VZCZCXRO9090
PP RUEHCHI
DE RUEHCHI #0110 1861039
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051039Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0227
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0502
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 0260
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0015
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0005

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHIANG MAI 000110 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/5/2016 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL TH
SUBJECT: LOCAL THAI TAKE ON KNU AND KNLA ACTIVITIES IN REFUGEE CAMPS 
 
REF: A) BANGKOK 3948   B) STATE 107330 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Bea Camp, Consul General, Consulate Chiang Mai, 
State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (U) This message responds to reftel request for information 
about Karen National Union (KNU) and Karen National Liberation 
Army (KNLA) activities in refugee camps along the Thai-Burma 
border. 
 
¶2. (C) Chiang Mai seconds Bangkok (ref a) on the difficulty of 
getting concrete information about KNU and KNLA activities in 
the camp; we hope to have more to add after a July 5-6 joint 
trip to Mae Rama Luang and Mae La Oun camps by officers from 
Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and Rangoon.  The information in this cable 
is based on local Thai National Intelligence Agency (NIA) 
contacts and does not differ significantly from anecdotal 
comments (ref a) about KNU and KNLA influence in the refugee 
camps. 
 
¶3. (C)  The Mae Sot-based Karen Refugee Committee (KRC), which 
coordinates between Karen refugee camps along the Thai-Burma 
border from Mae Hong Son to Ratchaburi provinces, is expected to 
toe the KNU line, according to our NIA sources.  Some three 
years ago, KRC Secretary-General Saw Tay Tay acknowledged to a 
group of visiting USG officials that the KRC serves as a de 
facto representative of the KNU. 
 
¶4. (C)  KNU influence in the camps is also evident in family 
ties and networks of NGOs such as the Karen Women's Organization 
(KWO), which is headed by Zipporah Sein, daughter of KNU Defense 
Chief and KNLA Supreme Commander General Tamala Baw.  Based in 
Mae Sariang and represented in every Karen camp in Thailand, the 
KWO coordinates assistance to projects inside the camps focused 
on livelihood development, education, counseling, and cultural 
activities.  Thai authorities informally permit several KWO 
staff who are registered camp residents to stay outside the camp 
in order to ease communications with NGOs and the RTG. 
 
¶5. (C) NIA contacts in both Mae Sot and Mae Sariang do not 
believe the KNLA uses the Karen refugee camps as a military 
recruiting ground, although some residents volunteer for the 
KNLA. 
The KNLA does not need new recruits from camps in Thailand, 
relying instead on ethnic Karen villages on the Burma side of 
the border.  The camps also serve as a living place for family 
members and a rehabilitation site for KNU soldiers.  (Mae Lama 
Luang and Mae La Oun camps for 5th Brigade soldiers and Mae La 
camp in the case of the 7th Brigade.) 
 
¶6.  (C) On the question of food distributed in the camps going 
to the KNU, our NIA contact from Mae Sot noted that the KRC is 
instrumental in updating camp population figures and suggested 
that this number is often inflated by 20-30 percent.  He 
believed that the additional supplies go to non-resident groups, 
especially KNU/KNLA soldiers.  However, a check with Bangkok on 
the numbers from a UNHCR border-wide camp registration completed 
in November 2005 showed an overall camp population not that 
different from the camp population number used by NGOs for 
feeding purposes.  The number used for feeding purposes was 
about 3 percent greater than UNHCR's registration figure. 
 
CAMP