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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
PACOM FOR POLAD 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
USUN FOR GORDON OLSON AND RICHARD MCCURRY 
DEPT FOR IO, EAP/MTS 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/25/2016 
TAGS: KPKO PREL PGOV KJUS UN AU TT
SUBJECT: CONTINUED TENSIONS OVER NATIONAL POLICE REINTEGRATION 
 
REF: DILI 352 
 
DILI 00000381  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political Officer, Embassy 
Dili, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Tensions have continued in recent weeks 
between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Minister of 
Interior, Alcino Barris, regarding how to handle the 
reintegration of East Timor's national police (the PNTL).  Each 
have presented proposals with competing approaches and 
priorities, with the AFP arguing for a thorough vetting of all 
police officers to precede reintegration, and the Minister 
pushing for an expedited process to get police back on the job 
quickly.  There are several underlying reasons for this 
continued tension, including fundamentally differing views on 
the state of the PNTL, different immediate priorities, and 
cultural differences undermining effective communication between 
the two.  There have been some recent indications that a 
compromise approach may yet emerge, possibly to involve very 
limited PNTL operations in advance of complete vetting.  How 
this issue is handled in the coming weeks and months will have 
potentially serious implications both for short and long-term 
stability in East Timor.  End summary. 
 
Competing proposals for police reintegration 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶2. (C/NF) There has been a continuing stalemate between the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Minister of Interior, 
Alcino Barris, (see reftel) over recent weeks in regard to the 
question of when and how to bring the National Police (PNTL) 
back to work in Dili.  In early July, the AFP presented a plan 
for PNTL reintegration, which involved extensive vetting of all 
members of the PNTL before they could start working again in 
Dili.  Barris reportedly objected both to the manner in which 
the AFP presented their plan, reportedly framing it as a 
directive rather than consulting with the Minister in advance, 
and to what he deemed to be excessive requirements before any 
police could return to work in the capital.  He presented his 
own counter proposal emphasizing much faster vetting to be 
conducted by a Ministry-led commission.  An impasse ensued as 
Barris made moves to constitute his commission while AFP 
Commander Steve Lancaster relayed to Emboff that if PNTL began 
working without a process of which he approved, the AFP would 
disarm them and remove them from operations. 
 
¶3. (C/NF) Last week there appeared to be some moves towards 
compromise as the AFP presented a revised proposal that 
Commander Lancaster said incorporated elements of Barris' 
proposal.  However, according to one of Barris' advisors, the 
presentation of the new proposal was accompanied by significant 
pressure on Barris to sign off immediately.  Barris refused 
pending additional changes, and the plan is to be reviewed again 
this week.  (Note: While international policing is being 
conducted by police from all four contributing international 
forces, the AFP has taken the lead regarding the reintegration 
issues.  The other international police forces reportedly are 
remaining neutral on the issue.  End note.) 
 
The view from AFP 
----------------- 
¶4. (C/NF) In conversations Emboffs have had with representatives 
on both sides of the issue, it is clear that the two 
institutions have very different assessments of the state of the 
PNTL.  The AFP views the PNTL as essentially have disintegrated 
during the recent unrest, beginning with their ineffective 
response to the April 28 riots and culminating in their 
disappearance from law enforcement duties during the violence of 
May 23-25.  Perhaps more importantly, the AFP believe the PNTL 
not only failed in carrying out their duties, but also 
participated in the recent violence.  They point to the many 
allegations of various police elements being involved in the 
late May fighting as well as participating in the mob violence 
 
DILI 00000381  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
that overtook Dili thereafter.  The AFP therefore believes that 
only a thorough vetting of all PNTL members, will address both 
the issue of professional capacity as well as allegations of 
wrong doing.  They see the Minister's push for a faster process 
as reflecting an inclination to avoid genuine accountability and 
reinstitute the same failed institution. 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Meanwhile, the AFP's present priority is not on the 
PNTL at all, but rather on the successful establishment of 
international police operations in Dili.  As of July 17, 
international police have taken over full responsibility for 
city security from military forces for 15 hours a day and are 
working towards 24-hour coverage.  From this perspective, the 
AFP regards the issue of PNTL integration as potentially 
diverting resources and energy from their primary mission.  AFP 
Commander Lancaster has stated that they are in no hurry to 
begin working with PNTL officers they regard as discredited and 
inexperienced.  Moreover, he describes Minister Barris' emphasis 
on bringing the PNTL on board quickly as complicating, and in 
some cases obstructing, operational needs.  One example he notes 
is Barris' resistance to allowing the AFP to take over the PNTL 
headquarters.  In addition, he said that Barris has attempted to 
circumvent coordination with international police to force a 
rapid return of the PNTL to Dili, in one instance by declaring 
that PNTL would immediately begin co-patrolling with the 
Malaysian police.  Lancaster expressed his resentment on these 
issues, stating they distract from immediate policing needs. 
 
The view from the Minister of Interior and PNTL 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶6. (C/NF) While Minister Barris acknowledges the need to screen 
police before returning them to full duties in Dili, he does not 
see the PNTL as the failed institution described by the AFP. 
Rather, he notes that a small number of police officers were 
involved in the recent unrest, but that these officers are 
already well known both within the police and in the community 
at large.  Moreover, he points out that several hundred of the 
Dili-based police force, probably more than half, have 
registered at PNTL headquarters and are waiting for the 
opportunity to return to work.  He therefore believes that with 
some basic screening procedures, the majority of the Dili PNTL 
could be back to work quickly.  Also, in recent conversations he 
has stated his belief that the internally displaced people 
(IDPs) need to see the PNTL back on streets to feel safe before 
returning to their neighborhoods. 
 
¶7. (C/NF) The Minister, as well as his two international 
advisors who are both long-term reliable contacts of the 
Embassy, also complained that the AFP's approach to working with 
the PNTL has been overly directive, with relatively little 
genuine consultation in advance of decisions.  One of his 
advisors stated to Emboff that the current AFP plan for PNTL 
reintegration is in fact very good, but that it will fail if 
implemented because it does not address or account for cultural 
issues and will be resented and undermineQver the long term as 
a result. 
 
¶8. (C/NF) Sources within both the ministry and the police have 
described to Emboffs what they view as arrogance and disrespect 
on the part of the AFP.  They note that the police remaining at 
the headquarters are not acknowledged as colleagues and are 
instead treated by the AFP as incompetent.  An American UN 
police advisor worried that the police are being progressively 
demoralized by not being allowed to operate in Dili, having all 
their equipment confiscated, and prohibited from appearing in 
public in uniform.  One example that particularly rankled some 
police was the AFP refusal to permit officers to wear their 
uniforms to the funeral of a colleague killed during the May 25 
police massacre. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Views regarding the process needed before PNTL can 
return to work also vary significantly among the police 
 
DILI 00000381  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
themselves.  Some, such as Ismael Babo, the Deputy Commissioner 
for Operations who was closely aligned with discredited former 
Minister of Interior Lobato, conveyed to Emboffs that the blame 
for the recent crisis lay entirely with the F-FDTL.  He strongly 
implied that no specific PNTL vetting or review process was 
necessary and that the police could return to work in Dili 
immediately.  Others, including those at the headquarters who 
are predominately from the West as well as the higher-ranking 
eastern police who remain outside of Dili, argue strongly that a 
thorough vetting and reconciliation process should precede a 
return to normal policing. 
 
Room for compromise? 
-------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) UN police have also been discussing possible approaches 
to the vetting and reintegration issue.  One UN police 
representative recently relayed to us that a "win-win" solution 
that addresses the concerns of both international police and the 
Ministry is in the works.  This would involve a fast track 
process to get PNTL back to work in the short term, but with 
limited powers, followed by a thorough vetting process that will 
most likely be conducted by the police component of the next UN 
mission.  In the short term, the most likely solution would be 
for PNTL to operate unarmed and conduct joint patrols with 
international police. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Since his swearing in on July 10, Prime Minister Jose 
Ramos-Horta has become more involved in the police issue, 
meeting with both AFP Commander Lancaster and Minister Barris on 
a regular basis.  The involvement of the Prime Minister's office 
is viewed as a positive development by both and should continue 
to help the move the negotiations forward.  In recent 
conversations with Ramos-Horta, he stated that he is not getting 
involved in the details, but trying to sQthe overall 
direction.  He emphasized, however, that his approach is 
generally to defer to the AFP and to encourage the MOI to 
cooperate with them. 
 
¶11. (C/NF) Comment: The issue of how to handle the PNTL in Dili 
has potentially serious implications both for short and 
long-term stability.  Too much delay in the reintegration 
process will likely lead to an increasingly unhappy and restless 
PNTL, and alienation between PNTL officers and their Australian 
counterparts would negatively impact their future working 
relationship.  On the other hand, bringing the PNTL back into 
action precipitously would leave grave doubts about PNTL 
involvement in the May-June violence that wracked Dili and 
compromise public confidence in police impartiality in 
protecting Dili's communities as displaced persons return home. 
Given these concerns, the idea of a two-stage reintegration 
beginning with co-patrolling with international police may be 
the only way to give the PNTL some visibility and credibility as 
an active force in Dili, without compromising the longer term 
need for a full review and vetting process.  End comment. 
WHITMAN