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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001632 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO 
NSC FOR DAN FISK 
TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE 
USCINCSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016 

TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR

SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: FAREWELL CALL ON KIRCHNER INNER CIRCLE 

MEMBER 

 

REF: A. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00141 

     ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 01610 

 

Classified By: CDA, a.i., Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 

 

¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: On July 19, the DCM paid a farewell call on 

President Kirchner's closest and most influential advisor, 

Technical and Legal Secretary Carlos Zannini, that included a 

discussion on the bilateral relationship and GOA regional 

policy.  Reviewing the U.S. bilateral objectives over the 

past three years, the DCM said he and the Ambassador had 

sought to support Argentina's democracy, economic recovery 

and political stability, cooperate with the GOA on security 

and counterterrorism issues, and after Argentina recovered, 

seek the GOA's constructive role in the region.  The DCM 

praised Argentina's economic recovery and Zannini thanked the 

U.S. for its help during the crisis.  Turning to regional 

issues, the DCM noted U.S. regional concerns regarding 

Venezuela and Bolivia.  The DCM said that Kirchner's close 

relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and 

Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his penchant 

for slandering President Bush and the USG, made it difficult 

for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral relations 

with the GOA.  Zannini said that the GOA's relationship with 

Venezuela was based on economics and that Mercosur membership 

would change Venezuela, not the other way around.  On 

Bolivia, both the DCM and Zannini agreed that isolating 

President Morales would not be good, but the DCM said that 

both countries needed to work to moderate Morales' actions. 

Looking towards the future, Zannini said he hoped 

communication between the two countries would be further 

strengthened.  The DCM highlighted incoming Ambassador 

Wayne's strong qualifications and noted that he would 

continue Ambassador Gutierrez's professional diplomacy.  END 

SUMMARY. 

 

-------------------------- 

REVIEWING THE RELATIONSHIP 

-------------------------- 

 

¶2.  (C) On July 19, the DCM paid a farewell call on Technical 

and Legal Secretary Carlos Zannini that included a discussion 

on the bilateral relationship and GOA regional policy. 

Carlos Zannini is a long-time, close Kirchner advisor and 

probably his most influential policy confidant (See reftel 

A).  Zannini began the discussion by noting the good 

relationship the Casa Rosada enjoyed with the Ambassador and 

DCM and expressed appreciation for U.S. help during the 

crisis.  The DCM said the U.S. is pleased that Argentina's 

economic recovery has been strong and said that Kirchner 

deserves a great deal of the credit for it.  Zannini replied 

that Argentina's process of recovery was unfinished, but that 

they too were pleased they were on the way. 

 

¶3.  (C) The DCM reiterated U.S. objectives in Argentina.  The 

DCM said that in the past three years he and the Ambassador 

had sought to support Argentina's democracy, economic 

recovery and political stability, strengthen cooperation with 

the GOA on security and counterterrorism issues, and after 

Argentina recovered, seek the GOA's constructive role in the 

region.  The DCM detailed the support that the U.S. gave to 

Argentina during the depth of the financial crisis, from 

advocating for Argentina within the G-7 to the U.S. 

Treasury's decision to support the private sector debt 

exchange that allowed Argentina to secure a higher rate of 

participation in the deal.  The DCM noted that no major U.S. 

company left Argentina during the crisis and that roughly 500 

U.S. companies currently operate in Argentina generating 

roughly 200,000 jobs. 

 

--------------- 

REGIONAL ISSUES 

--------------- 

 

¶4.  (C) Turning to regional issues, the DCM noted U.S. 

regional concerns and said the U.S. wanted to see Argentina 

take a more active role in supporting regional democracy. 

 

BUENOS AIR 00001632  002 OF 003 

 

 

The DCM thanked Zannini for the GOA's continued help in 

Haiti.  The DCM raised the issue of Venezuela, stating that 

Kirchner's close relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo 

Chavez and Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his 

penchant for slandering President Bush and the USG, made it 

difficult for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral 

relations with the GOA.  The DCM said, ""One day Kirchner is 

meeting with Chavez, and Chavez may be on good behavior 

because Kirchner has asked Chavez to avoid incidents, but the 

next day Chavez is calling President Bush a drunkard, a 

genocidal maniac and worse than Hitler.""  The DCM said that 

by so closely associating himself with a leader like Chavez, 

Kirchner risks being viewed by Washington as sharing Chavez's 

views.  The DCM said that the U.S. does not oppose 

Argentina's economic ties with Venezuela, as the 

U.S.-Venezuelan trade relationship is extensive, but both 

Argentina and the U.S. need to support Venezuela's democracy. 

 

 

¶5.  (C) Zannini responded by emphasizing the economic nature 

of Argentina's relationship with Venezuela and noted that the 

U.S. and Argentina ""have different definitions of democracy."" 

 Zannini said, ""Our relations with Venezuela are not 

anti-U.S., but based on economic interests.""  Zannini 

acknowledged Chavez's anti-U.S. tendencies, ""Attacking the 

U.S. is a way for him (Chavez) to build power in Venezuela."" 

He said that Argentina does not share Chavez's anti-U.S. 

message.  Regarding Venezuela's democracy, Zannini said that 

for the GOA, the most important part of a democracy is 

voting, pointing out that Chavez has won numerous national 

elections.  Zannini said that part of the problem with 

Venezuela's democracy is the intransigence of Venezuela's 

opposition.  Zannini noted the many ways that Venezuela was 

helping Argentina, from buying bonds, helping to meeting 

Argentina's energy needs, to selling Argentina agricultural 

equipment. 

 

¶6.  (C) The DCM responded by noting the increasingly 

authoritarian nature of the Chavez government.  He stressed 

Chavez's concerted efforts to weaken judicial independence 

and retain monopoly control of Venezuela's Congress, as well 

as his crackdown against the political opposition and media. 

The DCM said that many in the opposition and in the media in 

Venezuela lived in fear.  The DCM also noted the foreign 

policy dimension of the problem, citing Chavez's cultivation 

of the rogue regimes in Iran and North Korea.  Zannini 

replied by highlighting the GOA's cooperation with the U.S. 

on counterproliferation efforts on both Iran and North Korea 

in the UN Security Council. 

 

¶7.  (C) On Bolivia, the DCM said that the U.S. is not trying 

to isolate Bolivian President Morales, but is instead seeking 

to moderate Morales' actions.  Zannini said that isolating 

Morales would just create a worse situation.  Zannini said 

that Morales and Chavez often have rhetoric that is much 

worse than their actions.  The DCM acknowledged that focusing 

exclusively on rhetoric was not helpful, but reaffirmed that 

the U.S. is also concerned with some of the actions of both 

Morales and Chavez. 

 

¶8.  (C) Zannini raised the issue of the Mercosur Summit in 

Cordoba.  Zannini said Venezuela's incorporation into 

Mercosur should not concern the U.S.  ""Venezuela will adapt 

to Mercosur, not the other way around.  Argentina does not 

have a regime like Venezuela's; Argentina has its own 

characteristics.""  Zannini acknowledged that 

misunderstandings about Argentina's relationship with 

Venezuela could cause many problems with the GOA's 

relationship with the U.S.  However, he again sought to allay 

U.S. fears, ""Argentina is not going to be a tool of Cuba."" 

Zannini said that the highlights of the Summit in Cordoba 

would be announcing the creation of a South American 

parliament and a regional infrastructure fund.  Zannini noted 

that Mercosur's success would lead to stronger democracies in 

the region, ""With better economies, democracy can grow."" 

 

--------------------- 

 

BUENOS AIR 00001632  003 OF 003 

 

 

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 

--------------------- 

 

¶9.  (C) Looking towards the future, Zannini said he hoped 

communication between the two countries would improve. 

Zannini said that ""Argentina is focused just on the region 

and the U.S. is focused on the world.  At times, the U.S. has 

not exercised the leadership in the region that was needed."" 

The DCM replied that Argentina has benefited first-hand from 

the U.S. regional leadership in recent years.  The DCM 

highlighted incoming Ambassador Wayne's strong 

qualifications, predicting that he would maintain Ambassador 

Gutierrez's efforts to reach out and seek to strengthen 

bilateral ties. 

 

¶10.  (C) Zannini, noting incoming Ambassador Wayne's economic 

background, appealed for more U.S. investment in Argentina as 

the best way to improve bilateral relations.  The DCM said 

that the GOA needs to ensure that U.S. companies have the 

freedom to operate in Argentina without GOA price controls 

and interference that would harm the U.S. companies' ability 

to compete.  The DCM said that U.S. companies need open and 

clear regulations in order to encourage them to invest. 

Zannini acknowledged the benefits of the U.S.-style of 

business-government relations, which he said was superior to 

the common practice in Europe. 

 

------- 

COMMENT 

------- 

 

¶11.  (C) As Secretary of the Presidency Oscar Parrilli did in 

his recent meeting with the DCM (See reftel B), Kirchner's 

inner circle always attempts to allay our concerns regarding 

Argentina's relationship with Venezuela.  Although the GOA's 

goals in their dealings with Chavez are primarily economic, 

Chavez's primary goals are political.  President Kirchner is 

playing a dangerous game as he is drawing Argentina ever 

closer to Venezuela.  Chavez, and his ally Fidel Castro, are 

much more capable and adept at manipulating regional politics 

than is President Kirchner.  Kirchner likely thinks he can 

continue to strengthen his ties to the leftist bloc in Latin 

America, while maintaining positive relations with the United 

States.  Kirchner's foreign policy ineptness and lack of 

competent international relations advisors will likely 

prevent him from understanding the potential negative 

consequences of his actions. 

 

¶12.  (C) Our experience has been that the GOA is difficult 

government to work with and one with a lack of foreign policy 

expertise.  The Kirchner administration's lack of 

understanding in the international relations area, coupled 

with their sophomoric, 1970s leftist tendencies, make them 

easily susceptible to manipulation by more radical regional 

leaders, such as Chavez and Castro.  It is therefore 

extremely important for the U.S., both in Washington and in 

Buenos Aires, to actively engage the GOA at a high level at 

this critical juncture to avoid any further slippage of 

Argentina towards the Chavez orbit.  Despite differences, we 

have been able to achieve excellent cooperation with the GOA 

on a range of issues, including counternarcotics, 

counterterrorism, non-proliferation and in Haiti.  We need to 

further reach out to the GOA to achieve more cooperation in 

other areas.  The consequences of not maintaining a fluid 

dialogue with the GOA can only be negative for the U.S.  END 

COMMENT. 

 

 

LLORENS 


=======================CABLE ENDS============================