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FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4256
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 3016
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0013
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0149
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0054
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCQSOC/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 001089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2026 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL EAID
SUBJECT: (CORRECTED COPY) CT IN HORN OF AFRICA; RESULTS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MAY 23-24 RSI CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission D. Purnell Delly, Reasons 
1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
 ¶1. (S REL AUS UK CAN)  SUMMARY:  U.S. Chiefs of Mission and 
other Mission representatives from Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen, 
Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sudan met in Nairobi May 23-24 to 
discuss regional counterterrorism strategy with 
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism Hank Crumpton, 
Commander CJTF-HOA Admiral Richard Hunt, and other senior 
U.S. interagency representatives.  The third of its kind in 
a geographic region, this Regional Strategic Initiative 
(RSI) meeting sought to promote a coordinated regional CT 
strategy for the Horn of Africa, maximizing efforts of all 
USG agencies including CENTCOM, CJTF-HOA, USAID and the 
National Counterterrorism Center.  The COMs found it 
impossible to agree on an overarching regional 
counterterrorism strategy because there was no consensus on 
Somalia-specific recommendations.  There was, however, 
general agreement by all present that the following elements 
would be valuable components of a regional counterterrorism 
strategy for the Horn of Africa: 
 
1) establishing comprehensive programs to eliminate 
regional terrorist safe havens (both actual and potential), 
and to address social-economic-political conditions that 
terrorists exploit; 
 
2) building international partnerships to support these 
goals 
 
¶2. (S REL AUS UK CAN) Key programs Chiefs of Mission 
endorsed were: strengthened Rule of Law programs in each of 
the countries of the region; greater Muslim outreach programs 
including an immediate increase of quick return, 
high-visibility assistance programs such as the Ambassador,s 
Self-help Program; and programs to limit terrorist mobility 
by enhancing border and coastal security.  Follow-up meetings 
in the coming months, as well as a Regional (CT) Program Plan 
being drafted by AmEmbassy Dar Es Salaam in coordination with 
other Missions and their country teams, will measure progress 
on these objectives and ensure continued focus on a common 
regional CT strategy. END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
TERRORIST THREAT IN THE HORN 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S REL AUS UK CAN)  Chiefs of Mission agreed that the 
Ogaden, the Eastleigh neighborhood in Nairobi, and the 
Swahili Coast including Tanzania were low-level or potential 
terrorist safe havens.  Parts of Yemen could be termed proto 
safe havens. Somalia is the epicenter of terrorist activity 
in the region, an active safe haven qualitatively different 
from others in the world because it overlays a failed state. 
The al Qaida presence in Mogadishu is part of a larger 
network, al Qaida East Africa (AQEA), which maintains 
operatives, facilitators and associates in Somalia, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Djibouti, Ethiopia and probably Sudan and Eritrea. 
AQEA has close ties to al Qaida core leadership in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan, and has links to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen and appears to be funded by sources in these 
countries as well as the Somali diaspora. 
 
¶4.  (S REL AUS UK CAN)  Kenya and Djibouti are primary attack 
venues. The Kenyan AQ cell is rebuilding after the release 
from Kenyan custody of key AQ operative Aboud Rogo.  We are 
unsure of the AQ presence in Ethiopia, but AQ operatives may 
attempt to take advantage of grievances and instability 
resulting from the ongoing insurgency in the Ogaden.  Yemen 
serves as a source country for terrorists and a transit point 
for people and weapons. The government has had considerable 
success in tackling terrorist leadership, but has had little 
success in dampening the spread of radical Islam. The 
Government views instability in Somalia as the biggest 
cross-border threat to Yemen.   However, the fragility of 
the Yemeni government remains a serious concern. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
STRATEGIC GOAL ONE:  ELIMINATING TERRORIST SAFE HAVEN 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶5. (S REL AUS UK CAN)  A key objective of regional CT 
programs must be to deny terrorists the ability to conduct 
military training, plan operations, recruit, and transit 
within the region.  Such programs must further, over the 
long term, create the social-political-economic conditions 
and underlying stability inimical to terrorist networks. 
COMS also noted the importance of following through on 
promised programs, quick delivery, and personal diplomacy 
(meaning that short TDYs were less effective and language 
ability essential). Chiefs of Mission noted the importance 
of "changing the conversation" about current events in 
Somalia away from fighting in Mogadishu to positive U.S. 
steps to support the TFG and restore Somali institutions. 
Specifically, the group recommended: 
 
Immediate 
--------- 
A) Immediately increase budget for high-impact, 
quick-delivery assistance programs in safe haven areas 
across the region (including the Swahili Coast and 
Tanzania), particularly: 
 
-- the Ambassador's Self-help Program in RSI participant 
countries.  This program enjoyed considerable success under 
the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (FY03-04); and 
 
-- CJTF-HOA civil affairs (CA) programs in RSI participant 
countries, including Tanzania.  COMs urged closer integration 
of CA teams with USAID and other Embassy elements, possibly 
to include interagency-led CA programs in the future 
 
B) Increase Muslim outreach efforts, focusing on areas of 
instability: 
 
-- Upgrade VOA programming in the Horn.  In addition to 
countering an extremely successful jihadist propaganda 
campaign, the restoration of Somali language programming 
after a nine-year hiatus would have an important symbolic 
effect. 
 
--"Add Zeroes" to existing successful programs (e.g. 
program not 8 but 80 International Visitors).  Increase 
regional programming coordination to achieve economies of 
scale with American speakers and other programs. 
 
-- Chiefs of Mission expressed interest in partnership with 
private organizations;  e.g., a State Department-sponsored 
effort to connect American Muslims with their East African 
counterparts, perhaps by connecting U.S. mosques or Islamic 
Associations to East African counterparts.  COMs suggested 
such partnerships were a potential area for exploration by 
U/S Hughes, Brain Trust. 
 
-- Chiefs of Mission also noted the importance of calibrating 
programs so that Muslim communities did not perceive that 
the USG was bearing down on them. 
 
Specific Short-term Recommendations Included: 
 
A) Increase collection and analytical efforts to "map" the 
East African safe haven, to include Somalia as a whole, as 
well as tertiary safe havens of the Somali Coast, tribal 
areas in Yemen, the Ogaden, and Eastleigh, noting both 
potential sources of extremism and potential USG partners, 
extremists, funding sources, Saudi and other foreign 
influence, and potential new safe havens if the primary 
safe haven in Mogadishu is eliminated.  We also need 
additional information on activities of the Somali 
diaspora, particularly in the U.S. and Europe.  We need to 
overlay GIS data with information from the Somalia Aid 
Coordinating Body; 
 
B) Engaging all regional embassies in reporting on and 
providing local government views on how to deal with 
terrorism in the Horn and in Somalia.  One possibility is to 
provide Somalia watcher positions at all regional embassies, 
including locally engaged staff. 
 
 
Short to Medium Term 
-------------------- 
A) Improve Rule of Law programs throughout the region, 
focusing on police and prosecutorial training, 
implementation of effective CT legislation, regional legal 
cooperation (e.g. Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition 
treaties between Horn countries), assistance to TFG efforts 
to draft a constitution for Somalia, and prisons. 
 
B) Improving land and maritime border control and port 
security is key to restricting terrorist travel and to 
developing regional prosperity.  Coordinated international 
donor and U.S. interagency assistance could facilitate host 
nation controls over the Gulf of Aden and Somali and 
Swahili coasts, significant areas of terrorist transit, 
piracy, and arms and human trafficking. Potential programs 
include: 
 
--Department of Homeland Security, including its Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Coast Guard 
could assist host nations with training programs for local 
border officials to improve monitoring and interdiction of 
terrorists.  Training should include officials from across 
the region. 
 
--Immediate steps should be taken, facilitated by the U.S. 
military where appropriate, to encourage better cross-border 
cooperation between Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. 
 
--A regional ISPS Port Security Training Program conducted 
in the IMO Regional Office in Mombassa would make an 
important contribution to border security. (Potential 
funding sources: S/CT, EB, INL, and AF) 
 
--Chiefs of Mission also recommended increased TIP/PISCES 
funding to fully implement and interconnect programs in 
countries in the region. 
 
C)  Participants acknowledged both the urgency and the 
difficulty of encouraging better intelligence sharing 
between countries in the region. 
 
Somalia Specific Recommendations included: 
 
A) One program which should be funded immediately is USG 
assistance to the Government of Kenya to help speed up 
Kenyan training of Somali police.  The Kenyans have 
sponsored 200 Somalis, participation in police training in 
Kenya and have offered to train a total of 5,000, but lack 
the resources to do so. (Potential funding source:  S/CT 
ATA funds).  Chiefs of Mission noted that these programs 
would provide important governance as well as CT benefits, 
particularly in countries with poor human rights and 
corruption records.  Potential international partners 
include UNODC and the International Association of 
Prosecutors. 
 
B) USAID noted and Chiefs of Mission agreed that Rule of Law 
programs were extraordinarily difficult to implement in 
Somalia when, for example, Somali primary school enrollment 
was only 20%.  Chiefs of Mission strongly supported USAID,s 
request for $20 million in FY-07 funds for programs focused 
on Muslim youth in the region to address the conditions 
that terrorists exploit. 
 
Long Term 
--------- 
-- Expand development assistance programs to address the 
underlying conditions for terrorist recruitment.  Such 
activities would include: working with governments to help 
them become more effective and responsive to citizens' 
needs; helping governments better respond to social service 
needs, particularly in the areas of education, health, and 
sanitation; and rehabilitating basic infrastructure 
associated with such service delivery. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
STRATEGIC GOAL TWO: ENCOURAGE REGIONAL 
 
AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S REL AUS UK CAN) We should facilitate regional and 
international cooperation to restore political stability in 
troubled areas of the Horn (especially Somalia), stem the 
tide of Islamic radicalism, and eliminate environments 
conducive to hatred and violence throughout the region. 
Such cooperation may include coordination through the Arab 
League to establish links with moderate Islamic bodies, 
cooperation with the UN on reconciliation efforts inside 
Somalia, and work with IGAD countries plus Tanzania to 
develop necessary regional support mechanisms for the TFIs. 
Chiefs of Mission noted that African peacekeeping 
assistance would likely be key to restoring Somalia's 
stability, but most African militaries lack the capacity 
to deploy there now, and there are sensitivities about 
which African countries may participate.  Chiefs of Mission 
discussed the impact of Ethiopian insurgencies on regional 
stability and safe havens, and the possibility of providing 
counterinsurgency training (including human rights training) 
to the GOE. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Chiefs of Mission agreed to meet again on the 
margins of the Africa COMs Conference in October and 
suggested AmEmbassy Asmara,s inclusion in future meetings. 
The next meeting will assess the regional terrorist threat, 
examine RSI efforts to date, and discuss the applicability 
of a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative 
(TS/CTI)-like program to the Horn of Africa.  Embassy Dar 
Es Salaam will draft a Regional (CT) Program Plan (a 
&Regional MPP8), with specific programs, timelines and 
metrics to measure the impact of programs on the terrorist 
enemy. S/CT will fund a meeting to finalize the draft if 
required. 
 
------------------------- 
¶8.  Meeting Participants 
------------------------- 
 
--Nairobi: Ambassador Mark Bellamy (did not clear); Chris 
Bane, Regional Affairs 
 
--Djibouti:  Ambassador Marguerita Ragsdale; Nicholas 
Siegel, Regional Affairs 
 
--Sanaa:  Ambassador Thomas Krajeski 
 
--Addis Ababa:  Charge Vicki Huddleston; Brent Bahl, 
Regional Affairs 
 
--Dar Es Salaam:  Charge Purnell Delly; Mark Andersen, 
Regional Affairs 
 
--Khartoum:  Keith Kelly, Regional Affairs 
 
--Department of State: S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Hank 
Crumpton; AF/FO Ambassador Don Yamamoto; Virginia Palmer, 
S/CT Deputy Coordinator; David Kilcullen, Chief Strategist; 
Eunice Reddick, Director, Office of East African Affairs 
 
--DOD:  Rear Admiral Rick Hunt, Commander CJTF-HOA; 
Brigadier General (Select) Mark Schissler, Joint Staff; 
Michael Dumont, Special Assistant, OSD OSD/SOLIC; Rear 
Admiral (Select) Ed Winters, SOCOM 
 
--NSA: Lonny Anderson 
 
--NCTC:  Carol Burans, Deputy Director, Strategic 
Operational Planning 
 
--CTC:  Edward Gistaro, Sarah Pease 
 
--CIA:  Stephan Milliken, Africa Division 
 
--DOJ: Carl Alexandre, Director, Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development Assistance and Training Office 
 
--USAID: Andrew Sisson, REDSO Director 
 
 
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