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P 290958Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002490

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2016
TAGS: IR IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: TFLE01: MARWAN HAMADEH DISCUSSES CEASE-FIRE
POSSIBILITIES

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------

¶1. (C/NF) During a July 28 meeting with the Ambassador and
econoff, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh gave a
briefing on the July 27 cabinet meeting and the Rome
conference. Al-Nahar publisher Ghassan Tueni was also
present. Hamadeh said the cabinet meeting was "epic" as he
verbally parried President Lahoud and the Shia ministers. In
the end the cabinet unanimously approved all seven points
from Prime Minister Siniora's speech in Rome. Regarding
Rome, Hamadeh reported that the side conversations were good,
especially with Secretary Rice. He also met Saad Hariri whom
he advised to say out of Lebanon for now. Reviewing
cease-fire language, Hamadeh said he was concerned about
recent Israeli military moves. An EU source had told him the
military campaign would probably continue for 2-5 weeks.
When asked how the GOL would enforce sovereignty over all of
Lebanon, Hamadeh replied that the GOL and LAF would focus
only on Hizballah's rocket arsenal and heavy weapons.
Hizballah could either send it back to Iran and Syria, give
it to the LAF, or give it to the multi-national stabilization
force. End summary.

HAMADEH TAKES A STAND AT
JULY 27 CABINET MEETING
-----------------------

¶2. (C/NF) On the night of July 28, the Ambassador and
econoff met with Minister of Telecommunications Marwan
Hamadeh at his apartment. "An Nahar" General Manager Ghassan
Tueni was also there for much of the meeting, his main
contribution filling us in with breaking press reports
(almost all of which later proved to be erroneous). Hamadeh
began by briefing the Ambassador on the July 27 cabinet
meeting. "It was epic," smiled Hamadeh. He said he fought
with President Emile Lahoud, the Shia ministers, and some of
the "weak technocrats" of Saad Hariri's Mustaqbal (Future)
movement. When the Amal ministers chastised Prime Minister
Siniora's speech in Rome, Hamadeh replied that Speaker of
Parliament Nabih Berri had approved the speech beforehand,
which "shut them up." Hamadeh also pointed out that Berri
had defended Siniora in an interview with "Al Jazeera"
television.

¶3. (C/NF) In the cabinet meeting, Hamadeh proposed that the
cabinet approve the PM's statement. Lahoud and the Hizballah
ministers were furious about the idea of a new mandate and
scope for a peacekeeping force. Hamadeh told Lahoud that
there is "no more UNIFIL," so he should forget about it. "I
told him the cabinet decides, not you...and that shut him
up," Hamadeh boasted. Then Lahoud raised the issue of the
seven villages. Siniora snapped that the borders with
Palestine were drawn up in the 1920s before the boundaries of
Greater Lebanon were created. "Do you want to call into
question the borders of Greater Lebanon?," Siniora asked
Lahoud. Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh, normally a
Amal-Hizballah mouthpiece, did not say a word. Hamadeh said
he told the Hizballah ministers that Hizballah had taken
Lebanon to war without asking the rest of the cabinet, so the
cabinet must take a position now. And, Hamadeh added, he
told Hizballah ministers that if they keep attacking Siniora,
it will be open war with Hamadeh as well. At the end of this
heated debate, the cabinet unanimously approved all seven
points of Siniora's Rome speech.

ROME WAS "GOOD"
--------------

¶4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked Hamadeh how the Rome
conference went on July 26. Hamadeh replied that there were
"good side conversations," especially Siniora's discussion
with Secretary Rice. The Russians wanted an immediate
cease-fire, while the British and Germans were unclear.
Hamadeh described the French non-paper as confusing, but with
some good elements.

¶5. (C/NF) Hamadeh also talked to Saad Hariri. Hariri
reported that the Saudis had told him that the king salutes
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Hamadeh advised Hariri not to
return to Lebanon at this time. "I told him that he would be
met at Qoraytem by 20,000 refugees begging for food," said
Hamadeh. Hamadeh later commented that Hariri was most
deceived by Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.

BEIRUT 00002490 002 OF 002

Michel Aoun, too, was deceived but he has no where to go.
Aoun and Hizballah are now asking for a "war government,"
according to Hamadeh.

CEASE-FIRE AND BEYOND
---------------------

¶6. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed Hamadeh on the proposals
for a cease-fire. Hamadeh was concerned about the Israeli
attitude. He noted that Israel had called up tens of
thousands of reservists. Hamadeh's EU sources told him that
a cease-fire was two to five weeks away. Going through some
of the points, Hamadeh commented that a 20 km buffer zone in
southern Lebanon would mean that a Shia militia would be in
Mount Lebanon and then there would be civil war. The buffer
zone must be for all of Lebanon, Hamadeh asserted. Hamadeh
agreed that the GOL must request a multi-national
stabilization force.

¶7. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked Hamadeh how would the GOL
actualize its calls to enforce sovereignty over all of
Lebanon. Hamadeh replied that the GOL and LAF would demand
only Hizballah's rockets and other heavy weaponry. The GOL
would not worry about small arms, such as AK-47 assault
rifles, since everyone in Lebanon is armed. There would be
three options for Hizballah's rockets: 1) send them back to
Iran and Syria, 2) give to the LAF, 3) give them to the
international stabilization force. Hamadeh speculated that
Hizballah would never support option 3, and option 2 would be
an embarrassment for the LAF, because then it would have to
create a new rocket forces unit to operate weapons it is not
accustomed to using. The Ambassador pressed Hamadeh on why
the GOL had not already disarmed Hizballah under the
international support of UNSCR 1559 and 1680. Hamadeh
answered that with 1559, Lebanon was in "intensive care," and
with 1680 March 14 had made a mistake by allowing Hizballah
to join the government.

¶8. (C/NF) Finally, Hamadeh reported that the Iranian
Embassy had tried to put an antenna in the middle of the
renowned archaeological ruins at Baalbeck. "We stopped them
by force," he claimed.
FELTMAN