
5000 Americans have died in the Global War on Terror.  There 
are also more than 3 million Americans of Lebanese ancestry, 
and while the suffering of any people is abhorrent to the 
U.S., the tragedy in Lebanon is particularly difficult for 
Americans to countenance.  Tuomioja apologized for the 
remarks, stating that he had been taken by surprise by the 
reporter's question and that the comments as published were 
not what he intended or wished to say; nor had be been given 
a promised opportunity to edit the story, during which he 
would have removed the statement.  The Ambassador told him 
that the international media would now focus on every word. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Comment:  Tuomioja suggested that the EU is poised 
to move quickly on the stabilization force once a cease-fire 
is in place; but he also clearly indicated that finding 
enough troops to flesh out the mission will likely be a 
significant problem given limited EU capabilities.  On his 
remarks to the media, Tuomioja was apparently somewhat 
distraught that his poorly chosen words were an issue at a 
time when the US and EU needed to work together to solve an 
emergent crisis.  However, his long history of off-the-cuff 
gaffes and rhetorical stumbles, as well as the lack of 
staffing at senior levels in Finland's MFA, suggest he may 
need help growing into the role of foreign minister of the EU 
President country.  Post recommends that senior EU officials 
need to remind the foreign minister that his remarks will now 
be interpreted as having been vetted by all member states. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Comment, cont.:  Within hours of the Tuomioja 
meeting, the Ambassador saw Finland's Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs at a reception.  The U/S said 
that (please protect) Tuomioja, who has been Finland's 
foreign minister for over 6 years, had just advised his 
senior staff that he will not continue as FM after next 
year's general election. End Comment. 
 
WARE