VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJB #0607/01 1990728
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180728Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2301
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS BUJUMBURA 000607 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC SIPDIS 
 
USAID/W DCHA, WGARVELINK, LROGERS 
USAID/W DCHA/OFDA, GGOTTLIEB; AFERRARA; 
ACONVERY; CGOTTSCHALK; ATRACY 
USAID/ECARO/OFDA, JMYER; ADWYER 
USAID/AFR KODONNELL 
USUN/ROME, HSPANOS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
USEU/BRUSSELS, PMANSO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PHUM ASEC PREL BY
 
SUBJECT: BURUNDI - RELIEF TO DEVELOPMENT 
TRANSITION 
 
REF: Bujumbura 00459 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  Following significant political progress, 
the overall humanitarian situation is improving 
in Burundi.  The transition from relief to 
development is underway, but humanitarian 
coordination is essential to prevent critical 
gaps between relief and development assistance. 
However, several variables have the potential to 
tilt the balance toward instability and a return 
to crisis conditions.  To support the Government 
of Burundi (GOB) during this critical period, 
donors and relief and development actors must 
work to improve and/or create mechanisms to 
facilitate coordination and capacity building. 
End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2.  From May 8 to June 10, a Disaster Operations 
Specialist from USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) deployed to 
Burundi to assess the humanitarian situation 
throughout the country and facilitate the 
transition of USAID/OFDA's country office from 
expatriate to Foreign Service National (FSN) 
management.  During this period, OFDA's 
Principal Regional Advisor, Administrative 
Officer, Regional Advisor, Food for Peace 
Officer, and Health Specialist visited Burundi 
to assist in the transition of the office and 
the development of future programming.  During 
the course of the five-week mission, USAID/OFDA 
staff visited 11 of 17 provinces, and met with a 
number of U.N. agencies, donors, and non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs). 
 
¶3.  Political progress in Burundi, culminating 
in the peaceful 2005 presidential elections, has 
enabled much of the country to rebound from more 
than a decade of instability.  The general 
security situation has improved, curfew has been 
lifted, and peace talks continue in Tanzania 
between the GOB and remaining opposition group, 
the National Liberation Forces (FNL).  Since 
2002, nearly 300,000 Burundian refugees and an 
unknown number of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) have returned home.  The U.N. 
Peacekeeping Mission in Burundi (ONUB) is 
leaving at the end of 2006, and the U.N. is 
currently preparing a multisectoral integrated 
U.N. mission.  Although humanitarian programs 
continue under the GOB Emergency Plan for 2006, 
the World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is in 
the finalization process. 
 
¶4.  Since the beginning of the conflict in 1993, 
USAID/OFDA and other international donors have 
supported a range of humanitarian interventions 
in Burundi.  As security and humanitarian 
conditions have improved, remaining needs are 
more related to chronic poverty than crisis, and 
short-term emergency response programs are less 
appropriate.  The international community is 
gradually phasing out relief activities and 
donors are in the process of redirecting funding 
and programming toward transition activities, 
such as government support and community-based 
initiatives. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Potentially Destabilizing Factors 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  While the outlook for Burundi is generally 
 
optimistic, challenges remain that could hinder 
or derail the path forward.  The new government, 
largely comprised of staff without previous 
governance experience, is faced with the 
daunting task of rebuilding a country that has 
undergone 12 years of civil strife.  Challenges 
include damaged infrastructure, a devastated 
economy, and insecurity arising from the 
departure of ONUB and continued FNL attacks.  In 
addition, a number of destabilizing forces have 
the potential to derail the recovery: 
unrealistic expectations for the new government 
and a resulting frustrated populace, a large 
number of returnees that will overstretch 
limited services and bring conflicting land 
claims, food insecurity as a result of cassava 
mosaic disease (CMD) and chronic drought, and 
regional instability in the Great Lakes. 
 
¶6.  Limited Basic Services:  The newly elected 
government has made several promises to the 
public, specifically in relation to free 
education and health care for pregnant women and 
children under-five.  Most of the announcements 
followed GOB trips to assess conditions on the 
ground.  However, at present, the GOB is unable 
to follow through on these promises due to a 
lack of viable infrastructure (hospitals, 
schools) and personnel (doctors, nurses, 
teachers).  As schools, clinics, and hospitals 
become overwhelmed, the population's frustration 
has increased. 
 
¶7.  Stagnant Economy:  Burundi's economy has not 
shown marked improvement since 2005 when it was 
ranked 169 out of 177 according to the UN 
Development Program's (UNDP) Human Development 
Index.  More than 68 percent of the population 
lives below the poverty line and over 90 percent 
are subsistence farmers.  Additionally, Burundi 
is the second most densely populated country 
globally, with an annual population growth rate 
greater than three percent. 
 
¶8.  FNL and Security Concerns:  The outcome of 
peace talks remain inconclusive and were 
suspended last week when talks broke down amid 
mutual recriminations.  The talks are set to 
resume July 13. 
 
¶9.  Returnees:  To date in 2006, only 3.8 
percent (3,792 people) of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) planned 
100,000 refugees has returned from Tanzania. 
However, UNHCR states that the lower figures are 
in part a result of the observed cycle of 
movement, in which major returns are registered 
from May to July, just after the harvest in 
Tanzania.  As the Tanzanian Government has 
requested that refugees return to Burundi, UNHCR 
commenced a repatriation campaign on June 20 and 
expects 85,000 people to return by December 
¶2006.  Additional returnees will place 
significant strain on already limited services. 
 
¶10.  Food Insecurity:  Although the current 
harvest is expected to be relatively good 
throughout most of the country (see reftel), 
food insecurity will likely re-emerge during the 
upcoming dry season.  Coping mechanisms for 
these periods have consistently been inadequate, 
and there is concern of another "hunger period" 
from August to September.  Further, while 
various organizations are addressing cassava 
mosaic disease (CMD) through the planting of 
resistant cuttings, there will not be enough 
cuttings to mitigate the effects of CMD until 
2008 at the earliest, according to specialists. 
 
¶11.  Regional Instability:  According to UNHCR, 
more than 30,000 Congolese refugees reside in 
Burundi, and there is concern that this number 
 
will increase with the July elections in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Further, in 
recent months, approximately 20,000 refugees 
have arrived from Rwanda.  Current caseloads are 
adequately managed by UNHCR and other partners, 
but a large influx could prove problematic. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Transition from Relief to Development 
------------------------------------- 
 
-NGOs- 
 
¶12.  NGOs are moving at different speeds in 
adjusting to the transition from relief to 
development.  Strategy development meetings with 
several NGO headquarter staff indicate that 
there is acceptance of the changing trend at the 
headquarters level.  Unfortunately, adopting a 
development philosophy is not easy for all aid 
workers, many of whom have been working in 
Burundi in a relief capacity for several years. 
 
¶13.  NGOs and the GOB are also at odds over who 
should control donor funding in Burundi.  Some 
NGOs have voiced concerns about perceived GOB 
hostility toward NGOs, but these concerns are 
not shared by all NGOs.  At the same time, some 
members of the GOB worry that NGOs act without 
accountability, and the GOB has openly stated 
that the now democratically-elected GOB should 
control relief programs and the donor funding 
that supports them.  Currently, 70 percent of 
donor funding goes to NGOs.  In addition, NGOs 
do not adequately share information with the 
GOB, and the GOB seems to have some confusion 
about how NGOs operate. 
 
¶14.  U.N. transition efforts appear to be on 
target.  ONUB is scheduled to depart from 
Burundi on December 31, and an integrated 
mission is scheduled to take its place.  The 
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) has begun to hand over leadership 
of the international response to the U.N. 
Development Program (UNDP).  In a recent donor 
meeting with OCHA, donors agreed that OCHA 
should remain in country through 2007 to 
continue coordination efforts and ensure a 
successful transition. 
-Donors- 
 
¶15.  USAID and other major donors to Burundi 
have made significant pledges to bridge the gap 
from relief to development, most of which are 
directed toward the GOB's Emergency Plan for 
2006 (see reftel).  Relief and development 
donors agree on the need to prioritize capacity- 
building activities for the GOB's National 
Committee for the Coordination of Aid to enable 
the GOB to coordinate the aid and development 
sectors. 
 
¶16.  In FY 2006, USAID's Regional Economic 
Development Services Office for East and 
Southern Africa (USAID/REDSO) obligated USD 9.3 
million for conflict mitigation, democracy and 
governance, HIV/AIDS, health, and livelihoods 
programs, and has requested USD 9.5 million for 
FY 2007.  For FY 2005, USAID/OFDA provided USD 
9.8 million in health, nutrition, relief 
commodities, food security, and water and 
sanitation activities.  FY 2006 funding is not 
yet complete, but is expected to be considerably 
less, consistent with the transition to 
development programs. 
 
¶17.  The Belgian Development Cooperation (BDC), 
the U.K. Department for International 
Development (DFID), the European Commission 
(EC), the Swiss Agency for Development and 
 
Cooperation, and the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPIC) Initiative have also pledged 
significant development assistance in support of 
the GOB. 
 
a.  BDC has committed approximately Euro 15 
million to the GOB's Plan D'Urgence, Euro three 
million into a UNDP-held trust fund, and several 
million Euros to U.N. organizations.  The BDC 
expects to allocate approximately 60 million 
Euros over the next three years. 
 
b.  DFID has pledged approximately 10 million 
pounds, six million of which will go to the UNDP 
trust fund (and then to the Plan d'Urgence), 
while the remainder will go to OVC programming 
(education, health). 
 
c.  The EC has pledged approximately 66.75 
million Euros toward a rural development program 
in five provinces over three years.  The EC is 
also committing 19.75 million Euros to good 
governance initiatives.  The EC Humanitarian Aid 
Office (ECHO) funding levels will vary between 
12 and 17 million Euros, most of which will go 
to U.N. organizations.  ECHO is ending all 
support for emergency health and nutrition 
programs. 
 
d.  The Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation has pledged approximately 17 million 
Euros, focusing on Ngozi Province. 
 
e.  The World Bank and IMF have approved the GOB 
for USD 60 million under the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPIC) Initiative.  Upon 
finalization of the PRSP, the GOB will receive 
an estimated USD 115 million, most of which will 
fund the development of infrastructure and 
services. 
 
----------------------------- 
Conclusions / Recommendations 
----------------------------- 
 
¶18.  The transition from relief to development 
is slow, and critical gaps between relief and 
development assistance could emerge.  The 
USAID/OFDA Disaster Operations Specialist 
recommends the following actions for USAID to 
support the transition: 
 
a.  Improved coordination among donors.  Relief 
and development donors should begin a dialogue 
to avoid gaps in services during the transition 
period.  While it is important to support the 
GOB's efforts to coordinate donor activities, it 
is critical that an effective monitoring 
mechanism be set up rapidly to ensure that donor 
funds are used as effectively as possible. USAID 
should organize regular meetings that include 
relief and development donors, as well as GOB 
representatives. 
 
b.  The U.N. Country Team (UNCT) should be 
encouraged toward greater cooperation internally 
and externally.  USAID should promote dialogue 
between and amongst UNCT members through hosting 
sectoral meetings or through supporting UNOCHA 
in hosting sectoral meetings.  GOB 
representatives should be invited to attend 
these meetings. 
 
c.  Tensions between the NGO community and the 
GOB, although not shared by all, should be 
addressed immediately  so that they do not 
impede the path forward.  Transparency and 
information sharing is necessary so that trust 
can be developed.  A facilitated dialogue 
convened by a neutral but respected party could 
assist in this.  The USG can help to identify 
said person and promote said dialogue. 
 
 
MOLLER