Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BUCHAREST1219, ROMANIAN LIMITS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BUCHAREST1219.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BUCHAREST1219 2006-07-31 16:03 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bucharest
VZCZCXRO5904
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #1219/01 2121603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311603Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4897
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2197
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 001219 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016 
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL IS LE RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIAN LIMITS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 
THOUGHTS ON LEBANON 
 
REF: SECSTATE 121375 
 
Classified By: ADCM RODGER GARNER FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Despite popular sentiment in Romania that it 
is already stretched thin in contributing to peacekeeping 
operations overseas, decision makers appear cautiously 
optimistic that Romania would contribute to an international 
peace keeping force, should there be an UN mandate to 
stabilize Lebanon.  Upon returning from Washington, President 
Basescu confirmed the cautiousness of this optimism by saying 
he had not yet committed Romania to participate in a military 
buffer force for Southern Lebanon, but would consider it. 
Minister of Defense Atanasiu, who recently advocated for the 
withdrawal of Romanian troops from Iraq, also made press 
statements that Romania would send troops to Lebanon, if 
requested and paid for by the United Nations.  MOD and MFA 
officials promised to reply, albeit slowly, to reftel 
demarche's offer to participate in the Global Peace 
Operations Initiative.  The diminishing MOD budget, not the 
Defense Minister's appeal for withdrawing troops from Iraq, 
appears to be the major constraining force on Romania's 
ability to contribute to peacekeeping operations.  End 
Summary. 
 
Training for Peacekeeping 
------------------------- 
 
2. (C) PolOff delivered reftel cable on engaging Romania in 
the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to MOD Director 
for Strategic Affairs Mihaela Matei and MFA Acting Director 
for UN Affairs Eugen Mihut on July 27.  Neither the MOD nor 
the MFA representatives appeared overly enthusiastic about 
the opportunity for training in peacekeeping operations.  The 
MOD's Matei said she would forward the message to the General 
Staff, but focused her conversation on budgetary constraints 
within the MOD.  She was encouraged to hear that there could 
be U.S. funding available, and said that would help determine 
the degree of Romania's likely positive answer.  She said 
that it would likely take several weeks to formulate a reply. 
 She also mentioned the difficult transition MOD would be 
undergoing as it ends conscription and wondered how that 
would affect Romania's ability to deploy troops for 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
3. (C) The MFA's Mihut was much less enthusiastic, saying it 
would take more than a month for Romania to form a reply and 
that Romania is already stretched rather thin in just 
maintaining its current peacekeeping commitments.  He quickly 
cited the MOD's budgetary restraints and limited number of 
people that could be deployed overseas.  Mihut emphasized the 
political debate stemming from the center-right liberal 
party's campaign to remove troops from Iraq, and suggested it 
would be difficult for Romania to become further involved in 
peacekeeping overseas. 
 
Peacekeepers for Lebanon 
------------------------ 
 
4. (C) However, concerning the possibility of Romania 
deploying peacekeeping troops to Lebanon, MFA Director 
General for the Middle East and Global Affairs Stelian Stoian 
told polchief that Romania would "probably consider 
something" once it understands the size and type of force 
organized and its mandate. Stoian said the debate spurred by 
the Prime Minister over Romania's Iraq contribution would 
have no bearing on a decision with regard to Lebanon or 
anywhere else.  Overall he seemed somewhat positive.  Stoian 
also asked what kind of contribution the U.S. was planning to 
contribute to such a force. 
 
5. (C) MFA Director for the Middle East Laura Mircea told 
poloff that Romania is "extremely concerned with what happens 
in Lebanon and northern Israel." She said Romania "believes 
the international community can do something to bring an end 
to the crisis" and that "an international force would likely 
be necessary." She also mentioned the domestic situation 
regarding requests to withdraw troops from Iraq, but said 
there would be no such retreat.  She said if there was an 
international force -- whether UN, EU, or NATO -- with a 
clear mandate accepted by Lebanon and Israel, Romania would 
consider participating.  She cautioned, however, that the MOD 
"doesn't really have people" and she thought the likely 
contribution would be very low, probably under 200 troops. 
 
6. (C) The social democratic opposition party's George Maior, 
President of the Senate's Defense Committee, told poloff that 
"if there was an international force, legitimized by NATO or 
 
BUCHAREST 00001219  002 OF 003 
 
 
the UN, Romania would be an active player."  Maior said that 
PSD party leader Mircea Geoana commented about the 
possibility of President Bush asking President Basescu for a 
contribution of troops in Lebanon so that Basescu "would 
focus on real security issues" and "not be engaged in 
internal political disputes" such as those with the liberal 
party over troops in Iraq or over the resignations of the 
intelligence chiefs.  Maior mentioned the sizeable financial 
problems in terms of the MOD budget.  He said the budget for 
2007-2008 is now at 1.7%, rather than at 2.38% "where it 
should have been" according to pre-NATO accession 
commitments.  He said the MOD budget is "continuously 
decreasing," although he said he heard some discussions that 
would positively adjust it.  In any case, he said, the 
government would allocate an extra amount should there be an 
international force that Romania would join in Lebanon.  He 
estimated Romania could likely send 300-400 people for such 
an effort, and pledged that the opposition party would 
support such a contribution politically.  He also estimated 
that PNL's campaign to withdraw from Iraq was not going well 
for them and that there were discussions within the party 
that the leadership had gone too far on that issue.  He said 
that the Minister of Defense was in a difficult political 
situation and he would therefore not be able to afford 
"another radical stand" against deploying Romanian troops. 
Maior said that "if there is a UN mandate and a NATO 
umbrella, no one would complain" in Romania about 
contributing forces. 
 
7. (C) Minister of Defense Teodor Atanasiu declared to the 
press on July 28 that "if the UN makes a request, we will get 
involved in Lebanon."  He said that he would wait to see what 
the mission of such a peace-keeping force would be, and then 
"make an offer accordingly."  On July 31, Atanasiu added in a 
televised interview that if Romania participated according to 
a UN request, "the UN would pay the bill, as Romania does not 
have the necessary resources."  Atanasiu also announced that 
the Finance Ministry's draft 2007-2010 budget "would not be 
enough for the objectives of the Romanian Army, including 
those assumed within NATO." The draft budget gradually 
reduces military expenditures from 1.7% of GDP in 2007 to 
1.3% of GDP in 2010. 
 
8. (C) Upon returning from his trip to the U.S., President 
Traian Basescu stated to the press that neither he nor anyone 
else had committed Romania to sending a peacekeeping force 
into Southern Lebanon, but that Romania would consider such 
action, preferably based on a mandate from the UN Security 
Council to enforce resolution 1559.  The text regarding 
Lebanon of President Basescu's speech delivered upon arrival 
at Bucharest's Henry Coanda Airport is below: 
 
9. (U) Begin embassy's rough partial translation of President 
Basescu's July 29 speech: 
 
"...Our position is extremely clear: Romania acknowledges 
unequivocally Israel's right to security, a right defended on 
behalf of its citizens.  I have underscored that Romania is 
interested in the evolution of the conflict between Israel 
and Hezbollah, because we have a great number of citizens in 
Israel, plus their families, with Romanian or Israeli 
citizenship. 
 
At this moment, there are discussions at all levels -- inside 
NATO structures, inside the UN, or even in the context of 
bilateral discussions -- on the possibility of introducing a 
military buffer structure in Southern Lebanon. Neither 
myself, the chief of the General Staff, nor any other member 
of our delegation (who visited the U.S.) ever committed 
Romania to participate with troops in such an action.  From 
our point of view, Romania meets its commitments at the level 
established with our foreign partners, be they inside NATO, 
inside the EU, or within the framework of bilateral 
agreements. 
 
We have to wait first for a decision on Lebanon.  We would 
prefer a decision of the UNSC, as the organization with 
responsibilities in implementing its own resolutions, because 
-- as I have underlined in the discussions at all levels in 
the U.S. -- the actual situation is the result of the failure 
to implement the UNSC resolution 1559 from 2004, in its most 
sensitive areas, such as the disarmament of Hezbollah, the 
blocking of arms transfers to Southern Lebanon and securing 
the control of the whole territory of Lebanon by the Lebanese 
government.  We think a UNSC resolution should be implemented 
and not a solution coming from NATO or other international 
structures or organizations. 
 
 
BUCHAREST 00001219  003 OF 003 
 
 
In this context, Romania has not yet made any commitment 
regarding the structure or type of mission, or the 
responsibilities assumed by each country regarding Southern 
Lebanon. 
 
A NATO decision would take at least six to seven months to be 
enforced, given the decision making process inside NATO.  In 
our opinion, the organization that can take quick decisions 
is the UNSC, which in the past made decisions regarding 
Southern Lebanon that have not been implemented, and the 
Lebanese government was not supported to implement the 
decisions related to the security of Southern Lebanon.... 
 
End text of embassy translation. 
 
10. (C) Comment: The center-right Liberal Party's recent 
campaign to remove Romanian troops from Iraq appears to have 
introduced a measure of caution into Romanian officials' 
eagerness to commit troops to peacekeeping operations 
overseas.  It does not, however, appear to be a decisive 
factor.  Romanians are cautiously optimistic that they would 
participate in an internationally legitimized military buffer 
force in Southern Lebanon.  The rapidly diminishing MOD 
budget, on the other hand, appears to be a major constraining 
force on Romania's ability to contribute to peacekeeping 
operations.  End comment. 
 
11. (U) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are 
available on the SIPRNet website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest 
Taubman