VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #2463/01 1951248
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141248Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2569
INFO RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0429
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0207
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0082
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 7538
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0137

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 002463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MCAP MOPS KNNP AF CG IR BE
SUBJECT: PM: BELGIUM CAN DO MORE ON AFGHANISTAN, WANTS HELP 
ON CONGO, STAYS TOUGH ON IRAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Korologos; Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Verhofstadt told Ambassador Korologos July 
20 that he was trying to secure coalition approval to 
"double" the Belgian troop contribution to Afghanistan, 
adding some 200 troops around Kabul.  In principle, he 
accepted the need for NATO common funding, but that NATO's 
budgeting needed to be strengthened.  Verhofstadt called for 
more U.S. support for Congo post-transition, and has sent a 
letter on this to President Bush.  He also called for a donor 
coordination body to replace the expiring CIAT in Kinshasa. 
Ambassador pressed the PM to talk tough in his July 11 
meeting with Iranian nuclear negotiator Larijani (which we 
later heard he did).  Verhofstadt said he was unconcerned 
about coming local elections but was looking forward to his 
campaign for reelection in spring 2007.  END SUMMARY. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
¶2. (C) In a July 20 meeting at the PM's office, the 
Ambassador urged PM Verhofstadt to fulfill his pledge to 
President Bush to do more on Afghanistan.  Verhofstadt 
admitted Belgium's only increase so far this year is 8 
soldiers to PRT's.  Now, however, the government is 
discussing deploying some 200 soldiers to join the 
Franco-Turkish maneuver battalion in Kabul.  This would 
nearly double our troop strength in Afghanistan.  MoD Flahaut 
has agreed, but it is now blocked not by Flahaut's French 
Socialists but by the Flemish Socialists.  Belgium is also 
looking at collaborating with the Swedes on their PRT, 
including sending civilian personnel from Development 
Cooperation and at more development aid.  Any increases would 
probably only happen in November (Note: after elections). 
 
NATO 
--- 
 
¶3. (C) Verhofstadt said soon-to 
be-transferred-from-Washington Ambassador Van Daele will work 
effectively in NATO and will be given more authority to solve 
problems.  The PM accepted in principle the virtues of common 
funding, agreeing when Ambassador noted the efficiencies of 
common purchase of reusable equipment.  PM said Belgium found 
NATO budgeting sloppy, and that he had asked NATO SYG De Hoop 
Scheffer to more carefully delineate common funding 
guidelines, so the process can be predictable and 
transparent.  He has gained agreement from Defense Minister 
Flahaut, if budgeting can improve.  Belgium cannot resort to 
a supplemental, unlike the U.S. due to its need for a 
balanced budget.  In fact, it will run a modest surplus based 
on more robust economic growth. 
 
¶4. (C) The PM spoke proudly of Belgium's military 
modernization.  He said the newly-acquired armored trucks 
would be in the military parade the following week, but by 
July 2007 they will parade the whole panoply of new equipment 
for the army including armored vehicles purchased from 
US-affiliated MOWAG, armored jeeps, and NH-90 helicopters. 
This practical transformation underscores Belgium's 
commitment to the new NATO and its missions. 
 
SWIFT 
----- 
 
¶5. (C) PM said he would try to keep control of the matter by 
referring it to the College (like an interministerial 
Deputies Committee) on Intelligence and Security, which is 
headed by his personal Security Adviser Brice De Ruyver 
(note: an academic and part-time adviser).  He would strive 
to keep the case out of the hands of the Federal Prosecutor, 
who would not be subject to &political guidance8.  He hoped 
conclusion of College would be that no laws were broken.  In 
any event, he expressed the belief that the issue would be 
politically manageable and that much of the furor has already 
died down. 
 
CONGO 
----- 
 
¶6. (C) PM said he thought Congolese elections would go off as 
scheduled and turn out reasonably well.  He was concerned, 
however, about growing nationalist sentiment, a movement he 
called "Congolites."  These were not any members of the 
current coalition, but rather independents who are against 
the parties' dependence on foreign sponsors. 
 
¶7. (C) Verhofstadt believed that it was important to preserve 
international coordination post-election among the donors and 
a framework through which donor views could be communicated 
to the Congolese government.  He thought an "evolved CIAT" 
was needed on the economy, to give advice and urge the 
Congolese to do the right thing with the aid we give them. 
So much assistance is now wasted in duplication or 
corruption.  Kabila has accepted such an advisory body, 
without the formal power of the current CIAT.  One 
alternative is to create a "peace-building" commission, the 
second alternative is an EU aid coordination body convened 
under the Coutnou agreement.  Political coordination among 
key friends of Congo, including the U.S. and Belgium was also 
important, so they could effectively engage post-transition 
with the Congolese, particularly as the U.N. role would 
diminish after transition.  Verhofstadt ventured that this 
could be more informal than the current CIAT or his proposed 
donor structure. 
 
¶8. (C) Verhofstadt mentioned he had sent a letter to 
President Bush calling for the mobilization of additional 
resources to help the new government after elections.  He had 
also sent this letter to 29 other heads of government, 
including the EU, Switzerland, Norway and Japan.  (Text of 
letter has been forwarded to Department.) 
 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (C) PM said he was more focused on preparing the 2007 
budget than on October 8 local elections, and looked forward 
to national elections which he would not schedule to be held 
until June or late May of next year.  He said he would be 
judged on the performance of his government and the economy, 
which because of its modest (0.3%) budget surplus would be 
among the fastest-growing in Western Europe at 3% per year. 
(Note:  We are analyzing his economic predictions, which seem 
optimistic.  End note.)  Belgium's obligatory vote increases 
unpredictability, he joked.  He hoped for good weather on 
election day, because the voters vote against the government 
if the weather is bad.  He acknowledged that after two full 
terms, like politicians in other countries, he would have a 
tough election fight ahead. 
 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶10. (C) Verhofstadt said he would see Iranian nuclear 
negotiator Larijani July 11, at Iranian request.  His sole 
purpose was to underscore Solana's message on the P5 plus 1 
offer.  He said he was embarrassed by recent press reports 
that the Belgian lead of the IAEA investigative team in Iran 
had been moved to a desk job, due to his conviction that Iran 
was pursuing the bomb.  In direct contact, however, the 
inspector was not as critical of El Baradei as one might 
think from the press.  The Ambassador pressed the PM to hew 
to the customary tough Belgian line on Iran and not offer any 
daylight from the international community's generous offer. 
 
¶11. (C) (Note: A Verhofstadt staffer got back to Embassy July 
13 to report the meeting with Larijani largely reflected the 
Iranians disappointing session earlier in the day with 
Solana.  Verhofstadt, whose points had been coordinated with 
Solana's staff between the meetings, told Larijani that Iran 
must immediately accept the P5 1 package, cease enrichment 
and return to implementing the Aditional Protocol.  The 
Iranian said he had two points.  First, that Iran accepts the 
international community's offer, "as a basis to negotiate." 
The second point was that Iran wanted to negotiate the terms 
of package, but needed more time to review the offer.  It 
would not suspend enrichment and was prevented by going back 
to the Additional Protocol by its own Pariament.  Larijani 
said he would be back to neotiate more with Solana, perhaps 
in two weeks (the Belgians had not heard this from the EU). 
The PM's staffer said his impression was that Iran was just 
"playing for time."  End note.) 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT: Verhofstadt seemed buoyant as he looked 
toward some important moves before summer recess next week, 
including possible enhancement in Afghanistan.  He was more 
confident than one might predict given his party's weak 
standing in the polls, perhaps cheered by the flaring dispute 
between his likely opponent and the key Francophone coalition 
partner.  End Comment. 
ROBL 
.