VZCZCXRO3706
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHDBU #1440/01 2090929
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280929Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8224
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9539
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1731
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1458
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1668
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1715
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1672
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1654
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1702
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1253

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 001440 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR P, S/P, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, INR 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PINR PROP ECON MARR RS ZK
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MILITARY NEWSPAPER ASSERTS MOSCOW'S RIGHT 
EXCLUSIVELY TO DOMINATE CENTRAL ASIA 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00001440  001.3 OF 005 
 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  A seminal July 25 analytical article in Russia's 
official military newspaper asserts Russia's right to dominate 
Central Asia and to prevent the United States and NATO - 
"[Russia's] traditional geopolitical rivals" - from any sort of 
further military presence in the region.  The article ignores 
Turkmenistan, but states that Kazakhstan, though rich enough to 
attempt an independent foreign policy, is reliably in the 
Kremlin camp; Uzbekistan is now Russia's because of rigid U.S. 
human rights ideology; Kyrgyzstan is coming to its senses and 
knows who butters which side of its bread, especially because of 
American spies from Embassy Bishkek working to undermine 
President Bakiyev's government; and Tajikistan owes its 
existence and its current leaders solely to Russia.  This is not 
"black propaganda," like usually appears in the Russian press: 
it's a mostly sober political analysis and policy assertion. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  From time to time, Post has reported examples of Russian 
disinformation and "black propaganda" that floods the Central 
Asian information space.  This article (full text in para four 
below) from the official Russian military newspaper, "Krasnaya 
Zvezda" ["Red Star"], is qualitatively different from previous 
examples because it is a relatively sober analysis that asserts, 
country by country (except for Turkmenistan) how much Moscow 
"owns" Central Asia, and what remains to be done to sew it up 
for good.  Embassy Dushanbe suggests it is important that U.S. 
Posts in the former Soviet Union, Washington analysts, and other 
addressees, be aware of this important article. 
 
¶3.  The article, with the byline Vladimir Mokhov interviewing 
pundit Andrei Grozin and headlined "Asia is Subtle," was 
published July 25.  It asserts, "Central Asian states are still 
within the orbit of Russia's political, military-political, and 
economic influence.  And Russia must not stop there; it needs to 
continue building up its influence in all the areas of 
activity."  The author asserts the following: 
 
KAZAKHASTAN:  Because the country is rich and has $11 billion in 
U.S. foreign investment, it can afford to attempt a balanced 
foreign policy; but, in fact, Nazarbayev is reliably in the 
Kremlin's camp. 
 
TAJIKISTAN:  President Emomali Rahmonov's attempt to pursue a 
Tajjk version of multi-directional ["open-door"] foreign policy 
isn't very far-sighted.  In terms of its economic, demographic, 
intellectual, defensive, and other resources, Tajikistan is 
nowhere near equal to Kazakhstan.  It's a much more vulnerable 
and less self-sufficient state.  In the final analysis, 
Tajikistan owes its existence - within its current borders and 
with its current political elites - entirely to Russia. 
(COMMENT:  Dushanbe, which closely monitors the Russian press, 
will see this as an assertion that President Rahmonov serves at 
the pleasure of the Kremlin.  END COMMENT.) 
 
UZBEKISTAN:  [When] the West started portraying Karimov as some 
sort of "mad dog," Russian companies and politicians gained a 
window of opportunity for expanding cooperation with Uzbekistan. 
 
KYRGYZSTAN:  The Bishkek government's statement announcing the 
expulsion of two U.S. diplomats says plainly this decision was 
made on the basis of intelligence reports from the Kyrgyz 
special services, which repeatedly caught the Americans 
interfering in Kyrgyzstan's internal affairs.  According to some 
accounts, they were establishing a spy network in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, where Kyrgyz intelligence predicts an outbreak of 
radical activity at the end of this summer.  Although the U.S. 
Embassy in Kyrgyzstan has denied all allegations, there's 
obviously no smoke without fire. 
 
CONCLUSION:  Central Asian states are still within the orbit of 
Russia's political, military-political, and economic influence. 
And Russia must not stop there: it needs to continue building up 
its influence in all areas of activity.  One reason to do this 
 
DUSHANBE 00001440  002.3 OF 005 
 
 
is to minimize the possibility of any further American military 
facilities being established in Central Asia, whatever they may 
be called:  training centers for local military personnel, 
points for monitoring the Afghanistan drug-trafficking 
situation, or anything else.  One way or another, they would be 
military facilities controlled by the United States or NATO - 
our traditional geopolitical rivals. 
 
¶4.  BEGIN TEXT: 
 
The United States has completely abandoned its plans for a 
strategic partnership with Uzbekistan. Washington now describes 
the regime there as unacceptable and "undemocratic." The White 
House does not consider it necessary to engage in dialogue or 
bridge-building with the Uzbek regime; moreover, it expects that 
regime to be replaced as a result of socio-political upheavals. 
 
Uzbekistan has not lived up to the expectations of the US State 
Department and the Pentagon. But was it ever capable of doing so? 
 
Andrei Grozin, head of the Central Asia and Kazakhstan 
department at the CIS Countries Institute: "Clearly, after what 
happened in Andijan in May of 2005, American strategists decided 
that Uzbekistan was dependent on them, so it could be pressured 
into agreeing to an 'international investigation' into the 
tragic Andijan events - thus bringing the Uzbek administration 
entirely under American control, or at least giving the United 
States substantial leverage." 
 
But President Islam Karimov refused to give in to pressure. 
Instead, he learned some appropriate lessons from what had 
happened. The Andijan events could hardly be described as 
another "revolution" in the former Soviet Union. This was more 
like an armed uprising in one particular city, with the prospect 
of instability spreading to adjacent cities and the entire 
Ferghana Valley. If the first and second phases of the Ferghana 
Valley power-grab attempt had succeeded, the rebels could have 
escalated the situation and overthrown the existing political 
regime, or at least attempted to proclaim some sort of 
independent state formation in the Ferghana Valley. 
 
In contrast to the West, Moscow and Beijing understood this - 
and in general, they did not condemn the resolute measures used 
to crush the revolt. Russia, for example, behaved quite 
rationally under the circumstances. By refraining from any 
active involvement, and accepting the Tashkent government's 
official account of events in Andijan, we not only maintained 
good relations with Karimov, but actually strengthened that 
relationship. What's more, while the West started portraying 
Karimov as some sort of "mad dog," Russian companies and 
politicians gained a window of opportunity for expanding 
cooperation with Uzbekistan. 
 
These opportunities have been developed successfully, as 
confirmed by Uzbekistan's decision to renew its membership of 
the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the 
gradual change in Tashkent's foreign policy priorities as it has 
re-entered Russia's sphere of influence. By the end of this 
year, Uzbekistan will have joined the dozens of agreements 
within the Euro-Asian Economic Community framework. Another 
logical development has been Uzbekistan's official request for 
Washington to withdraw its troops and hardware from the Khanabad 
airbase. 
 
But the United States was thrown out of Uzbekistan so fast that 
American military experts and State Department officials had to 
rewrite their Central Asia strategy on the fly. This strategy 
cannot be implemented without some new allies in the region. 
 
Washington is primarily focusing its attention on Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan. 
 
Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, has been visited by many 
 
DUSHANBE 00001440  003.3 OF 005 
 
 
American officials over the past six months - including 
high-level officials like Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
and Energy Secretary Sam Boden. Observers note that all of a 
sudden, as if by command, Washington officials have started 
expressing support for Kazakhstan's claims that it is a leader 
in the region. American officials had not been known to support 
such statements before.  Over the years of Kazakhstan's 
independence, the United States has invested just over $11 
billion there - primarily in hydrocarbon production. American 
transnational corporations hold very strong positions in 
Kazakhstan, stronger than in any other post-Soviet state in 
Central Asia. 
 
Note that none of the above applied to Uzbekistan. Of course, 
Taskhent was initially promised a great deal of investment, but 
this never materialized. American business projects in 
Uzbekistan weren't very large or substantial; they mostly 
concerned gold-mining, uranium-mining, and some other raw 
materials projects. 
 
Andrei Grozin: "The situation is completely different in 
Kazakhstan. In economic and investment terms, it is very 
dependent on the United States - much more than Uzbekistan was. 
After all, Kazakhstan's economy has been reformed to a far 
greater extent, and is more liberal. Consequently, it has long 
been tied to world energy markets, and that makes it far more 
vulnerable." 
 
So President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has consistently pursued 
a multi-directional foreign policy, finds it absolutely 
essential to maintain good relations with all of his large and 
influential neighbors, especially China and Russia, as well as 
with the West, especially the United States. Thus, on the one 
hand, Kazakhstan has recently decided to participate in the 
overtly anti-Russian Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project. 
On the other hand, when Nazarbayev attended the G8 summit in his 
capacity as CIS chairman, Kazakhstan agreed to sign a number of 
major energy project deals with Russia. The CIS Countries 
Institute maintains that Kazakhstan has always balanced on the 
boundary of the interests of various other countries, and seems 
likely to continue this policy. 
 
That applies to defense as well. Kazakhstan can probably be 
described as Russia's most consistent Central Asian ally in 
defense cooperation, participating actively in all CSTO measures 
- just as actively as it participates in NATO's Partnership for 
Peace. 
 
Astana doesn't reject Western aid either. The United States, for 
example, is spending substantial sums on infrastructure for 
Kazakhstan's marines on the shore of the Caspian Sea. The very 
same Kazakhstan battalion, now a brigade, has been equipped by 
the Americans and uses the Hummers they donated. Only the 
artillery is still Soviet- or Russian-made. 
 
Tajikistan was the main target of US Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld's visit to the region. The Americans make no secret of 
their vital interest in air corridors over Tajikistan and 
refuelling rights there. So there was some discussion of a 
substantial increase in NATO flights over Tajik territory, and 
allocating another airfield for NATO there. 
 
The Tajik government in Dushanbe is interested in additional 
revenues for its scanty budget - in the form of plentiful 
American dollars. Tajikistan is willing to take full advantage 
of its key geostrategic location in Central Asia. Moreover, 
Tajikistan fully approves of everything the Americans are doing 
in Afghanistan. The American presence there reduces the danger 
of terrorism from the south, allowing Tajikistan to get on with 
fortifying the Tajik-Afghan border. So Dushanbe's readiness to 
respond to Washington's requests has more to do with simply 
wanting to make money, rather than adopting a multi-directional 
foreign policy course.  Tajikistan hasn't found any other 
 
DUSHANBE 00001440  004.3 OF 005 
 
 
money-making opportunities so far. This seems to be the sole 
explanation for current American-Tajik cooperation. 
 
Some experts maintain that Tajikistan is talking of a 
multi-directional foreign policy partly because its hopes of 
attracting substantial investment from Russia haven't yet been 
fulfilled. So this is a way of putting pressure on Russian 
companies which have discussed plans for a number of major 
projects in Tajikistan.  Chief among these companies is RAO 
Unified Energy Systems (RAO UES). 
 
Andrei Grozin: "But Anatoly Chubais's company has some equally 
large projects in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, in my view, there's 
obviously some bargaining going on here - these two post-Soviet 
republics have a monopoly on water resources in Central Asia, 
and it's a question of deciding which one of them will be the 
priority partner." 
 
It's no secret that some of America's intellectual elite have 
been floating the idea of a "Greater Central Asia" project over 
the past six months. When Rumsfeld visited Dushanbe, he noted 
once again that there is a great deal of scope for energy 
projects in American-Tajik cooperation. American corporations 
could invest $1.5-2 billion in these projects over the next few 
years. RAO UES CEO Anatoly Chubais was mentioning similar 
figures for potential Russian investment in Tajikistan. But the 
Tajiks seem more inclined to believe the Americans, rather than 
Chubais. 
 
Russian border guards have left Tajikistan; Russia's 201st 
Division, which recently became a military base, has been asked 
to relocate from central Dushanbe to the outskirts. According to 
some observers, these developments indicate that Tajikistan is 
trying to distance itself from Russia, or at least show Russia 
its place, to some extent. 
 
Andrei Grozin: "President Emomali Rakhmonov's attempt to pursue 
a Tajik version of multi-directional policy isn't very 
far-sighted, in my view. In terms of its economic, demographic, 
intellectual, defensive, and other resources, Tajikistan is 
nowhere near equal to Kazakhstan. It's a much more vulnerable 
and less self-sufficient state. In the final analysis, 
Tajikistan owes its existence - within its current borders and 
with its current political elites - entirely to Russia." 
 
One of the few post-Soviet states to resist American dominance 
is Kyrgyzstan. Washington has been somewhat annoyed by President 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev independent stance in deciding his foreign 
policy direction. This annoyance peaked when Bakiyev made a 
much-publicized statement about the presence of America's 
[former Uzbekistan] Khansi airbase being unwelcome in 
Kyrgyzstan. Some experts maintain that the statement was 
political: Kyrgyzstan's new administration wants to restrict 
Washington's influence on its domestic policy-making. 
 
Observers link the same factor to Kyrgyzstan's recent expulsion 
of two American diplomats, declared personae non grata.  The 
Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry's statement says plainly that this 
decision was made on the basis of intelligence reports from the 
Kyrgyz special services, which repeatedly caught the Americans 
interfering in Kyrgyzstan's internal affairs. According to some 
accounts, they were establishing a spy network in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, where Kyrgyz intelligence predicts an outbreak of 
radical activity at the end of this summer. Although the US 
Embassy in Kyrgyzstan has denied all allegations, there's 
obviously no smoke without fire. 
 
This diplomatic scandal had a negative impact on American-Kyrgyz 
negotiations regarding terms for the Pentagon's lease on an 
airbase at the Manas International Airport. These talks have 
been under way for several months. The Americans will have to 
pay up - unless they want to lose their strategic bridgehead in 
Kyrgyzstan like they lost the one in Uzbekistan. Most likely, 
 
DUSHANBE 00001440  005.3 OF 005 
 
 
they'll also have to restrain their zeal in imposing the Western 
model of democracy on Kyrgyz society. 
 
Andrei Grozin: "Kyrgyzstan's 'willfulness' is due to a 
combination of various factors. I get the impression that 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev is gradually bringing the situation in 
Kyrgyzstan under control. At any rate, the unrestrained 
lawlessness observed only six months ago - the bacchanalia that 
continued for a few months after the revolution - is now gone. 
The central authorities are gradually establishing control over 
unruly regions. Life is slowly returning to normal, more or 
less. The economy is doing relatively well, for a country which 
has experienced such cataclysms." 
 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev's initial demand was $200 million a year for 
use of the airbase. Obviously, the United States could easily 
afford that. It could afford much more. In principle, the 
Pentagon's budget would cover it. According to recent reports, 
the two sides seem to have agreed on $150 million. One way or 
another, this is a lot of money for Kyrgyzstan, which is a 
fairly poor country, lacking minerals or other resources; it 
would amount to about a third of Kyrgyzstan's annual budget 
revenues. So the Kyrgyz government does have something to fight 
for. 
 
Over the past 12-18 months, Russia has gone on the offensive in 
Central Asia. Compared to the preceding five years, the heights 
reached there by Gazprom, LUKoil, RAO UES, some defense 
enterprises, mobile communications operators, and even large 
retail networks show that our country is making a comeback to 
the region. But it's coming back as a reliable economic partner, 
not a politically dominant forces. As the economists put it: 
banks are better than tanks. 
 
Andrei Grozin: "Central Asia is still dependent on Russia to a 
considerable extent. For this region our country means trade 
routes, a market for surplus labor, and a market for a 
substantial proportion of the raw materials that come from 
Central Asia, including exports across Russian territory." 
 
But the "tanks" should not be overlooked either. Russia remains 
the leading supplier of arms and military hardware to Central 
Asian countries (some of it at concessional prices for members 
of the CSTO). The overwhelming majority of future officers are 
trained in Russia. For example, Kazakhstan has over 700 
officer cadets studying at Russian military education 
institutions, while only about a hundred are studying in Western 
Europe and the United States. This is an obvious example of how 
closely Kazakhstan cooperates with the Russian Federation. In 
principle, the same can be said for other Central Asian states. 
 
Moreover, there are the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. There are associations within these influential 
international organizations: the Regional Anti-Terrorism Center 
(within the SCO) and the CSTO Regional Coalition Group in 
Central Asia. In other words, Central Asian states are still 
within the orbit of Russia's political, military-political, and 
economic influence. And Russia must not stop there; it needs to 
continue building up its influence in all the areas of activity. 
 
One reason to do this is in order to minimize the possibility of 
any further American military facilities being established in 
Central Asia, whatver they may be called: training centers for 
local military personnel, points for monitoring the Afghanistan 
drug-trafficking sitation, or anything else. One way or another, 
they would be military facilities controlled by the United 
States or NATO - our traditional geopolitical rivals. 
 
END TEXT. 
Hoagland