Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06DARESSALAAM1089, CORRECTED COPY) CT IN HORN OF AFRICA; RESULTS AND

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06DARESSALAAM1089.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DARESSALAAM1089 2006-07-03 10:11 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Dar Es Salaam
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDR #1089/01 1841011
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031011Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4256
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 3016
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0013
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0149
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0054
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCQSOC/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 001089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2026 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL EAID
SUBJECT: (CORRECTED COPY) CT IN HORN OF AFRICA; RESULTS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MAY 23-24 RSI CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission D. Purnell Delly, Reasons 
1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
 1. (S REL AUS UK CAN)  SUMMARY:  U.S. Chiefs of Mission and 
other Mission representatives from Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen, 
Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sudan met in Nairobi May 23-24 to 
discuss regional counterterrorism strategy with 
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism Hank Crumpton, 
Commander CJTF-HOA Admiral Richard Hunt, and other senior 
U.S. interagency representatives.  The third of its kind in 
a geographic region, this Regional Strategic Initiative 
(RSI) meeting sought to promote a coordinated regional CT 
strategy for the Horn of Africa, maximizing efforts of all 
USG agencies including CENTCOM, CJTF-HOA, USAID and the 
National Counterterrorism Center.  The COMs found it 
impossible to agree on an overarching regional 
counterterrorism strategy because there was no consensus on 
Somalia-specific recommendations.  There was, however, 
general agreement by all present that the following elements 
would be valuable components of a regional counterterrorism 
strategy for the Horn of Africa: 
 
1) establishing comprehensive programs to eliminate 
regional terrorist safe havens (both actual and potential), 
and to address social-economic-political conditions that 
terrorists exploit; 
 
2) building international partnerships to support these 
goals 
 
2. (S REL AUS UK CAN) Key programs Chiefs of Mission 
endorsed were: strengthened Rule of Law programs in each of 
the countries of the region; greater Muslim outreach programs 
including an immediate increase of quick return, 
high-visibility assistance programs such as the Ambassador,s 
Self-help Program; and programs to limit terrorist mobility 
by enhancing border and coastal security.  Follow-up meetings 
in the coming months, as well as a Regional (CT) Program Plan 
being drafted by AmEmbassy Dar Es Salaam in coordination with 
other Missions and their country teams, will measure progress 
on these objectives and ensure continued focus on a common 
regional CT strategy. END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
TERRORIST THREAT IN THE HORN 
---------------------------- 
 
3.  (S REL AUS UK CAN)  Chiefs of Mission agreed that the 
Ogaden, the Eastleigh neighborhood in Nairobi, and the 
Swahili Coast including Tanzania were low-level or potential 
terrorist safe havens.  Parts of Yemen could be termed proto 
safe havens. Somalia is the epicenter of terrorist activity 
in the region, an active safe haven qualitatively different 
from others in the world because it overlays a failed state. 
The al Qaida presence in Mogadishu is part of a larger 
network, al Qaida East Africa (AQEA), which maintains 
operatives, facilitators and associates in Somalia, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Djibouti, Ethiopia and probably Sudan and Eritrea. 
AQEA has close ties to al Qaida core leadership in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan, and has links to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen and appears to be funded by sources in these 
countries as well as the Somali diaspora. 
 
4.  (S REL AUS UK CAN)  Kenya and Djibouti are primary attack 
venues. The Kenyan AQ cell is rebuilding after the release 
from Kenyan custody of key AQ operative Aboud Rogo.  We are 
unsure of the AQ presence in Ethiopia, but AQ operatives may 
attempt to take advantage of grievances and instability 
resulting from the ongoing insurgency in the Ogaden.  Yemen 
serves as a source country for terrorists and a transit point 
for people and weapons. The government has had considerable 
success in tackling terrorist leadership, but has had little 
success in dampening the spread of radical Islam. The 
Government views instability in Somalia as the biggest 
cross-border threat to Yemen.   However, the fragility of 
the Yemeni government remains a serious concern. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
STRATEGIC GOAL ONE:  ELIMINATING TERRORIST SAFE HAVEN 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
5. (S REL AUS UK CAN)  A key objective of regional CT 
programs must be to deny terrorists the ability to conduct 
military training, plan operations, recruit, and transit 
within the region.  Such programs must further, over the 
long term, create the social-political-economic conditions 
and underlying stability inimical to terrorist networks. 
COMS also noted the importance of following through on 
promised programs, quick delivery, and personal diplomacy 
(meaning that short TDYs were less effective and language 
ability essential). Chiefs of Mission noted the importance 
of "changing the conversation" about current events in 
Somalia away from fighting in Mogadishu to positive U.S. 
steps to support the TFG and restore Somali institutions. 
Specifically, the group recommended: 
 
Immediate 
--------- 
A) Immediately increase budget for high-impact, 
quick-delivery assistance programs in safe haven areas 
across the region (including the Swahili Coast and 
Tanzania), particularly: 
 
-- the Ambassador's Self-help Program in RSI participant 
countries.  This program enjoyed considerable success under 
the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (FY03-04); and 
 
-- CJTF-HOA civil affairs (CA) programs in RSI participant 
countries, including Tanzania.  COMs urged closer integration 
of CA teams with USAID and other Embassy elements, possibly 
to include interagency-led CA programs in the future 
 
B) Increase Muslim outreach efforts, focusing on areas of 
instability: 
 
-- Upgrade VOA programming in the Horn.  In addition to 
countering an extremely successful jihadist propaganda 
campaign, the restoration of Somali language programming 
after a nine-year hiatus would have an important symbolic 
effect. 
 
--"Add Zeroes" to existing successful programs (e.g. 
program not 8 but 80 International Visitors).  Increase 
regional programming coordination to achieve economies of 
scale with American speakers and other programs. 
 
-- Chiefs of Mission expressed interest in partnership with 
private organizations;  e.g., a State Department-sponsored 
effort to connect American Muslims with their East African 
counterparts, perhaps by connecting U.S. mosques or Islamic 
Associations to East African counterparts.  COMs suggested 
such partnerships were a potential area for exploration by 
U/S Hughes, Brain Trust. 
 
-- Chiefs of Mission also noted the importance of calibrating 
programs so that Muslim communities did not perceive that 
the USG was bearing down on them. 
 
Specific Short-term Recommendations Included: 
 
A) Increase collection and analytical efforts to "map" the 
East African safe haven, to include Somalia as a whole, as 
well as tertiary safe havens of the Somali Coast, tribal 
areas in Yemen, the Ogaden, and Eastleigh, noting both 
potential sources of extremism and potential USG partners, 
extremists, funding sources, Saudi and other foreign 
influence, and potential new safe havens if the primary 
safe haven in Mogadishu is eliminated.  We also need 
additional information on activities of the Somali 
diaspora, particularly in the U.S. and Europe.  We need to 
overlay GIS data with information from the Somalia Aid 
Coordinating Body; 
 
B) Engaging all regional embassies in reporting on and 
providing local government views on how to deal with 
terrorism in the Horn and in Somalia.  One possibility is to 
provide Somalia watcher positions at all regional embassies, 
including locally engaged staff. 
 
 
Short to Medium Term 
-------------------- 
A) Improve Rule of Law programs throughout the region, 
focusing on police and prosecutorial training, 
implementation of effective CT legislation, regional legal 
cooperation (e.g. Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition 
treaties between Horn countries), assistance to TFG efforts 
to draft a constitution for Somalia, and prisons. 
 
B) Improving land and maritime border control and port 
security is key to restricting terrorist travel and to 
developing regional prosperity.  Coordinated international 
donor and U.S. interagency assistance could facilitate host 
nation controls over the Gulf of Aden and Somali and 
Swahili coasts, significant areas of terrorist transit, 
piracy, and arms and human trafficking. Potential programs 
include: 
 
--Department of Homeland Security, including its Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Coast Guard 
could assist host nations with training programs for local 
border officials to improve monitoring and interdiction of 
terrorists.  Training should include officials from across 
the region. 
 
--Immediate steps should be taken, facilitated by the U.S. 
military where appropriate, to encourage better cross-border 
cooperation between Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. 
 
--A regional ISPS Port Security Training Program conducted 
in the IMO Regional Office in Mombassa would make an 
important contribution to border security. (Potential 
funding sources: S/CT, EB, INL, and AF) 
 
--Chiefs of Mission also recommended increased TIP/PISCES 
funding to fully implement and interconnect programs in 
countries in the region. 
 
C)  Participants acknowledged both the urgency and the 
difficulty of encouraging better intelligence sharing 
between countries in the region. 
 
Somalia Specific Recommendations included: 
 
A) One program which should be funded immediately is USG 
assistance to the Government of Kenya to help speed up 
Kenyan training of Somali police.  The Kenyans have 
sponsored 200 Somalis, participation in police training in 
Kenya and have offered to train a total of 5,000, but lack 
the resources to do so. (Potential funding source:  S/CT 
ATA funds).  Chiefs of Mission noted that these programs 
would provide important governance as well as CT benefits, 
particularly in countries with poor human rights and 
corruption records.  Potential international partners 
include UNODC and the International Association of 
Prosecutors. 
 
B) USAID noted and Chiefs of Mission agreed that Rule of Law 
programs were extraordinarily difficult to implement in 
Somalia when, for example, Somali primary school enrollment 
was only 20%.  Chiefs of Mission strongly supported USAID,s 
request for $20 million in FY-07 funds for programs focused 
on Muslim youth in the region to address the conditions 
that terrorists exploit. 
 
Long Term 
--------- 
-- Expand development assistance programs to address the 
underlying conditions for terrorist recruitment.  Such 
activities would include: working with governments to help 
them become more effective and responsive to citizens' 
needs; helping governments better respond to social service 
needs, particularly in the areas of education, health, and 
sanitation; and rehabilitating basic infrastructure 
associated with such service delivery. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
STRATEGIC GOAL TWO: ENCOURAGE REGIONAL 
 
AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (S REL AUS UK CAN) We should facilitate regional and 
international cooperation to restore political stability in 
troubled areas of the Horn (especially Somalia), stem the 
tide of Islamic radicalism, and eliminate environments 
conducive to hatred and violence throughout the region. 
Such cooperation may include coordination through the Arab 
League to establish links with moderate Islamic bodies, 
cooperation with the UN on reconciliation efforts inside 
Somalia, and work with IGAD countries plus Tanzania to 
develop necessary regional support mechanisms for the TFIs. 
Chiefs of Mission noted that African peacekeeping 
assistance would likely be key to restoring Somalia's 
stability, but most African militaries lack the capacity 
to deploy there now, and there are sensitivities about 
which African countries may participate.  Chiefs of Mission 
discussed the impact of Ethiopian insurgencies on regional 
stability and safe havens, and the possibility of providing 
counterinsurgency training (including human rights training) 
to the GOE. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
7.  (C) Chiefs of Mission agreed to meet again on the 
margins of the Africa COMs Conference in October and 
suggested AmEmbassy Asmara,s inclusion in future meetings. 
The next meeting will assess the regional terrorist threat, 
examine RSI efforts to date, and discuss the applicability 
of a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative 
(TS/CTI)-like program to the Horn of Africa.  Embassy Dar 
Es Salaam will draft a Regional (CT) Program Plan (a 
&Regional MPP8), with specific programs, timelines and 
metrics to measure the impact of programs on the terrorist 
enemy. S/CT will fund a meeting to finalize the draft if 
required. 
 
------------------------- 
8.  Meeting Participants 
------------------------- 
 
--Nairobi: Ambassador Mark Bellamy (did not clear); Chris 
Bane, Regional Affairs 
 
--Djibouti:  Ambassador Marguerita Ragsdale; Nicholas 
Siegel, Regional Affairs 
 
--Sanaa:  Ambassador Thomas Krajeski 
 
--Addis Ababa:  Charge Vicki Huddleston; Brent Bahl, 
Regional Affairs 
 
--Dar Es Salaam:  Charge Purnell Delly; Mark Andersen, 
Regional Affairs 
 
--Khartoum:  Keith Kelly, Regional Affairs 
 
--Department of State: S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Hank 
Crumpton; AF/FO Ambassador Don Yamamoto; Virginia Palmer, 
S/CT Deputy Coordinator; David Kilcullen, Chief Strategist; 
Eunice Reddick, Director, Office of East African Affairs 
 
--DOD:  Rear Admiral Rick Hunt, Commander CJTF-HOA; 
Brigadier General (Select) Mark Schissler, Joint Staff; 
Michael Dumont, Special Assistant, OSD OSD/SOLIC; Rear 
Admiral (Select) Ed Winters, SOCOM 
 
--NSA: Lonny Anderson 
 
--NCTC:  Carol Burans, Deputy Director, Strategic 
Operational Planning 
 
--CTC:  Edward Gistaro, Sarah Pease 
 
--CIA:  Stephan Milliken, Africa Division 
 
--DOJ: Carl Alexandre, Director, Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development Assistance and Training Office 
 
--USAID: Andrew Sisson, REDSO Director 
 
 
WHITE