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PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0372/01 2000015
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190015Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2811
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0617
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0690
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0608
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0446
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0471
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0547
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0341
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2138

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KPKO UN PO AU TT
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER RAMOS HORTA'S LATEST VIEWS 
 
REF: DILI 368 
 
DILI 00000372  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In several conversations with Ambassador and 
Emboffs following his swearing in as East Timor's new Prime 
Minister, Jose Ramos Horta shared his views on some issues 
facing his government. Among the subjects addressed were: his 
delicate working relationship with the Fretilin party; his plan 
to establish a civil society council and a strategic planning 
group to advise his government; his intention to withdraw the 
criminal defamation portion of the penal code and to provide 
support to media development; his thoughts on the election law 
currently under review; and his recommendations regarding the 
the operational security and police training components of the 
next UN mission. Although Ramos-Horta has a clear vision of what 
needs to be done to turn around the fragile political situation, 
it remains to be seen to what extent this legendary 
international negotiator will prevail in moving hard-line 
Fretilin members to a more practical and inclusive approach to 
governance. End summary. 
 
Working with Fretilin 
--------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) One of the key challenges facing Ramos Horta in the 
coming weeks and months will be working with the ruling Fretilin 
party whose representatives have clearly indicated that they 
consider this a Fretilin government bound to implement the 
party's policies. In a conversation with Ambassador Rees 
immediately following his swearing in, Ramos Horta noted that he 
would have liked to have made many more changes to the 
composition of the cabinet but that the party "remains in 
control of cabinet appointments~it's only fair, they still have 
the majority in Parliament." (See reftel for discussion of 
cabinet appointments.) However, in the same conversation he 
noted adamantly that "my judgment is final" on policy decisions, 
although he will be in regular discussions with Fretilin's 
Political Committee. 
 
Plans for civil society council and strategic planning group 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
¶3. (SBU) Ramos Horta relayed to us his plans to establish two 
bodies to assist in advising and the government and shaping 
future policy development. First, he wants to establish a civil 
society council, comprising representatives of the Catholic 
Church, non-governmental organizations, the media, and other 
civil society organizations. The role of the council would be to 
review and advise on all major government decisions, with 
particular emphasis on decisions with wide social impact. In 
describing this concept, Ramos Horta remarked that civil society 
has felt shut out of government deliberations and the council 
would begin to remedy this complaint. A second body that he 
plans to establish is a strategic planning group. His 
explanation of the precise function of this group remains 
somewhat general at this time, but the overall idea is to hire a 
group of consultants who could provide policy and public 
outreach direction, particularly on economic development issues. 
 
Criminal defamation to be withdrawn from penal code; 
government support of media development 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶4. (SBU) In several conversations Ramos Horta has stated his 
unambiguous intent to resubmit the penal code with the sections 
criminalizing defamation withdrawn.  He noted that he might 
support criminalizing defamation if East Timor, and especially 
its media sector, were significantly more developed. However, he 
noted that criminal defamation is particularly inappropriate for 
the current stage of media development. In this vein, Ramos 
Horta spoke of his intent to provide greater material support to 
media organizations if possible within the budget. Examples of 
the kinds of support that might be included were salary 
subsidies and support to provide for free distribution of 
newspapers around the country. He also wants to start a monthly 
government "lift-out" section in papers to educate the public 
about government policies while providing additional support to 
the papers. Finally, he stated that there should be a new law 
stipulating that the government cannot financially punish 
 
DILI 00000372  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
papers, for example by withdrawing advertising, because of 
differences in opinion. 
 
Election law 
------------ 
¶5. (SBU) On the subject of the election law, a draft of which 
was produced by the Alkatiri government and is currently under 
review by Parliament, Ramos Horta stated that he will insist on 
broad consultations. While he expressed equanimity regarding the 
resubmission of the Alkatiri government's version by the 
Fretilin bench in Parliament, he noted that he has some specific 
disagreements with the contents that "must be worked out." In 
particular, he noted the current draft law's provisions for 
providing funding support to parties based on the proportion of 
seats they have in Parliament. He stated that while there could 
be some proportionality in this support, it should not be so 
directly proportional as this would clearly unfairly benefit the 
majority Fretilin party. His suggested alternative is to either 
give an equal amount to each party, or to have a proportional 
system with a set minimum and maximum to reduce the discrepancy 
between parties. 
 
The next UN mission 
------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) In discussing his current views of the next UN mission, 
Ramos Horta emphasized that he still wants at least one 
battalion of Peace Keepers in addition to the policing 
operation. While noting that Peace Keepers were not strictly 
necessary for day-to-day security needs, he believes that the 
symbolism would be very important and that they would provide a 
potentially vital rapid reaction back up capability. On the 
policing operation, he still believes that it will be necessary 
to have around 1,000 on the ground. He emphasized that he wants 
the Portuguese National Republican Guard (GNR) to play as big a 
role as possible in this operation. He said that the population 
like and respect the GNR and believe they are the most effective 
international police operating here. He also believes there is a 
role for the GNR in police training, noting that the Australian 
training program has been good but that the GNR have also been 
working on training plans and could make a valuable contribution. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Separately, Ramos Horta expressed to the Ambassador 
that he hopes that Ian Martin will be the next SRSG, remarking 
that the current SRSG Sukehiro Hasegawa "has experience in 
development but not in politics." 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: Under the Constitution the Prime Minister 
merely "proposes" cabinet members and the President has 
discretion about whether to "appoint." It seems unlikely that 
the Fretilin inner circle would have agreed to the appointment 
of Fretilin reformer Jose Luis Guterres as Foreign Minister if 
they had as much control as Ramos-Horta has suggested. However, 
other changes and retentions in the Cabinet, such as the 
decision not to abolish the five regional Secretary of State 
positions suggest that Ramos-Horta deferred to the Fretilin 
leadership except when he had a particularly strong opinion. 
Ramos-Horta's belief that he, not the Fretilin committee, has 
ultimate authority over matters of policy is notable. His 
decision to reintroduce the penal code without the controversial 
criminal defamation provision, a pet project of former Prime 
Minister Alkatiri, suggests that he really means this. An even 
more important test of Ramos-Horta's asserted authority over 
policy will be whether he succeeds in changing the election law 
to meet his own specifications, which conform closely to those 
of United Nations experts, opposition parties, and civil 
society, but not very closely to the views of Fretilin 
leadership. Never so much as now has East Timor's ability to 
move forward as a truly participatory democracy depended on 
Ramos-Horta's legendary negotiating skills. 
DICKEY